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Abstract
In recent decades, species diversity has been greatly reduced within agro-ecosystems, although
political efforts to protect biodiversity exist (Batàry et al., 2015; Pe’er et al., 2014). The aim of
this study is to show the spatial effects of long-term farming decisions regarding field and farm
sizes in order to improve political impact analyses on biodiversity protection. The concept of
socio-ecological resilience has a systemic and dynamic view that considers several interrelated
scales and domains. Changes in one domain-scale combination might trigger others and lead to
an irreversible regime shift throughout the whole socio-economic system (Kinzig et al., 2006)
that is often less desired by society (Matthews and Selman, 2006). By applying this concept,
our economic model creates relationships with other domains in order to get a comprehensive
view of the socio-ecological system of the case study. In a sequence of linear mixed integer and
non-linear programming models it covers spatial and temporal dimensions of structural change
processes by considering economies of size. Farmers of three different farm types decide on
their livestock production, the cultivation of crops and flowering strips, as well as their field and
farm sizes. Using our innovative approach, the cropping and field size results were spatially
translated via GIS. Based on the resulting maps, three different spatial biodiversity indicators were
calculated and analyzed. The model was applied to a small municipality within intensively used
agricultural lands in Hesse and tested three alternate political incentive schemes. Two of them
were inspired by the new CAP reform 2020 and the results showed that for our case study, both
were ineffective with respect to habitat quality. Moreover, the new CAP reform even accelerated
structural change processes and led to a more homogeneous landscape with larger fields and fewer
farms. In the third policy design, alleviation of structural change and the establishment of many
more semi-natural habitats through incentive-based payment schemes led to higher levels of biotic
diversity. Dairy farmers quit the agricultural sector in all simulated futures. This had impacts on
the labour market and might influence population dynamics in rural areas. The interplay of spatial
scales may shift dynamic agro-ecosystems into other ones, where they might be locked in and
less resilient against perturbations (Walker et al., 2004). Therefore, political impact analyses need
to consider economic long-term decisions at the farm scale and their spatial meaning at the field
scale. Both scales interact and have impacts on the landscape scale.
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Chapter 1.
Introduction
1.1. Loss of species diversity in agricultural landscapes
‘Where have all the flowers gone?’ is the beginning of an American pop song written by Peter
Seeger and later translated into German known under the title ‘Weißt du wo die Blumen sind?’.
The song is against war in which, after flowers, girls, men, soldiers, and finally the graveyards also
disappear. Although the topic of this work is somewhat different from war, the song text reveals
some inspiring notions. It indicates that at the beginning of a horrible development, aesthetic
values, having a deep meaning for individual sensations, vanish first and have to make way for
overriding aims. The view of cultural landscapes are often shaped by aesthetic, romantic, and
historical ideas and therefore inherit high cultural values. However, when taking a walk through
rural areas where agricultural production dominates land use, these ideas and expectations are of-
ten not met. Instead of enjoying the sound of busy insects, singing birds, or the beauty of plentiful
butterflies and sweet-smelling flowers while walking along naturally shaped ditches surrounded
by alley trees and idyllic lush pastures and cornfields, agrarian deserts with monoculture and only
a few natural landscape elements that provide shelter and food for a diverse fauna open up. What
we often actually smell is diesel from big machinery, pesticides, and fertilizer, giving space only
for the intended and economically valuable crops.
Over the last decades, one third of the breeding bird species have disappeared from German
landscapes, and farmland birds are affected most severely (Wahl et al., 2015). Besides birds,
populations of other species also continue to decrease. As an example, Sorg et al. (2013) found
out that the biomass of fluctuating insects declined by more than 75% between 1989 and 2013 in
a nature conservation area near Krefeld, which is close to the border of the Netherlands. Insects
not only deliver essential ecosystem services such as pollination or pest control but also serve
as fodder for birds and other predators. As another example, in central Germany, the regional
species pool of vascular plants declined by 23% since 1950 (Meyer et al., 2013). Mammals are
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also affected by high extinction rates. The population of hares has declined by 50% within the
last ten years (Wildtierschutz Deutschland e.V., 2015). The list of species extinction is long and
cannot be presented here. There is a general trend to biotic homogenization, which means that
specialists are gradually displaced by generalists with yet unknown impacts on future ecological
and evolutionary processes (Julliard et al., 2004; Olden et al., 2004).
First countermeasures for decreasing environmental quality and its associated biodiversity
loss in Europe were already implemented on behalf of the MacSharry reform of the common
agricultural policy (CAP) in 1992 in the shape of so called agri-environmental schemes (AES). At
the same time, CAP reforms promoted farm productivity and a higher efficiency through farm
modernization (Burrell, 2009). This endeavor is grounded in increasing competition pressures
originating from liberalization processes that are advanced by the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Whilst political countermeasures against environmental degradation failed (Kleijn et al.,
2006), farm productivity goals were reached by utilizing economies of size (EoS). Larger fields
lead to lower costs and thus increase productivity (Johnston and Mellor, 1961). Hötker and
Leuschner (2014) hold agricultural field consolidation accountable for many habitat type changes,
which led to an intended homogeneity and thus simplification of landscapes. The main reasons
for biodiversity losses are agricultural intensification (Hendrickx et al., 2007; Bengtsson et al.,
2005; Tscharntke et al., 2005; Fuller et al., 2005), the loss of extensively used grassland, fallow
ground, other habitat types (Settele et al., 2010; Benton et al., 2003; Sanderson et al., 2009; Batàry
et al., 2010; Cornulier et al., 2010; Wahl et al., 2015), and the decline of landscape heterogeneity
(Hendrickx et al., 2007; Sanderson et al., 2009; Batàry et al., 2010; Vandermeer, 2011; Tscharntke
et al., 2011; Doxa et al., 2012).
The new ‘CAP towards 2020’ reform seems to put a high priority on environmental issues
(European Commission, 2013). However, in the public debate the new reform is discussed
controversially. There is a lot of concern that the new CAP reform follows a green-washing
strategy (Matthews, 2013), which would imply that the European Commission is sustainable
with respect to their mission to be steeled for market competition without being serious about
environmentally destructive economies. In any case, improving ecosystem services and species
diversity has not yet been effectively addressed by the CAP reforms (Batàry et al., 2015; Pe’er
et al., 2014). Against warnings of the German scientific advisory board for biodiversity and
genetic resources to reduce landscape elements such as hedges, natural habitats, field strips, or
fallow land to less than 7% of the agricultural area (Gerowitt et al., 2012), the new ‘CAP towards
2020’ reform planned only 5% of these semi-natural habitats, which are implemented as so called
‘ecological focus areas’ (EFAs). On these EFAs, certain crop types and cropping management
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practices are even allowed1. The German advisory board further emphasized the importance of
diversifying agricultural production (ibid.). Especially with respect to climatic changes, diverse or
mosaic landscapes that offer habitat requirements for species are urgently needed. In earlier times,
temperature changed in comparable dimensions, and species could react easily either through
dispersion or through microclimatic variations. Nowadays habitat fragmentation hampers these
strategies and climatic change could in fact be fatal for biodiversity (Pearce-Higgins et al., 2015).
Following the new crop diversity strategy of the ‘CAP towards 2020’ reform, in most regions
not many farmers are supposed to change their crop rotation schemes (European Commission,
2016). For example, in the Wetterau county in central Germany, which is an agriculturally
intensified area, the main crops in 2010 were wheat (45%), rapeseed (13%), and barley (7%)
(Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012j). The most intensively producing municipality within
the Wetterau county cultivates 51% wheat, 16% sugar beets and 11% rapeseed as main crops.
Even there farmers easily fulfill the new crop diversification plans of the EC council without being
forced to change their usual crop rotation schemes. Similar criticism arose for EFAs. A new study
of Lakner and Bosse (2016) showed that the implementation of EFAs has high deadweight effects.
Academics have been developed sustainability indicators with the aim to improve natural
resource management and policy (Woodhouse et al., 2000). However, by means of effectiveness,
resource management ought to change from a rather relativistic to an absolute view including
absolute limits. The gap between what is known to be done in order to improve the allocation of
natural resources and natural life-supporting systems, and what has actually been done rises, and
normative aspects of humans’ impacts on the ecological system should not be excluded from the
scientific agenda. Small political steps in the right direction are positive but won’t improve the
situation and won’t stop the system from collapsing (Fischer et al., 2007).
First political attempts to set absolute limits on critical biodiversity thresholds for Germany were
made in 2010 by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and
Nuclear Safety (BMBU). The BMBU (2010) summarized all catastrophic phenomena regarding
biodiversity losses on the basis of several indicators describing the status of flora and fauna. They
found that eleven of thirteen biodiversity indicators are far beyond what is required to reach the
desired biodiversity goals of the CBD.
1Annex X of the supplementing Regulation (EU) No. 1307/2013 of the European Parliament
3
1. Introduction
1.2. Research objectives
The aim of our study is to analyze spatial impacts of political incentive schemes. Using GIS, we
seek to show local landscape dynamics induced by farmers’ decision making and the impacts on
biodiversity. Within the ecological impact assessment, we focus on pollinators such as bees who
deliver important ecosystem services. The spatial representation of farmers’ decision making is
characterized by the following:
• field and farm sizes.
• cropping changes.
• participation in environmental measurements in the mode of flowering strips.
Our case study is a municipality within an intensified agricultural area in Hesse, Germany. Par-
ticularly in intensified areas, political measurements to enhance biodiversity in agro-ecosystems
are not effectively implemented (Batàry et al., 2015). Temporal planning plays a crucial role in
political targeting since long-term processes may undermine biodiversity goals (Beunen et al.,
2013). Therefore, we take into account structural change as a slow but concurrent social and
economic process. It will be modeled by considering incentives to use economies of size.
This leads us to the hypothesis that the new CAP 2020 reform does not match with the goal of
enhancing biodiversity due to structural change within the study site. Our research questions are
further formulated as follows:
1. To what extent is the socio-ecological system of our case study influenced by the new CAP
2020 reform?
2. How efficient is the CAP 2020 reform with respect to the intended European biodiversity
targets within the study site?
3. Is a restructure of governmental payments in order to improve biodiversity protection within
the research area superior?
The research questions are further divided into several secondary questions, which we will
address before we set up our conceptual and analytical framework. They are summarized in the
following:
1. Why is it necessary to sustain biotic diversity within agricultural farmlands?
4
1. Introduction
2. Which processes within socio-ecological systems need to be considered for governmental
impact assessments on biotic diversity?
3. How can farmers’ decisions technically be linked with the field and landscape level?
1.3. Study structure
Chapter two starts with theoretical concepts about the connectivity between biodiversity and
human well-being. It elaborates on resilience thinking since we regard agricultural systems as
being part of social and cultural systems. Since we emphasize biodiversity protection, resilience
thinking within socio-ecological systems forms the conceptual and analytical framework of our
study. The following part of the chapter covers our methodological background. It summarizes
philosophies of landscape-oriented agricultural modeling approaches that strive to assess govern-
mental impacts on human-environmental systems and leads to a synthesis upon which our applied
modeling approach is based. In the last part of the chapter we summarize the common agricultural
policy (CAP) reform towards 2020 in short.
Chapter three is dedicated to our research area. It outlines the socio-ecological system of our
case study with respect to the conceptual framework of the previous chapter. In doing so, it depicts
the ecological, socio-cultural, and economic domain of the case study. Afterwards, an overview
of the agricultural production system is given. It builds the data foundation for our mathematical
model.
In chapter four our mathematical model is finally described in detail. The first section starts
with explanations regarding the model content as well as the programming language used. The
mathematical model formulations are presented in the second section. Our three alternate political
incentive schemes are delineated therein. They are aligned towards the CAP 2020 reform and
other more radical policy suggestions. The third section covers the description of our chosen
biodiversity indicators that we will apply to measure changes in biodiversity in order to assess the
political impacts of our three different policy designs.
Chapter five gives an overview of the model results. Results are evaluated with respect to our
analytical framework and are set in relation to findings of other authors. After that, simulated
spatial land use patterns are visualized and presented. They form the sandbox for our spatially
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explicit biodiversity indicator calculations, which are analyzed at the end of the chapter.
In chapter six, we classify our findings in a broader context and contrast them with respect to
our conceptual framework. Further clues on changes in biotic diversity due to political control
within the study site are given here. Thereafter we outline methodological issues within the
given framework conditions. At the end of this chapter, research needs and model proposals are
elaborated.
The last chapter summarizes our work and gives final conclusions.
6
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Chapter 2.
State of the art and model
frameworks
This chapter is concerned with theoretical foundations of human-environmental systems and
practical sides of their modeling applications. In the first section, theoretical concepts about
biodiversity and the connection with human well-being are depicted. Thereafter, resilience theory
within socio-ecological systems is considered. Based on the socio-ecological resilience theory, the
conceptual framework of our model has been developed. It leads us to our analytical framework
against which we are going to evaluate our model results (in chapter five). The fourth section
outlines the methodological background of landscape-oriented agricultural modeling approaches.
After a literature review that summarizes several modeling techniques, we develop our modeling
approach. It is a synthesis of the presented model approaches. The fifth section gives a short
overview of the new common agricultural policy (CAP) reform 2020. It delivers an orientation
for the development of three alternate policy schemes, which we will apply to our model.
2.1. Theoretical background
2.1.1. Biodiversity and human well-being
Academics involved in human-environmental disciplines often capture the impact of natural
resources and processes on human well-being through the concept of ecosystem services (ES)
established by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment founded in 2001. It considers nature as
an important and essential provider of basic living conditions from which humans benefit. The
intention of the ES concept was to operationalize essential natural processes for humans’ natural
resource use due to critical resource depletion and degradation processes occurring around the
globe. This ought to shift attention onto the preservation of natural resources and ecosystems
(Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). However, some conflicts with respect to definitions
7
2. State of the art and model frameworks
and the usefulness of the ES concept exist (De Groot et al., 2010). Mainly ecologists are critical
of the connotation that nature provides its services for humans. They would rather talk about
ecosystem functions that maintain the ecosystem and all living species therein. This directs the
focus onto the natural system as a whole, which operates due to biotic diversity (Spangenberg and
Settele, 2010).
Conceptual and methodological uncertainties about how to address natural systems and how to
connect ES with biodiversity remain (Kremen, 2005). This is mainly caused by big knowledge
gaps in underlying biological processes and due to interdisciplinary communication issues between
social and natural scientists when it comes to the valuation of ES (Bockstael et al., 1995; Noss,
2007; Jackson et al., 2007; Meinard and Grill, 2011). Nevertheless, there are agreements about the
supporting function of biotic diversity on food production and other ES, such as nutrient cycling,
pollination, pest control, and cultural recreation (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
Biodiversity as such is not easy to grasp (Duelli, 1997). The multidimensional notion of
biodiversity is reflected in a huge variety of indicators measuring biodiversity. One hundred
highly diverse indicators are nominated for the evaluation of the 2020 goals of the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Pereira et al., 2013). By increasing one of these indicators,
another might decrease (Mouysset et al., 2012). Most attention and protection is given to
charismatic species. The decision about which biodiversity indicator to take depends on certain
basic framework conditions of the study under investigation and is additionally influenced by
intrinsic values (Metrick and Weitzman, 1998)1. In order to overcome normative biases, other
ecological concepts with broader views have been developed. They have the notion of not knowing
everything about the functioning of ecosystems and the living species therein. The concept of
ecological memory, for example, considers the health of whole ecosystems and assumes that their
functioning maintains the provision of services upon which humans depend (Bengtsson et al.,
2003). The health of ecosystems strongly depends on regulatory processes, and the ability to
self-organize is the highest predictor for the delivery of ES (Müller, 2005; Kay, 1993).
Connected to ecosystem health are other concepts such as ecological integrity or resilience. Eco-
logical integrity as a general principle strives to prevent unspecific ecological risks by protecting
ecosystem patterns and processes (Barkmann et al., 2001). Ecological patterns and processes are
strongly interlinked and mutually adapted, which makes the system more efficient in generating
ES (Müller, 2005; MacCann, 2000; Ives and Carpender, 2007; Keesing et al., 2010; Tilman et al.,
2002). The older an ecosystem is, the more disparate biotic and abiotic patterns emerge. The more
numerous and diverse these patterns are, the more complex their interactions are and the higher
1This is then called the Noah’s Ark problem.
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the degree of information (Forman and Godron, 1986) is. Therefore, ‘[...] the appropriate level of
biodiversity is a necessary condition for the sustainability of any managed system’ (Perrings, 1998,
p. 514). This goes hand in hand with the insurance hypothesis claiming that high biodiversity
levels keep ecosystems functioning (Naeem and Li, 1997).
2.1.2. Resilience theory
The resilience theory evolved in the early eighties and was significantly shaped by C.S. Holling.
Holling (1973) challenged the usefulness of traditional equilibrium-oriented and quantitative
analyses of ecological systems. He suggested focusing on the behavior of ecological systems
and their elements. According to that, the total number of species or the change in numbers
should not be the focus, but rather what kind of conditions are needed for the probability of
species survival. Holling [ibid.] considered resilience and stability as two unique characteristics of
ecological systems as a result of evolutionary strategies and defines them as follows: ‘Resilience
determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability of these
systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist’
and: ‘Stability [...] is the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary
disturbance’ (Holling, 1973, p. 17).
Ecological systems can have high resilience, but a low stability and vice versa. The higher the
heterogeneity in space and time, the higher the resilience. Management approaches adapted to
the resilience theory need a shift in perspective since they do not predict the future in numbers of
species left. They rather assess the capacity to absorb and accommodate future events (Holling,
1973). Ecological models need to be open and consider heterogeneity in time and space where
unexpected events occur. Studies confirm that the lower the diversity of a system is, the lower the
capacity to recover and the lower the ecological resilience is (Bengtsson et al., 2003).
Gunderson and Holling (2001) supplemented the resilience theory with the concept of adaptive
cycles. They claim that an ecological system passes through a typical two-dimensional cycle
visualized as a recumbent eight. The two dimensions are stored capital and connectedness.
Depending on the starting point and direction, four phases follow upon each other: (a) an
exploitation phase, in which stored capital and connectedness are low but increasing, (b) a
conservation phase, where stored capital and connectedness are highest, (c) a release phase, where
stored capital decreases to the utmost and connectedness drops, and (d) a reorganization phase,
where the stored capital again accumulates, having a low connectedness. As such, the resilience
theory is free of normative aspects. It tries to quantify the state of an ecosystem and whether the
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ecosystem remains in that state, or how far it is from switching into another one (Brand and Jax,
2007).
In social, economical, and environmental science, resilience theory is often mixed up with the
normative concept of sustainability and is further used in a broader perspective in order to to
analyze socio-ecological systems at multiple scales (Cumming, 2011; Folke, 2006). Due to its
use in several scientific disciplines, a clear distinction between ecological resilience and social-
ecological resilience has to be made. Ecological resilience is a well and precisely defined concept
for applications in ecological science. On the contrary, socio-ecological resilience, which is used
in interdisciplinary studies, does not claim to be quantifiable and has a rather vague conceptual
framework including normative connotations (Brand and Jax, 2007).
2.1.3. Socio-ecological resilience
Matthews and Selman (2006) used resilience thinking to combine human and natural aspects by
focusing on the landscape as a multifunctional and holistic entity that underlies intrinsic dynamic
and cyclic changes as described in Gunderson and Holling (2001). Landscapes are created
through human practices and particularly through agricultural land management. Therefore,
landscape changes are driven by natural pressures, social and economic needs, unconscious
actions (e.g. demographic trends or human-induced climatic changes), and human perceptions
of how landscapes should look. As a result, today’s cultural landscapes are characterized by
agricultural land intensification or rural abandonment, both leading to landscape homogenization
and perceived cultural value losses within the society. According to that, Matthews and Selman
(2006) differentiated between virtuous and vicious cycles, meaning desired and undesired basins
of attractions. They promoted modeling approaches that test changes in cultural landscapes before
they are altered. These modeling approaches should take into account economic, social, and
natural components interacting with each other. The authors suggested modeling policy impacts
and how far they stabilize socio-ecological systems or whether they lead them into other (virtuous)
basins of attraction.
The concept of socio-ecological resilience combines resilience theory with socio-ecological
systems. It has the capacity to shift the manner of thinking about economic-ecology dynamics
from an equilibrium paradigm to a broader view of system interactions at multiple scales that
operate around instead of at an equilibrium (Anderies et al., 2006). The concept of socio-ecological
resilience is in its infancy but bears lessons from management practices since it reveals important
parts of system dynamics. Socio-ecological systems (SES) are open systems that permanently
adapt to material, energy, and information flows. They are determined by human and natural
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components (Berkes et al., 2003).
Walker et al. (2004) borrowed the adaptive cycle concept of resilience theory and transferred it
to SES in order to contribute to sustainability research. They assumed that an SES passes through
dynamic development phases regarding stored capital and connectedness, i.e. without changes in
the framework conditions, and moves within its so-called basin of attraction. Precariousness as
one of the components making up a basin of attraction is defined as the distance of the current
state of the system from a threshold limiting the basin. The probability to cross a critical threshold
is determined by the resistance of a system, which can be understood as the depth component of
the basin. The level of the system’s (social) ability to control the components of a basin without
leading it to another one is defined as adaptability. Transformability is the capacity of a basin to
transform into a totally new and desired system. Within a so-called stability landscape, several
basins that are separated by their thresholds can exist. Scales above or below a considered variable
influence the dynamic behavior of SES, which is referred to as panarchy.
SESes need clear definitions of their state variables with regard to location and level as well
as their connections. In order to measure changes in the resilience of a socio-ecological system,
a reference system is needed (Cumming, 2011). However, numbers for the components of a
stability landscape are often not quantifiable or even understood completely, and the location
as well as thresholds of a current state (regime) are not known. Thresholds are hard to define
since they underlie altering processes of slowly changing variables at higher levels of ecological
self-organization, on stochastic events outside of the system, and on dynamics within and between
the sub-systems (Scheffer and Carpenter, 2003; Carpenter, 2003). Interrelations across ecological,
social, and economical domains may lead to changes in or passings of thresholds (Walker and
Meyers, 2004). Every kind of connectivity changes within ecosystems affect the socio-ecological
resilience of a system. A full description of an SES and its current location within a basin of
attraction according to its components in order to measure the socio-ecological resilience is
challenging and has not yet been reached (Cumming, 2011). More detailed information is needed
in order to understand forces and feedbacks that might trigger regime shifts. Models that take
into account network structures at multiple scales and domains are required in order to gain more
insights into the dynamics of SES (Anderies et al., 2006).
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Figure 2.1.: A: Domain-scale combinations and their interaction possibilities (arrows). B: Critical
domain-scale interactions of four case studies (solid lines indicate cascading effects
in all case studies, whereas the dotted lines indicate cascading effects in two case
studies) (Kinzig et al., 2006).
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2.2. Conceptual framework
The systemic view regarding the delivery of ES is one strategic level of implementing a political
impact assessment within our study. It requires a holistic understanding of human-environmental
systems. The other strategic level of conducting our political impact assessment refers to the
systematic and technical procedure in which we focus on the spatial translation of farmers’ short
and long-term decisions. This procedure will be described in more detail in section 2.4.2 after
a comprehensive literature review of practical modeling applications in section 2.4.1. In the
following, conceptual framework suggestions of socio-ecological systems are presented. These
conceptual frameworks deliver practical guidance to define thresholds and system components of
our case study.
With respect to the research questions, we test whether the new CAP 2020 reform is capable
of leading the system of our case study into a desired basin of attraction. As described above, a
switch from one to another basin of attraction is determined by the resilience of an SES. Therefore,
a conceptual framework that allows one to operationalize resilience thinking is required. What has
been ‘desired’ is aligned to the German national indicator report of the BMBU (2015). According
to that report, only 66% of the biodiversity target within agricultural land was reached in 2008.
The political aim was to reach 100% by the year 2015. Newest results showed that in 2011, the
biodiversity indicator level had even decreased to 56% (BMBU, 2015). Since then the BMBU
has not released an updated version of the German national indicator report. We take these
numbers as a benchmark. Assuming that the target is reached at the one hundred percent mark,
biodiversity indicators need to increase at rather high rates in order to reach the biodiversity targets.
However, which variables drive the system into a desired state? Ecological and social systems
are intertwined, and the conditions of resilient systems need to be examined. The socio-ecological
resilience concept is targeted to deliver a holistic view of human-environmental systems (Fischer
et al., 2007; Perrings, 1998). With the concept of socio-ecological resilience, several domains and
scales of a system are addressed (Walker et al., 2004). They are delineated in the following.
Kinzig et al. (2006) used the socio-ecological resilience theory to develop a conceptual frame-
work that focuses on regime shifts and cascading effects. They considered interrelated scales with
respect to their ecological, economic, and sociocultural domains. Within a domain, influences on
the dynamics of SES at three scales can occur:
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• small scale (patches).
• the medium scale (farms, managed entities).
• the large scale (regions).
All possible interactions between scales and domains are depicted in figure 2.1 (A). Within
one domain-scale combination (gray box), changes can occur without leading to a regime shift.
However, if a critical threshold is reached, domain-scale regime shifts can induce a regime shift in
the whole system, which results in a new basin of attraction.
The authors characterized the current state of a system with a few main variables that were
defined by simplistic thresholds. Thresholds were, for example, a certain commodity system, the
level of farm debt, the size of the rural population, or the area of soil salinity. For practical reasons,
the systems under investigation was defined by a manageable number of state variables. These
variables determined the current location of the SES within a basin of attraction. If a threshold was
reached, a regime shift followed. The authors defined a regime shift as ‘[...] any drastic change in
the properties of a system resulting from smaller perturbations or smooth changes in independent
controlling variables [...]’ (Kinzig et al., 2006, pp.2). In analyzing several case studies, they found
that at most five (of nine) domain-scale combinations occurred in which regime shifts took place
(see figure 2.1 B). This amount of regime shifts always led to a new regime of the whole SES and
was less desired than the regime before and irreversible (hysteresis effect). The authors further
found out that a single domain-scale regime shift can lead to a cascading effect, resulting in a new
basin of attraction. Interrelated ecological regime shifts took place at the ‘patch’ scale, whereas
economic regime shifts happened at the medium (‘farm’) scale. Regime shifts at the regional
scale, however, occurred in all three domains. Large-scale changes within the socio-cultural
domain have been much faster than large-scale changes within the ecological system. Therefore,
feedbacks from social systems onto ecological systems might appear to be time delayed. On the
other hand, small-scale changes within the socio-cultural system have often been slow. In order
to understand the behavior of SES, short as well as long-term perspectives of socio-ecological
systems need to be taken into account (Kinzig et al., 2006).
According to these findings we focus on the critical domain-scale combinations of figure 2.1
(B). The following scales are addressed:
• the field scale by recognizing of field sizes, which determine field margins.
14
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• the farm scale by taking into account farmers’ decisions on cropping patterns, farm and
field sizes, as well as the participation in environmental measurements in form of flowering
strips.
• the landscape scale by considering the interaction between several farms and farm types as
well as by assessing impacts on biotic diversity.
In order to capture long-term effects on biodiversity, structural change processes as slowly
changing variables within the economic domain are also considered. The following domains are
addressed:
• the ecological domain via the calculation of spatial biodiversity indicators.
• the economic domain by simulating farm optimizations.
• the socio-cultural domain by taking into account farm type developments and labour
possibilities within the agricultural sector.
Equipped with these aspects and the basic conceptual framework of socio-ecological resilience,
our study shows possible future cascading effects of policy changes leading to regime shifts
before they actually happen. A regime shift within a domain and scale is defined as a change
in the respective variables so that a critical threshold is reached. These thresholds are dynamic
and are affected by the state of other variables below or above the considered variable (Walker
et al., 2004). Due to knowledge and information gaps, science has lacked adequate models to
identify and define critical thresholds until now. Arbitrary threshold assumptions are made based
on available data, and focus is put on the regime shifts that follow (Kinzig et al., 2006; Cumming,
2011). In the next section, we will define our critical thresholds.
2.3. Analytical framework
The economic argument at the farm scale is a slowly changing process of structural change
induced by the exploitation of economies of size (EoS). EoS are defined as an average (fixed)
cost reduction per unit of production due to an increase in farm size (Duffy, 2009). Larger farms
have lower per unit costs than smaller farms (Chavas and Barham, 2007). In order to increase
labour productivity, technical progress is needed. Therefore, EoS are often accompanied by
capital-intensive investments and a lower complexity in production steps. This also includes
spatial attributes such as field structures (Chavas, 2008). EoS have successfully increased land
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Figure 2.2.: Potential regime shifts at different domains and scales as well as interactions among
them. Boxes represent potential regime shifts, while arrows show interrelations
among them. The black box indicates the starting point of our analysis. Gray boxes
indicate variables with defined critical thresholds related to our case study. The figure
is adapted from Kinzig et al. (2006).
and labour productivity through land consolidation and farm specialization (Johnston and Mellor,
1961; Chavas, 2008). Expensive machinery is only profitable if scale enlargements are feasible
(De Roest et al., 2017). This is the starting point of our analysis.
Figure 2.2 summarizes the potential regime shifts of our case study and their interactions. These
are simplistically formulated potential shifts in a certain direction (e.g. from ‘high’ to ‘low’).
With this figure we want to show interrelations among the observed domain-scale combinations
and link them with biodiversity, which is our target value. We identified seven domain-scale
combinations that may directly or indirectly affect biodiversity. For three of these combinations,
we defined critical threshold levels. They are indicated as gray boxes and are subsequently defined
as driving variables for which we will evaluate their trajectories.
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Kinzig et al. (2006) have deducted critical thresholds from historical observations. In one of the
case studies2 analyzed, they found that a critical threshold within the socio-cultural domain was
reached when the number of farming enterprises declined from 23,000 to 8,000 between the late
1960s and 2003. In parallel, from the beginning of the 1970s, consolidation and amalgamation of
farms took place, which led to increasing land and water degradations (Walker and Salt, 2006,
chapter 2). At around the same time in Germany, between 1975 and 1990, the indicator for biotic
diversity on farmland of the national report fell from the one hundred percent mark by around
20%. It arrived at a state far below the target value from where it could not recover up to now
BMBU (2015). Between 1979 and 1991, the amount of farms in Germany reduced by around
30% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). On the basis of these historical values and the case study
mentioned above, we define the critical threshold with respect to the amount of farms. The critical
threshold is reached if one-third of the farms of our case study close down.
As noted before, farm growth is the starting point of our analysis (see the black box of figure
2.2). On the one hand, if farms grow bigger (due to EoS), field sizes increase at the ‘patch’ scale.
The critical threshold at the ‘patch’ scale is reached if average field sizes increase more than
double. Unfortunately, neither in general nor at the local level was information about historical
changes in field sizes available. However, farm size increased by 83% between 1979 and 1991
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). Brady et al. (2012) and others assumed a correlation between
farm and field size. By including an additional buffer (of 17%) this value seems to be legitimated.
The critical threshold at the farm scale is linked to the degree of specialization. In Hesse,
the specialization of farms is already high (Berger, 2012). If farms become more specialized
while mixed farm types disappear, fewer crop types might be cultivated at the ‘patch’ scale. As
specialization processes weaken the economic resilience of farms due to greater risk exposures
(De Roest et al., 2017), each loss of farm type crosses the critical threshold at the farm scale.
Regionally, both effects at the economic ‘patch’ scale may lead to lower landscape heterogeneity
and therefore reduce biodiversity within the ecological domain. A less heterogeneous landscape
as well as low biodiversity may also lead to a reduction in rural population since the landscape is
less attractive. It no longer represent cultural values (Manos et al., 2013). If farms close down
due to farm size changes, at the regional scale, the amount of rural population might decrease
(Knickel et al., 2017). By using EoS and simplifying farm structures with respect to their types,
less farm labour might be required since fewer farms remain as potential employers. This, too,
may lead to a reduction of the rural population.
2‘The Western Australian Wheatbelt’
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With this systemic view of the three different domains and scales, we try to get deeper insights
into background processes that occur within the landscape of our study site. In considering
interrelated regime shifts, we will delineate possible scenarios in the case study that depict
different political incentive schemes.
2.4. Methodological background
The theoretical background covers the conceptual and analytical framework of our study. It
combines a systematic approach with several domains and scales and is the first strategic level
of conducting a comprehensive political impact assessment. The second strategic level for the
political impact assessment focuses on the temporal and spatial scale. Therein the methodological
base for our case study is developed, which will be outlined in the following sections.
2.4.1. Landscape-oriented agricultural modeling approaches
Interdisciplinary modeling approaches associated with agricultural production are widely used in
human-environmental research (Kissinger and William, 2010). A huge amount of applications
exist and to review all of them would be far beyond the scope of our work. Reviews can be found
in Rossing et al. (2007), where they focused on integrative modeling approaches, in Barthel et al.
(2012) with the focus on climate change and water resources, in Kragt et al. (2016) with the
main emphasis on bio-economic modeling, or in Kanter et al. (2016) who summarized all kinds
of trade-off analyses within the agro-ecological context regarding their tools, parameters, and
methods.
Bio-economic farm models stress economic farming decisions and the effects on ecosystems,
which enable them to assess policy changes and technological developments (Jones et al., 2016).
There is a vast variety with respect to the spatial scale (from the global to the local and even the
field scale), the farming decision model type (e.g. linear programming or agent-based models),
and the temporal scale (different types of stochastic and dynamic models) (Janssen and van
Ittersum, 2007).
The following sections are dedicated to applied economic process-based agricultural modeling
approaches, which put the landscape at the core of their research. In order to narrow the literature
review, we focus on economic models being part of some selected interdisciplinary modeling
approaches mainly conducted in Germany. We outline the differences between the chosen
approaches with respect to their agricultural system modeling and particular attention is given to
the spatial scale.
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Figure 2.3.: Our methodological framework in comparison to the ProLand model.
2.4.1.1. ProLand model
As part of a project on the development of land use concepts for peripheral regions3, the Justus-
Liebig University of Giessen employed more than 30 researchers from thirteen institutes working
either in the Faculty of Biology and Chemistry or the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Nutritional
Sciences, and Environmental Management. From 1997 to 2005, the Insititute of Agricultural
Business Operations, one of the latter faculties, was commissioned to develop a spatially explicit
land use model in order to predict land use patterns with respect to technological and political
developments: the ProLand model (Möller et al., 1998). The Aar watershed in central Germany
was taken as the research area, representing a marginal region that faces land abandonment and
demographic decline. Several scenarios about the effects of policy interventions or changes in
socio-economic, technical, or natural conditions were applied (Weinmann et al., 2006; Schroers,
2005; Möller et al., 2000). For further calculations, the resulting land use maps were transferred to
abiotic and biotic models (Weber et al., 2001; Fohrer et al., 2002). Waldhardt et al. (2010) applied
the ProLand model to the Wetterau region in Hesse. They used ProLand in order to calculate
normative scenarios based on the results of ecological models.
3Sonderforschungsbereich 299: Landnutzungskonzepte für periphere Regionen.
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ProLand produces agricultural and silvicultural land use patterns based on bio-physical and
socio-economic characteristics. With respect to graphical implementation, ProLand is a GIS-
based4, comparative-static, and deterministic economic simulation model that is suitable for raster
or vector elements as decision units. Depending on the size of the research area, it works with
25 m by 25 m grid cells (Weinmann et al., 2006). For each grid cell, it chooses the optimal land
use by maximizing the land rent. This procedure, however, causes friction since the land rent
theory does not represent the actual value of the land (Czyzewski and Matuszczak, 2016). There
is evidence that agricultural subsidies, for example, increase land rents and reward land owners
instead of farmers (Patton et al., 2008; Ciaian and Kancs, 2012). Intrinsic land values such as
recreational and visual values partly determine land rents (Wasson et al., 2013; Delbeq et al.,
2014). Taking the land rent as a single decision criterion for land use does not seem appropriate.
By working at the regional scale on maximizing land rent per pixel, the modeling design abstracts
from the agricultural farm level. The farm level, though, is the crucial scale where decisions are
made and is affected by individual resource availabilities and socio-economic factors (Kenny,
2017)5. In ProLand, interrelations between farms and microeconomic coordination processes
within farming homesteads that drive land management are not considered. The authors argue that
this is necessary for stressing spatial aspects and for improving interfaces with natural science
models (Schroers, 2005). However, we challenge this argument and have developed a model that
integrates economical and spatial land use decisions by taking into account the field, farm, and
regional scale.
Figure 2.3 shows a comparison between our framework and the methodological framework
of ProLand. In ProLand, simulations take place at the field level, where revenue and cost
calculations on the base of socio-economic and biophysical factors lead to a certain land use type
that maximizes the land rent within each grid cell (Weinmann, 2002; Schroers, 2005). In Fohrer
et al. (2002), different field sizes were taken as input parameters for modeling production costs
with the ProLand model. Farming decisions on field sizes were not simulated, though. On the
contrary, our approach transfers spatial landscape characteristics into spatial decision units6 and
operates at the field, farm, and landscape scale. The spatial decision units have certain land uses
(cropping patterns), field sizes defined by ai × bi), and farm sizes (ai ×Bj). ai of Fig. 2.3 defines
the length of a field and bi the field width. Based on mathematical optimization routines, we use an
iterative process to calculate field and farm sizes separately but not independently from each other.
First of all, the model calculates the optimal land use and field sizes under the given (predefined)
4Geographical information system
5Farm models will be described in the next sections.
6For all calculations, ArcGIS from ESRI group is used.
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farm sizes. After that, our model optimizes the farm sizes under the given (preprocessed) land use
decisions. How this will be conducted and which model outputs will be transferred to the next
iteration will be shown in section 2.4.2 after a detailed description of the farm scale. Therefore, it
is necessary to look into the literature on farm models, based on which we will develop our model.
2.4.1.2. Farm models
Farm models can be used in interdisciplinary modeling approaches that investigate human-
environmental interrelations in taking into account farmers’ decisions (Jones et al., 2016). In
order to simulate farmers’ decision making at the farm level, mathematical programming models
are often used (Wossink et al., 1992). Simple linear programming models maximize a linear
function by calculating the optimal combination of a set of variables subject to linear inequality
and equality resource constraints (Dantzig, 1963).
According to Hazell and Norton (1986, pp. 10-11) a simple linear programming farm model
that maximizes the total gross margin Z can be written as follows:
Z =
n∑
j=1
cjxj = max! (2.1)
such that
bi ≥
n∑
j=1
aijxj (2.2)
and
xj ≥ 0, (2.3)
where
• xj is the level of land use activity for n numbers of activities (j = 1, 2, . . . , n).
• cj is the gross margin of one unit of the jth activity.
• aij is the demand of the ith resource required to produce one unit of the jth activity.
• bi is the resource endowment for m numbers of resources (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m).
Depending on the model complexity, several variables with more than one index can be opti-
mized in order to maximize the target value. The elements of i and j cover the components of any
optimization problem. In GAMS7, the modeling software we used, they are summarized as ‘sets’
7General Algebraic Modeling Software
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(Rosenthal, 2017).
One example of a spatially simple representation of land use is the ‘Landschaftsmodell Kraich-
gau’. It describes the effects of land management on the profitability of farms, soil erosion, nitrate
depletion, and habitat quality according to different political scenarios. It was developed by
Dabbert et al. (1999). The approach includes socio-economic as well as biotic and abiotic aspects,
which were modeled by corresponding disciplines. As ProLand, it operated with a geographical
information system (GIS), which served as interface between the interdisciplinary modules of the
model complex. In order to unify data exchange, the spatial reference units of all models were 50
m by 50 m grid cells. The modeling concept was strongly influenced by landscape planning views,
emphasizing the visualization of results and scenarios at the spatial scale (Herrmann, 2000). The
economic module as part of the whole model complex was based on a comparative static linear
programming approach. It aggregated farms of several municipalities and calculated the optimal
land use decisions of the grouped (average) farmers. The land use results were allocated based on
biophysical or stochastic models (Dabbert et al., 1999). Aurbacher and Dabbert (2011) enhanced
the allocation of (economic) land use results with a Markov chain approach in combination with a
minimum cross entropy approach. In order to cover soil erosion variability, conventional farming
practices were extended by more environmentally friendly soil treatment practices, and nitrate
balances were computed based on land use results. As it is conventional in such optimization
models, maximization of total income of all aggregated farms was taken as an objective function.
Large areas were homogenized, which led to a high spatial imprecision regarding farm manage-
ment decisions and practices. Landscape and field structures were not considered at all. However,
within the same research area but for two smaller case studies, Aurbacher (2010) developed
a linear optimization model at the farm scale that took into account the field scale in order to
calculate production costs of different field shapes.
Kenny (2017, pp. 5) noted, that ‘[...] some element of spatially explicit mapping is especially
important for any farm model seeking to integrate considerations of natural capital.’ Since spatial
scales between socio-economic decisions and the provision of environmental services and biodi-
versity do not match in these kinds of modeling approaches (Mottet et al., 2005), environmental
effects such as carbon sequestration or groundwater strains were investigated (see for example
Barthel et al. (2012)). These ES do not occur within the same location where the actual agricultural
management takes place.
Several attempts to overcome these spatial mismatches were made with continuously improving
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results. One example is a spatial application of a linear programming model that was developed
by Kächele (1999). He showed that it is possible to connect economic land use results with
ecological models on a very accurate spatial scale if enough data is available. On behalf of a
project, the author developed a decision support system for stakeholders within the context of
severe conflicts between land users and conservationists. The research area was the German
national park ‘Lower Odra Valley’, where, along with total reservation areas without any human
interventions, grassland production mainly takes place. The study included 23 farms that cultivated
334 agricultural fields. A survey of all farms was conducted in order to gather information about
the location of each farmer’s fields and other production factors such as holding capacities, capital,
and contracts. The developed MODAM model (multiple objective decision support tool for
agroecosystem management) simulated the optimal amount and allocation of nature preservation
areas by considering their spatial allocation. The author applied multiple goal programming, and
economic income maximization was constrained by ecological preservation goals. The ecological
goals were a certain amount of land and connected area for conservation purposes. However,
the land belonged to farmers. In order to find the best solution, income losses of farmers were
minimized through spatial considerations of conservation land that farmers were forced to enact.
Each field was represented by a polygon of the underlying GIS-database, and land use scenarios
were visualized (see also Kächele and Dabbert (2002)).
The background of the MODAM model was very specific. For example, typical agri-environmental
schemes (AES) such as political conservation incentives were not implemented. Schönhart et al.
(2011) developed a spatially explicit farm model including AES and applied it to a small (550 ha)
research area in Austria. They used linear programming techniques in order to assess the cost
effectiveness of AES within their case study (in total 430 fields and 20 farms). For each farm,
land use activities were optimized with a mixed integer linear programming model chosen from
a pre-processed selection of crop rotations8 that caused certain effects on soil and climate. The
authors focused on landscape development and appearance, which is why fields were regarded as
landscape elements in their actual shape and location. By accounting for different land use types
such as crops, orchard meadows, and grasslands, and different intensification levels of these land
use types, they applied a Shannon-Wiener index in order to measure landscape heterogeneity. AES
were limited to management practices that reduce nitrogen loads, soil loss, and soil organic carbon
emissions to protect water and soil, and mitigate climate change. Happe et al. (2004) applied
another method. They used agent-based models to allocate land use results. In doing so, they
added information of land ownership and transportation costs in order to distribute land use results
8These crop rotations were based on historical observations.
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to pixels. The different approaches can be divided into top-down and bottom-up approaches.
While the latter approach requires high levels of information and data acquisition, the former
ones are often used to allocate land use results to larger areas. Only a few studies considered
field size changes, although farmed landscapes have experienced severe changes due to increasing
agricultural production units (Hötker and Leuschner, 2014).
The examples above showed that it is possible to conduct spatially explicit political impact
assessments based on farm models. However, these farm models did not consider interrelations
between farmers, and land use activities were the only driver of landscape changes. Our approach
considers structural change processes, and changes in farm and field sizes represent additional
aspects of landscape developments.
2.4.1.3. Agent-based models
Matthews and Selman (2006) suggest using agent-based models (ABMs) in order to to understand
underlying dynamic processes of socio-ecological systems. In ABMs the landscape can be seen as
a system that evolves out of the interaction of its users and components. It has no equilibrium state
that the system adapts or tends to (Kay et al., 1999). Furthermore, by linking the dynamics of farm
structures, ABMs cover important parts of structural change and landscape processes (Schouten
et al., 2013). Their inherit conceptual framework is based on spatial farm interconnections
(Verburg and Veldkamp, 2005). Parker et al. (2003) gave an overview of agent-based land use
models, and An (2012) summarized ABMs linked with coupled human and natural systems.
ABMs enable users to depict farms as heterogeneous entities with respect to different variables
such as capital, asset structure, contracts, management capacities, individual adoption costs, or
even to bounded rationality issues (Ligtenberg et al., 2001). Interrelations between farmers are
explicitly taken into account and directly influence the farmers’ behaviors (Verburg and Veldkamp,
2005). The advantages of these bottom-up farm behavior models are that - in theory - many
current and complex conditions regardless of the region can be integrated (An, 2012). When a
large number of individual farmers are chosen, a huge amount of data is necessary to run the
simulations and utilize these potentials (Murray-Rust et al., 2014). Another strength of applying
ABMs in agricultural economics is to show how differently heterogeneous farmers behave based
on similar external changes such as prices or political incentives. Therefore, the dynamics of
structural change can be delineated more adequately (Uthes et al., 2011).
An important cornerstone for ABM applications in landscape-related agro-ecological science
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was laid by Balmann and his working group at the Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development.
Balmann (1997) investigated the dynamics and complexity of structural change process within
the agricultural sector by working on path dependencies. In Balmann (1999), he showed how
sunk costs affect structural change and the implementation of economies of size in regions where
small family farms dominated large scale farms. These first modeling efforts served as a basis for
the development of the AgriPoliS model, which is used to show structural change processes. It
takes into account farm size changes, farm exits, and land use changes (Happe et al., 2004). In
AgriPoliS, farmers (agents) decide independently from each other on their production choices,
investments, and land rentals. They are connected through product and factor markets. Farming
decisions are modeled using linear programming tools such as multi-integer programming with
the objective of maximizing household income. AgriPoliS models the land rent market with
auction mechanisms through which it ties together all agents9.
Regarding space, AgriPoliS works with a stylistic landscape of grid cells with equally sized
plots, which can have different possible land use types (e.g. grassland, arable land, forest, or
roads). In addition to the land use structure, ownership and land quality attributes can be included.
Transportation costs are determined by the distance between the location of the farm and the
managed plot. In Happe et al. (2004), the farmsteads were randomly distributed, and transportation
costs were calculated with an Euclidean distance function.
AgriPoliS was applied to several (developed) regions, and research questions related to pol-
icy switches affecting farms in different manners creating varying adaptation strategies among
farmers (Balmann et al., 2001; Happe et al., 2006; Schnicke et al., 2007; Happe et al., 2008;
Uthes et al., 2011). Therein the focus was the complexity of agents (farmers) and their long-run
production adjustments. Brady et al. (2012) extended the AgriPoliS model in order to conduct a
spatially explicit nature conservation study. They focused on how policy affects farmers’ decisions
on land use differently depending on farm types and spatial heterogeneity. Furthermore, they
elaborated different effects on biodiversity and ecosystem services. The research area comprised
two low-intensive regions in Sweden. In the study, the field level was addressed through plots as
basic elements of an artificial landscape grid. The plots were kept constant during the simulations
and only ownership changed. Several plots of the same type (e.g. arable land) formed a land
block, which was later fixed and addressed in order to allocate cropping results. An algorithm
minimized costs by allocating each farmer’s crop production to fields, i.e. for minimizing produc-
tion costs. Therefore, the initially created farm blocks formed the spatial field size constraint of
the respective farmers. After the standard procedure of AgriPoliS, farm sizes changed subject
9For more information about land markets in ABMs, see Kellermann et al. (2008).
25
2. State of the art and model frameworks
to agents’ decisions, which led to field size changes. The authors assumed a positive correlation
between farm and field sizes. Together with a Shannon-Wiener index measuring the diversity of
land use types, field sizes formed a landscape indicator. The model was applied to three different
political scenarios: coupled production (Agenda 2000), decoupled production (CAP reform 2005),
and a reduction of DP by 30%. Results showed significant impacts on the landscape mosaic, bio-
diversity, and ecosystem services that differ between the regions. In a similar application, Happe
et al. (2011) investigated abiotic environmental effects. Both studies showed the importance of
considering complex interactions between farmers and the dynamics of structural change in order
to promote biodiversity and ES. Nonetheless, linear landscape elements as part of agricultural
fields were not considered. However, due to the use of grid cells, important linear landscape
elements such as field margins or strips along field edges are missing.
Linear landscape elements can serve as niches for certain species that contribute to the delivery
of ecosystem services within agricultural landscapes (Zhang et al., 2007; Davies and Pullin, 2007;
Hinsley and Bellamy, 2000). Therefore, spatial maps including such landscape elements are
required for biodiversity assessments at the regional scale (Van der Zanden et al., 2013; Meyer
et al., 2012). A lot of literature about the impact of the intensive margin of agricultural production
on biodiversity and ES are present but only few studies about the ’extensive’ margin exist (Rizzo
et al., 2013). Extensive margins of agricultural lands are supposed to comprise natural elements
and field sizes (Antle and McGuckin, 1993). Linear artificial landscape elements such as flowering
strips are often the only landscape structures in highly intensified agricultural areas (Bengtsson
et al., 2003). Although they provide habitat for insects and facilitate pollination (Geert et al., 2010)
we rarely see them. In order to account for potential insect and pollinator habitats, our model
includes the cultivation of flowering strips, implemented AES. According to HALM guidelines10,
flowering strips need to have at least a width of 5 m, a minimum area of 0.1 ha, and a maximum
area of 1 ha. Modeling such field characteristics requires a greater spatial awareness of the field
scale. In the following section, examples of optimization models that take into account spatial
field and landscape characteristics are presented.
2.4.1.4. Field and landscape pattern optimization models
Following suggestions of Hanf (1994), models with the focus on landscape patterns should
transform spatial units into decision units. Non-dimensional economic models are not sufficient
10Hessian program for agri-environmental and landscape measures (‘Hessisches Programm für Agrarumwelt- und
Landschaftspflegemaßnahmen’
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for modeling landscape interaction.
From this perspective, Wossink et al. (1998) searched for optimal wildlife conservation at
lowest costs. Their modeling approach included decision making at the farm level and the spatial
extent and location of nature conservation measures within fields (sprayed vs. unsprayed field
margins). They followed a landscape-centered spatial approach. The ecological benefits of
different disposals of unsprayed field margins were calculated and compared to the costs. Through
the assessment of an ecological network, a wildlife cost function at the landscape level was
delineated. The authors used a simplified and stylized landscape digitized with GIS, and for the
baseline scenario they randomly distributed crops and field margins. Normative scenarios were
developed in order to ensure species dispersion. By taking into account the economic preferences
of farmers, land use patterns for minimal costs were calculated. They found that selective control
of field margins through farmers’ preferences leads to win-win situations.
A French research team further developed a model appreciating this basic approach. They
investigated agricultural landscape changes and the impacts on biodiversity. With their approach,
both landscape appearance (e.g. landscape mosaic and networks) and dynamics on farm structure
(induced by policies) were addressed. The configuration and composition of certain landscape
elements (depending on the habitat of focal species) was used to assess population dynamics
(Gaucherel et al., 2010). The farm-based mathematical optimization model was linked to three
spatial scales: the field, farm, and landscape scale (Havlík et al., 2008).
The modeling approach was applied to intensively used farmland in France, where the abun-
dance of the Little Bustard (Tetrax tetrax) has decreased. The model first calculated the optimal
reserve for the Little Bustard and used the simulated landscape appearance as a normative scenario
in order to test how it can be achieved with lowest costs. Moreover, the authors developed
positive scenarios with political incentives for farmers and compared the outcomes in terms of
conservation achievement and governmental payments. The underlying economic model was a
mixed integer linear programming model, which optimized the sum of all farms’ gross margins
within a stylized landscape. Abiotic factors of each field (e.g. soil or slope) influenced farmers’
land use decisions. Each farm had a similar size with similar amounts of fields lying adjacent to
each other. The authors divided the farms into two different farm types: crop and mixed dairy
farms. The decision variables consisted of crop rotations. The political framework referred to the
CAP reform of 2003 with 10% obligatory set-aside area and the voluntary participation of farmers
in AES (permanent and temporary grassland and alfalfa production). The AES are possible habitat
elements for the Little Bustard. At the regional scale, the spatial extent of land use and habitat
measures determined the habitat quality and the conservation success of the Little Bustard. The
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spatial analysis was conducted using Ripley K and L functions, which count for a combination
of densities and distances of habitat patches. In another work, they focused on optimal policy
strategies in the form of contracts (Bamière et al., 2011) and auction schemes (Bamière et al.,
2013) in order to reach desired landscape structures.
In another alternative approach, Cong et al. (2016) investigated spatial aspects of farming
with respect to the provision of ecosystem services (ES). They assumed that farmers conserve
certain habitats on their fields purposely for the need of crop pollination, which increased the
yield up to a certain threshold. Habitat configuration and composition served as indicators for
crop pollination. Individual farmers were represented within a landscape of grid cells where each
farmer had the same size of land and amount of fields. Farmers had perfectly consolidated fields
and the same production conditions. The field was the smallest decision unit and was represented
by a grid cell. In order to model crop pollination, the optimization model included a feedback
loop that linked yields with pollination. The higher the distance between the field and the habitat
was, the less ‘yield’ was positively influenced. Since the parameters for yield effects originating
from the presence of pollinators are difficult to measure from an ecological point of view, yield
efficiency was changed in a sensitivity analysis. The authors calculated the optimal allocation of
habitat measures11 for individual farmers at the farm scale and compared the results to those at
the landscape scale, where they optimized the total profit of all farms.
Results showed that landscape management enhances the efficiency of ES management. Habitat
dispersion was much higher in the landscape management scenario than in the farm scale man-
agement scenario (individual farm optimization). At the farm scale, farmers aggregated habitat
measures in the very middle of their farmland so that they profit the most from ES provision. If
modeled at the landscape scale, habitat measures became more dispersed over the whole landscape.
Note that the quality of the ES provider (scale and mobility) effected the habitat configuration.
With their analysis, Cong et al. (2016) pointed out that synergies between habitat conservation
and agricultural production are too weakly considered in policy and landscape management.
Having the intention to promote biodiversity protection is not enough. The search for win-win
situations should be examined. The authors showed that habitat dispersion supports the provision
of some intermediate ecosystem services such as pollination or pest control but effects of other
ES were limited. Up to now, interactions between farmers as well as aspects of structural change
were not considered in the models. Practical applications are scarce and not yet well adapted to
real landscape parameters.
11Farmers had an obligation to dedicate 5 % of their land to ‘habitat areas’.
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2.4.2. Applied modeling approach
In the following sections, our modeling approach is described in more detail. It is a synthesis of
several modeling approaches described above.
2.4.2.1. FOLAS model: a synthesis
The literature review of human-environmental modeling approaches revealed important system
components that need to be captured. Commonalities in the models described above (except for
the ProLand model) are the simulation of farmers’ land use decisions; they address the farm scale.
Our approach is also based on farm optimization in mode of mathematical programming models.
By implication, promoting biodiversity on agriculturally used land needs to consider farmers as
decision-making units and spatially explicit biological processes in order to delineate a nature
production function at the landscape scale (Nuppenau and Helmer, 2007). In order to account
for farmers’ spatial decisions, optimization routines must be applied in an interactive way. This
investigation will show how it can be done.
The modeling approach is landscape oriented and particularly takes into account the spatial
distribution of farmers’ decisions. In order to account for variations in the behavior of individual
farmers as decision units, it includes some agent-based modeling aspects since it divides between
farmers. Farms are treated differently with respect to their production capacities (farm sizes,
financial capital, and livestock husbandry capacity) and production modes. Three different farm
types are modeled:
• arable farms.
• pig-fattening combined with arable farming.
• dairy production combined with arable farming.
Field sizes play a central role in landscape complexity since they effect the landscape mosaic,
patterns, and processes (Antle and McGuckin, 1993). Depending on the species involved, the
field scale is crucial for biodiversity conservation (Gaucherel et al., 2010). Therefore, a closer
look at field sizes is also relevant. Farmers apparently decide on sizes and fields. These kind of
decisions are much slower than choosing appropriate cropping patterns for the next year. Our
approach covers long-term decisions by considering structural change. Most field and landscape
pattern optimization models do not yet explicitly consider structural change processes (e.g. Havlík
et al. (2008); Cong et al. (2016)), since this requires modeling farm interrelations. Our approach
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captures farm interrelation through the exchange of land (consolidation) and land leases between
neighbouring farmers. Therefore, farm size enlargements and farm closings can be modeled
with our approach. As a limitation, interactions between different social groups or institutions
and social networks are not captured with our model, albeit they play an important role in socio-
ecological systems (Adger, 2000). In order to spatially reflect structural change, our model stylizes
the actual landscape through landscape simplification measures (see fig. 2.3). The simplified
landscape and the modeling results are visualized via GIS. In doing so, our model follows a certain
execution logic, which is outlined in the next subsection in more detail.
In view of the political impact assessment, new political measurements can be tested with
respect to their capability to provide a habitat for rich biodiversity. Habitat loss and isolation mainly
threaten farmland biodiversity (Benton et al., 2003; Watling and Donnelly, 2006). Although they
are hardly represented in agricultural areas (Bengtsson et al., 2003), semi-natural habitats promote
species abundance (Hendrickx et al., 2007) and are of great importance in order to maintain ES
such as pollination (Kremen, 2005; Klein et al., 2007). The dispersal distance between habitat
patches depends on the land use matrix (Roland et al., 2000). For bees and smaller insects, the
travel radius is much smaller than for birds, for example. According to Jauker et al. (2009), a
radius of around 250 m can be used as buffer zone for the abundance of bees and hoverflies within
agricultural lands. For our study, we chose three different spatial biodiversity indicators and
applied them accordingly. The biodiversity indicators encompass (1) the total area of semi-natural
habitats defined as grassland and flowering strips within a buffer zone, (2) the Simpson’s diversity
index in order to account for cropping diversity, and (3) the number of patches/fields within a
buffer zone targeting the landscape structure.
With these aspects, the field, farm, and landscape scales are taken into account. In addressing
the three domains mentioned in section 2.2, potential regime shifts are delineated based on the
analytical framework (see figure 2.2). This allows us to develop a comprehensive picture of the
case study and deduct possible futures. Our applied modeling approach captures the following:
• the farm scale using optimization models.
• spatial aspects of landscape pattern models.
• farm interrelations.
• structural change processes.
• far-reaching spatial decisions on field sizes.
• farm sizes.
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• flowering strips as an example of linear semi-natural landscape elements.
• spatially explicit biodiversity indicators.
In the following sections, our model is shortened to ’FOLAS’ (FarmOptimization atLAndscape
Scale).
2.4.2.2. Spatial and temporal model assumptions
In FOLAS, short and long-term decisions are modeled. Short term decisions refer to cropping
decisions each farmer makes at the beginning of a cropping year. A core issue for our modeling
approach is to consider structural change within the agricultural sector. This determines the time
scale of our model. For the present study a comparative static approach is chosen, where several
discrete points in time are compared to each other. FOLAS captures a long time period in which
a farm might close down, reduce, or expand its production in terms of farm size. With respect
to long-term decisions, investments play a key role in mathematical programming approaches.
However, in this work, investment activities are not modeled since this would outgrow the tem-
poral and financial scale of our study. Based on the new farm sizes, new field size decisions are
made. Changes in field sizes are modeled by explicitly taking into account EoS as a driver of
structural change. Structural change is typified by farm and field sizes, cropping patterns, and the
variety of farm types. For modeling EoS, we made some assumptions regarding the equipment of
farmers’ machine power. Within the time span of a model run, each farmer was given the same
engine power of 120 KW. Therefore, the observed mechanical equipment of farmers served as
productivity boundaries. The level of machine power determined the labour requirement per field
size. It showed how strong existing machinery power can be exploited by increasing field sizes.
In fig 2.4 the average labour requirements (depending on the field size) with engine power of 120
KW is depicted. With this machine power set as baseline, EoS can mainly be exploited between
farm sizes of 1 - 10 ha.
The FOLAS model run consists of four model iterations and use information from the previous
iterations. Each one is linked to the next one via the transfer of output data, which leads to a
stepwise solution. The four iterations contain short and long-term decisions of farmers and underlie
certain spatial and temporal assumptions, which are delineated in the following paragraphs.
• 1st Iteration: land use decisions are modeled assuming a dispersed location of all farmers’
fields. Therefore statistical information about farm size and types, as well as field sizes and
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Figure 2.4.: Average labour requirements of all crops in the model depending on field size. Data
refer to an engine power of 120 KW (received from Ktbl on request).
livestock keeping of the case study for the calibration year (2011), were used as orientation.
It was sufficient to set up the basic model parameter structure. FOLAS most efficiently
allocates the total amount of grassland (due to statistical information) to the farms by
maximizing the total gross margin at the municipality level. This is done since we assume
that farm structures with their grassland proportions evolved due to path dependency in
an optimal manner. Results on grassland proportions per farm are transferred to the next
iteration.
• 2nd Iteration: In order to use economies of size and economics of transport, farmers require
fields located next to each other so that field enlargements are possible. According to these
efforts we assume that farmers exchange their fields until they reach full consolidation. This
might take several years. However, the grassland proportions from the 1st iteration stay the
same for each farmer; albeit the location of the grassland can change. Cropping results,
information about the participation in AES, and livestock keeping are passed on to the next
iteration.
• 3rd Iteration: After consolidation, farmers are capable of renting out lands to their neigh-
bouring farms in order to further exploit EoS by increasing farm and field sizes. FOLAS
optimizes the amount and size of the farms with respect to labour savings by creating
bigger fields. Therefore, land use proportions of the former iteration are fixed, and EoS
32
2. State of the art and model frameworks
are modeled explicitly. In order to model EoS for each crop type, a proximity function of
labour per field size based on Ktbl data was calculated. As suggested by Nuppenau and
Helmer (2007), approximations in order to receive computable were applied. The resulting
functions per arable crop were included in the model to calculate labour requirements for
each crop and field. Detailed mathematical model formulations follow in section 4.2.3.1.
• 4th Iteration: Farming activities including crops, livestock keeping, and AES are modeled
again to check how farmers adapt to the new land capacities calculated in the previous
model step. This model run is necessary since it checks whether farmers use their new lands
or rent them out again. In this case the former iteration would not lead to an optimal farm
size.
FOLAS maximizes the total gross margin at the municipality level and assumes Kaldor-Hicks
compensations. This enables the model to distribute certain cropping patterns such as grassland
or sugar beets to single farms in an optimal manner. Since single farm data is often missing and
restrictions at the farm scale make the model less flexible at the landscape level, a strict landscape
scope is pursued.
When land exchange mechanisms are included in the modeling process (2nd iteration) and farm
interactions take place (3rd iteration), maximization at the municipality level implies that those
farmers who are able to increase the total gross margin of all farms (the most), will survive. From
a short-term perspective, this would mean that farmers give up farming only because they do not
contribute to the total gross margin of the farming community, which is rather unrealistic. But
considering a much longer time span (with the current hassles of farmers facing global markets
with increasing competitive pressures and the lack of farm successors) this assumption has a more
solid basis. In order to show long-term labour flows between agricultural and other sectors as well
as due to important socio-cultural regime shifts represented by population developments, off-farm
work is modeled from a macroeconomic perspective12. It applies to each iteration.
2.4.2.3. Simplification of spatial outlay and the modeling approach
In our study, farmers are the decision-making units. We translate farming decisions into spatial
units, though. The landscape serves as a spatial interface between the economic and ecological
domain (Bockstael et al., 1995), not only with respect to the land use activities of farmers, but
also with respect to overarching farming decisions of field and farm sizes (Nuppenau and Helmer,
12Off-farm labour is not modeled in the sense of household economics since the contribution of off-farm work to
total farm utility is not the focus of the study.
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2007). Besides cropping and livestock patterns, they also decide on field and farm sizes. As
already indicated in figure 2.3, the landscape is stylized as coherent rectangles. These have a
certain length and width and represent the fields and farms, respectively. Figure 2.5 gives an
overview of the consecutive model iterations and their graphical representations. The starting point
is an image of a real landscape at the left edge of the figure. In preparation for land transformation
into rectangles, the fields within the study area were aggregated to bigger spatial units. Each
spatial unit represents one agricultural farm (farm B1 and B2 in figure 2.5).
This procedure is based on general trends within mainstream agriculture, where full consolida-
tion by exchanging land is seen as a golden standard for crop production13. In doing so, spatial
conditions such as roads, streams, and housing areas were taken into account, insofar as they do
not belong to the agricultural area and aggregation over these spatial units is unfavorable. Due to
this procedure, the farm size depends on spatial aggregation possibilities, and each farm differs
with respect to its size. Within a farm, aggregation over fields is assumed to be possible and
also sought by the farmer due to utilization of EoS. In the next step, farm types were allocated
randomly to the farm outlet. Since from public statistics no information about land ownership
or farmstead locations was available, it had to be done this way14. Based on the spatial farm
consolidation, achieved farm sizes were taken as the baseline for the modeling procedure in the
1st iteration (see B∗j of figure 2.5, where j is the number of farms (j = 1, 2, . . . , n)).
In order to model land rentals, artificially aggregated farm units were simplified to rectangles.
These rectangles have the same size as the previous aggregated spatial farm units. In the 3rd
iteration, neighbouring farms enlarge their cropping area and use EoS since the neighbouring
fields have shapes similar to their own fields. These farms are assumed to be willing to rent land
from the other farm and are modeled as described in section 4.2.3.4. In order to display farm size
changes, the rectangles of farms are located next to each other and have the same edge, which is
defined as the field length ai of the respective farms. The farms are assumed to arrange all of their
fields next to each other and therefore only one field length per farm exists. In this way, farms
are stringed together, and farm size changes can occur through parallel shifts of the farm edge
of two neighbouring farms (change in Bj). The field length stays the same while the sum of all
field widths (bi) may change for one farm after the 3rd iteration. Based on the new farm sizes,
new field sizes and farming activities are calculated within the last iteration. The resulting map
of the aggregation procedure as well as the stylized rectangles of the case study can be found in
Appendix A.
13Research into the development of software enabling agricultural floor exchange exists and gets even remunerated
(Agrarzeitung, 2013).
14In projects this might be different.
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The first iteration is calibrated to the current agricultural landscape. It assumes scattered fields
that are allocated randomly throughout the farmland. This is simulated by restricting the upper
limit of the field size variable to an observed average of our case study. Since land amalgamation
is not yet realized, EoS through field merging cannot be exploited, and fields are smaller. The
output of the farm optimization model for each field bj comprises the cultivated crop (’crop’),
field size (’fdsize’), and flowering strip (’fs’). These variables refer to the field scale. For example,
the first variable indicates which crop is cultivated on that specific field. Bj,′gl′ is the grassland
proportion of farm Bj . It is the central variable of the first iteration and will be fixed for all
following iterations. The underlying assumption is that regardless of field consolidation processes,
the proportion of grassland per farm should not be subject to change. However, the location of
grassland after consolidation (the 2nd iteration) may change. In the 2nd iteration, consolidation
of farmland is assumed. Farmers are able to exploit EoS and fields get bigger. Based on the
grassland proportions of the previous model run and without restrictions on the field size variable,
new model output is produced: bj,′crop′ , bj,′fdsize′ , bj,′fs′ and bj,′gl′ . The latter variable for grassland
(’gl’) now refers to the field and indicates whether it is managed as grassland or not. Within the
3rd iteration, the farm size Bj is simulated. Therefore, the model output of the 2nd iteration is
taken as input. The new farm sizes (together with the grassland proportions of the farms Bj,′gl′)
serve as the basis for the newly simulated field scale variables in iteration four (bj,′crop′ , bj,′fdsize′ ,
bj,′fs′ and bj,′gl′). Results show the land use patterns after structural change processes.
During the iterations, the model provides information on farm and field size changes as well
as on land use and flowering strips for each farm. Results are collected and semi-automatically
transferred to GIS. The field size results need to be translated into field widths with a respective
coordinate for GIS presentation. Basically two python scripts were developed: one to generate
rectangles representing farms and one to generate fields and their cropping patterns. In order
to generate the rectangles, information about length and width of each farm was used with
coordinates for the central points. The fields were generated by first calculating the coordinates for
the points on both sides of each farm width, and second we created polygons out of those points
as well as concurrently transferred the correct cropping patterns. The results for the 1st, 2nd, and
4th iterations were mapped. They contain farm and field sizes as well as land use information on
crops and flowering strips.
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2.5. CAP 2020 in short
In farming decisions, political incentives play a crucial role (Ewert et al., 2005, 2011; Mandryk
et al., 2012). Since our model is calibrated to the year 2011, the past CAP reform (decoupled
payments and agri-environmental schemes) was set as the baseline. As we intended to test the
achievements of the ‘CAP towards 2020’ reform with respect to the biodiversity targets of the
EC, policy interventions were introduced by applying parts of the new CAP reform. Additionally,
due to critical responses to the new measurements (Lakner and Bosse, 2016, e.g.), an alternative
political incentive scheme was tested. It covers a fully restructured governmental payment scheme.
The different policies applied in the model will be described in section 4.2 before the results of
the policy choices are presented. In the following, the new CAP reform is described roughly. It
gives an overview of the main characteristics of the current incentive structures of the European
Commission. Detailed information can be found in the utilized references.
In 2013, the Council of the EC agreed upon the new CAP Reform 2014-2020. Therein, they
seek to support a ‘sustainable’ agricultural production with respect to economic (food security,
globalization, price volatilities, etc.), ecological (e.g. biodiversity, soil and water quality, and
climate change), and territorial (e.g. demographic changes and urban migration) aspects (European
Commission, 2013). Its financial framework in order to fulfill theses promises is around 400
billion EUR for 2014-2020, paid by European citizens. This budget is separated into direct
payments (DP) of the first pillar and rural development schemes, which form the second pillar.
Around one quarter of the money is dedicated to the second pillar and also contains the budget for
agri-environmental schemes (AES).
One of the main novelties of the new CAP 2014-2020 reform is the so-called mandatory
greening component of the first pillar. 30% of the DP are coupled with environmentally friendly
measures covering the following:
• a crop diversification strategy.
• the preservation of permanent grassland.
• 5% ecological focus areas (EFAs).
The crop diversification strategy provides that farms bigger than 10 ha need to grow at least
two different crop types. Farms larger than 30 ha need to grow at least three crop types, provided
that not more than 95% of the arable land is covered by the two main crops. The main crop is
restricted to cover not more than 75% of the arable land. For the EFAs, a farmer has to dedicate
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5% of agricultural area in order to get the mandatory DP. Therefore, a bunch of measures from
fallow land to landscape elements (single trees, hedges, etc.) were determined by the EC council.
The measurements are weighted according to their natural capital. Weighting factors15 are used in
order to calculate the actual area.
Another novelty is the opportunity to use DP in order to support small and medium-sized farms.
The German implementation of the new CAP reform makes use of this redistributive payment and
pays 50 EUR/ha for the first 30 ha, and 30 EUR/ha for the following 16 ha farmland. Farmers
below the age of 40 receive an additional payment16.
The second pillar of the CAP supports the rural areas. Besides the provision of AES, it includes
investment funding as well as development projects for municipalities. They ought to increase the
attractiveness of rural areas for tourism and the population living therein.
15Fixed in Annex X of the supplementing Regulation (EU) No. 1307/2013 of the European Parliament.
1644 Euros per ha for five years and 90 ha.
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Chapter 3.
Research site
The first section of this chapter is dedicated to the description of the socio-ecological system of
our study site. We adapt the socio-ecological resilience approach to our rural study region in
order to meet our conceptual framework (see figure 2.2 of the previous chapter). Since we are
investigating the effects of agricultural production at all three domains (with the respective scales),
the study site is screened according to the ecological, socio-cultural, and economic domains.
Afterwards, particular interest is given to the agricultural production system of our case study.
This second section is further used in order to refer to the chosen values for the model parameters
of the baseline model and of the sensitivity anaylses.
3.1. Socio-ecological system of the case study
3.1.1. Location and land cover: the ecological domain
Hesse consists of three administrative districts: Darmstadt, Kassel, and Giessen. Wetterau county
belongs to the Darmstadt district. The study site is a small municipality named Wöllstadt and
is located in the middle of the most intensively cropped agricultural area of Wetterau county in
central Hesse, Germany. It has an area of 15.38 km2.
Fig. 3.1 shows the Wetterau region. As can be seen, in the eastern part of the Wetterau region
as well as in a small strip of the westernmost Wetterau area, the landscape is covered with a mix
of forest, agricultural, and residential areas. In the middle, there is an elongated strip from the
north to the south where predominantly agricultural production takes place. The study site is
outlined in red and lies in the midst of this highly agriculturally used area.
Wetterau county is well known for its intensive agricultural production, with an agricultural area
of 53%, followed by 29% forest cover in 2010. Infrastructure and housing area contribute around
7% each to the land cover of Wetterau county, the rest being water bodies (1.2%), recreational
area (0.8%), and other areas (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012b). Due to highly fertile
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loess soils, which evolved in the Tertiary Period and reach a depth of up to twenty meters, good
climatic conditions, and plenty of water bodies, Wetterau has been used for agricultural production
for more than two thousand years (Wetterauische Gesellschaft, 2012; Waldhardt et al., 2010).
Consequently, Wetterau counts for one of the oldest cultural landscapes in Europe.
According to Bundesamt für Naturschutz (2012), smaller conservation areas totaling 1.5% are
scattered within Wetterau. Moreover, bird protection areas encompass 11.6% of the total Wetterau
area, whereas 4.4% are dedicated to FFH1 areas. FFH areas belong to the European protected
Natura2000 network of indigenous habitats2. Therein, agricultural production is subject to stricter
nature conservation requirements.
Compared to Wetterau county, Wöllstadt has an even higher area of agricultural production
(81%). In Wöllstadt, only 1.1% is covered with forest. There is no land that belongs to the
Natura2000 network. Housing and infrastructure together cover almost 15% of the area in
Wöllstadt, the rest being water bodies (1.5%), recreation area (1%), and other areas (Hessisches
Statistisches Landesamt, 2012a).
The geo-physical conditions and historical land use characteristics have prepared the ground for
the intensively used agricultural lands of our case study. The ecological domain is confronted with
a low land cover heterogeneity. Less then 5% of the landscape is used for something other than
agricultural purposes or housing. There is no conservation area at all. Only a few semi-natural
landscape elements exist, which deliver wildlife habitats. In our research area, a poor basis for the
abundance of species diversity as well as for the delivery of ES is prevalent.
3.1.2. Population and demographic change: the socio-cultural
domain
In 2011, Hesse hosted a population of around six million people, of which two thirds were in
the Darmstadt district. Within this district, the Wetterau county is the second largest county with
respect to the inhabitants with almost three hundred thousand people (Hessisches Statistisches
Landesamt, 2012b). As we search for possible futures of our case study, we need to look into
the dynamics of demographic change within and around the research area. The population
structure in Hesse has developed in different directions. While the population in rural areas
dramatically decreased, it increased in cities or regions adjacent to urban centers. The reasons for
this development in Hesse were the insufficient supply of care facilities, price increases of mobility
1Flora-fauna habitat
2FFH guideline 92/43/EWG and Bird Directive 79/409/EWG
40
3. Research site
Figure 3.1.: Land use in Wetterau county in 2011. Source: own map based on Schlagkatatster,
ALKIS, and ATKIS data provided by the ‘Hessischen Landesamt für Umwelt und
Geologie’ (HLUG).
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services, a lack of medical and social supply structures, the absence of economic potential, and an
increasing importance of urban lifestyles (Mager, 2011).
Wetterau county attracts more people and exhibited a population increase of 19% between 1987
and 2011 due to its closeness to Frankfurt a. M. (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012b).
According to HMWVL (2011), the positive demographic change in Wetterau county continues,
and the population will further increase by 5% by 2030.
Wöllstadt is a small municipality with only 6,153 inhabitants (Hessisches Statistisches Lan-
desamt, 2012a). With respect to demographic change processes, negative population trends are
registered. Between 2008 and 2011, population decreased by 1.8% (Statistische Ämter des Bundes
und der Länder, 2013a). Afterwards, the number of inhabitants decreased by 0.5%. According to
newest estimations, population will further decrease by 7.1% until 2030 (Bertelsmann Stiftung,
2014).
Within the socio-cultural domain of our case study, we are faced with a declining population.
Population decline is an issue that is also addressed in the new CAP reform. Through investments
and development plans, the EC tries to strengthen rural areas in order to support the livelihoods of
the rural population (European Commission, 2013). With regard to our conceptual framework,
we try to show whether this negative population trend is boosted, mitigated, stopped, or affected
by the new CAP reform at all. As socio-ecological systems are linked together through several
domain-scale combinations and cascading effects, modeling the farm scale also may give insights
into the socio-cultural domain at the regional scale (see figure 2.2).
3.1.3. Economy and agriculture: the economic domain
At the level of the federal state of Hesse, the agricultural sector plays only a minor role, contributing
0.4% to the total gross value in 2012. Financial services contributed the most to the total gross
value with 35%, followed by public services (21%), production industry (20%), transport and
trade sector (20%), and the construction industry with around 4%. However, at the level of
Wetterau county, the agricultural sector contributed 6.2% to the total gross value and played a
major role within Wetterau county. The construction industry followed with 4.3%, public services
with 3.5%, financial services with 3.1%, production industry with 3.0%, and transportation and
trade with 2.9% (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2014a).
Although agriculture is an important part of the economy within our case study, the average
agricultural net wage is at a low level compared to other sectors. In 2010, the total average gross
wage of Wetterau county was 29,725 Euros per year (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2014b).
After deductions, the average net wage was around 18,900 Euros, which resulted in an average net
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wage of 1,575 Euros per month or 9.8 Euros per hour. This hourly net wage is taken as off-farm
wages for the model. The gross wage for the agricultural, silvicultural, and fishery sector is much
lower with 16,350 Euro per year in 2010 (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2014b).
In order to reduce risk and for other lifestyle reasons, income resources are diversified, and
many farms are managed as part-time farms (Hansson et al., 2013). Hesse is one of the German
states with the highest agricultural area under part-time farming (35% in 2010) (Hessisches Statis-
tisches Landesamt, 2013). The average size of part-time farms is 23.6 ha, which differs highly
throughout the regions (Mawick et al., 2011). In Wetterau county, 63% of the farms are part-time
farms (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012a). Under these conditions in Wetterau county,
72% of all farms have an uncertain farm succession, and the average age of most farmers in
Hesse lies between 45 and 64 (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012j). Due to the ‘Hessische
Landgüterordnung’ from 1947, after succession, there is no legal obligation to split land property
into partial plots. Instead, farmland can be passed on to only one heir, and compensation for
the coheirs is regulated by law. Fields keep their sizes without getting smaller throughout time.
Nevertheless, most farms with a size of 50 ha or smaller do not have a secure farm succession in
Hesse (Mawick et al., 2011).
In Wöllstadt, agricultural production with respect to area is even higher in relative terms3.
Within the economic domain of our case study, farmers face an insecure farm succession and
predominantly part-time farming (40%) (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012a). With
the prevalent agricultural practices, farming is in most cases not the only income source since
more attractive ones (with higher wages) exist. In the coming years, structural change can be
expected, which might lead to a regime shift within the economic domain at the farm scale. This
domain-scale regime shift may trigger other domain-scale combinations, and a new regime of the
socio-ecological system might evolve. In the following section, a closer look at the agricultural
production system is taken. It also serves as a basis for our model calibration.
3.2. Agricultural production system of the case study
Parameters presented in this section refer to fixed values and constitute model data in order to
calculate endogenous model variables, which we are going to present in the next chapter. Since the
model was calibrated according to spatial land use data from the ‘Hessische Landesamt für Umwelt
3See land use distributions from Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt (2012a) and Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt
(2012b) above.
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und Geologie’ (HLUG) from 2011, most statistical data was collected from the agricultural census
in 2010. If possible, statistics were collected at the level of the study site. However, due to data
protection regulations, in some cases only information at the county or district level was available.
All statistical values used as parameters in the model are summarized in Appendix B.1 unless
specified differently at the spot. With the aim of presenting a comprehensive picture of the study
site, some statistical values were compared to different spatial scales including the federal state,
district, county, and municipality levels.
3.2.1. Farm types and sizes
In our model we include different farm types. Therefore, a closer look at the farm types within the
study region is needed.
The officially established classification system organizes agricultural farms according to their
common economic orientation: (1) arable farms producing, for instance, cereals, pulses, oil fruits,
root crops, and vegetables among other crops; (2) horticultural farms; (3) permanent crop farms
(e.g. wine); (4) grazing livestock farms (e.g cattle, goats, or sheep); (5) processing farms (e.g.
pig-fattening or poultry); and three different mixed farm types: (6) mixed plant production, (7)
mixed livestock production, and (8) plant plus livestock-producing farms (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2012).
In table 3.1, the proportions of farm types and their changes over time for Wetterau county
are charted. Therein, arable farms had the highest relevance and covered more than 50% of the
agricultural area in 2010, followed by plant and livestock-producing farms (23.1%) and grazing
livestock farms (22.2%). Horticultural and permanent farms as well as mixed plant producing
farms cover only a small area within the Wetterau county. With respect to the percentage of farms,
these three farm types became less important over time. In 2010, 1% of the farm types were
processing farms covering 1% of the total area. For comparison, in 2003, the same proportion of
farms covered only 0.2% of the agricultural area. From 2003, the production area of processing
farms increased fivefold. Mixed livestock production farms have also increased their production
area from 0.7 to 1.2%, although the farm proportion sunk from 1.4 to 1.3%. These trends indicate
an increase in farm sizes.
There are differences within the classification thresholds and counting units, which makes
comparisons over time difficult. From the beginning of the ‘70s, the German classification criterion
was the operating income4. If 50% of the operating income was earned through horticulture, the
farm belonged to type two. However, in 2003, the European classification system was applied,
4Before, the classification was based on the size of the agricultural area under cultivation.
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Table 3.1.: Proportions of farm types in Wetterau county regarding their economic orientation for
2003, 2007, and 2010 (%). Source: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder
(2013b); Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt (2012j,i)
Farm type
Share in Wetterau county [%]
2003 2007 2010
Farms Area Farms Area Farms Area
Arable farms 48.0 55.9 48.2 55.9 47.8 50.2
Horticulture 5.6 0.6 4.7 0.6 3.8 0.4*
Permanent farms 4.4 0.3 2.0 0.3 2.4 0.3
Grazing livestock 18.8 19.0 22.8 19.7 22.0 22.2
Processing farms 1.0 0.2 1.2 0.4 1.0 1.0
Mixed plant production 4.5 3.2 4.8 4.0 3.1 1.6
Mixed livestock production 1.4 0.7 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.2
Plant and livestock production 16.4 20.0 14.7 19.0 18.5 23.1*
*Imprecise values due to incomplete data in Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt (2012j).
and the threshold for the classification criterion rose to 75% (Blumöhr et al., 2006; Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2012; BMELV, 2012). Since 2010, the standard output5 has been used. Due to that, a
separate consideration of livestock farming will be conducted later in this section.
The average farm sizes in Germany increased from around 15 ha in 1979 to 56 ha in 2010, and
the amount of farms more than halved during this time (see fig. 3.2) (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2013). An even stronger trend can be found in Hesse. From almost 91,000 farms in 1971 only
18,000 in 2010 remained (Mawick et al., 2011). Concentration and specialization processes within
the agricultural sector in Hesse have been observed, and mainly single production systems, such
as pig fattening or purely arable farming prevail (Berger, 2012).
Within Wetterau county, 988 agricultural farms cultivate an area of more than 525 km2 agri-
cultural lands. Of these, half of all farms have a farm size between 20 and 100 ha. Only 15%
cultivate more than 100 ha agricultural area, and the remaining 35% less than 20 ha (Hessisches
Statistisches Landesamt, 2012a).
In Wöllstadt, 25 farms cultivate 1,432 ha agricultural area. 20 farms are arable, four produce
plants and livestock, and one is a horticultural farm. The proportion of farms in Wöllstadt that
cultivate more than 50 ha is 44%, which is even higher than the average for Wetterau county
(37%). 80% of the farms in Wöllstadt have an area between 20 and 100 ha. Two farms cultivate
total areas larger than 200 ha (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012a), which indicates the
agriculturally intensified production situation of the study site. There is only one farm in Wöllstadt
that has an area less than five ha (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012i), which might be the
5Gross value of agricultural products using farm-gate prices without subtracting variable costs.
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Figure 3.2.: Average farm size development in Germany (1979-2010). Source: Statistisches
Bundesamt (2013).
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horticultural farm6. This farm will be excluded from the modeling process.
3.2.2. Crop production and prices
In table 3.2 the percentage of cultivated crops in Wöllstadt are compared to the percentage crop
area within Wetterau county.
For both regional levels, wheat is the most important crop. However in Wöllstadt, wheat
production is particularly pronounced with 52% of the total agricultural area. Sugar beet pro-
duction also plays an outstanding role in Wöllstadt with more than 16% compared to 5.5% land
cover in Wetterau county. Rapeseed production in Wöllstadt and Wetterau county have similar
proportions with around 11%. In Wöllstadt, the area of permanent grassland is much lower (5%)
than in Wetterau county (24%). The proportion of potato production in Wöllstadt is more than
twice as much as in Wetterau county. Due to one horse farm, oat production is relatively high in
Wöllstadt7. However, silo maize production is much lower in Wöllstadt compared to the county
level. Particularly apparent is the absence of forest land in the study site, which is already low
in the entire Wetterau county. The emphasis on wheat, sugar beet, and potato production shows
excellent soil conditions and again mirrors the intensive agricultural land use in Wöllstadt.
Crop prices are highly volatile throughout the year as well as annually. In figure 3.3, time series
of grain prices between 2000/01 and 2014/15 for the Darmstadt district are depicted based on data
from Ktbl (2016)8. As visible in the graph, grain prices are highly correlated. Density functions
of the grain prices show a skewed distribution to the left (see Appendix D), leading to a lower
median than mean value (see table 3.3). Farmers within our research area face volatile prices. The
mean values for grain prices lie between 12.8 Euros/dt (triticale) and 14.6 Euros/dt (maize) with
standard deviations of around 4.5 Euros/dt. For model calibration, relatively high crop prices,
having the same level as the mean values plus one standard deviation are taken9. In order to check
for model robustness, a sensitivity analysis is conducted with the median values for grain crops.
For model calibration, average crop prices of the Darmstadt district are taken from Ktbl (2016).
For some crops such as grass silage and hay coming from permanent grassland, silo maize for
biogas plants, corn cob mixes, and corn maize, data from the same Ktbl database was not available,
and other sources needed to be found. In Appendix E, all land use activities included in the model,
as well as their prices, year, regional level and data sources, are presented in a tabular form.
6Horticultural farms have an average size of only 6.8 ha (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012f).
7Expert interview with the responsible farmer.
8Prices on lower spatial level were not available.
9This is adapted to crop prices of the calibration year 2011.
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Table 3.2.: Land use in Wöllstadt and the Wetterau county in ha and % (2011). Source: GIS data
(Schlagkatasterdaten) received from HLUG
Crop Wöllstadt [ha] (%) Wetterau county [ha] (%)
Winter wheat 627 (51.7) 19,593 (36.1)
Sugar beets 199 (16.4) 2,985 (5.5)
Rapeseed 129 (10.6) 5,804 (10.7)
Winter barley 95 (7.9) 2,990 (5.5)
Permanent grassland 60 (5.0) 13,132 (24.1)
Potatoes 28 (2.3) 606 (1.1)
Oats 16 (1.3) 378 (0.7)
Rye 16 (1.3) 401 (0.7)
Fallow 9 (0.7) 338 (0.6)
Silo maize 8 (0.6) 2,484 (4.6)
Grasses (silage) 6 (0.5) 525 (1.0)
Corn maize 5 (0.4) 1,055 (1.9)
Triticale 3 (0.2) 357 (0.7)
Winter oats 3 (0.2) 3 (0.0)
Vegetables 2 (0.1) 130 (0.2)
Strawberries 2 (0.1) 67 (0.1)
Mixed grains 2 (0.1) 7 (0.0)
Forest land 0 (0) 791 (1.5)
Miscellaneous 4 (0.3) 2,697 (5.0)
Figure 3.3.: Time series for grain prices: Darmstadt district (2000/01 - 2014/15). Source: Ktbl
(2016).
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Table 3.3.: Descriptive statistics for grain price time series of the Darmstadt district (2000/01 -
2014/15)
Crop Min [Euros/dt] Mean [Euros/dt] Max [Euros/dt] Sd [Euros/dt] Median [Euros/dt]
Wheat 8.76 14.07 22.67 4.69 12.29
Barley 8.90 13.96 22.07 4.43 13.74
Rye 7.59 13.21 20.85 4.65 12.72
Triticale 7.84 12.80 20.57 4.38 11.90
Maize 8.90 14.63 21.39 4.25 14.28
3.2.3. Livestock keeping
Numbers for Hesse show an increase in the average amount of livestock per farm (Mawick et al.,
2011). Between 1970 and 2010, the amount of cattle farms decreased by almost 94%, while
the number of cattle decreased only by around 58%. Within the same time period, milk yield
increased by more than 50%. This shows an intensification of milk and cattle production. Similar
trends can be found for pig-fattening and pig-breeding farms. While in 1983 only 3% of all pigs
were kept in farms with more than 100 stable places, in 2010, 64% were kept in such farms.
Actually, in 2010, 42% of all pigs were kept in farms with more than 200 stable places. However,
with respect to the total number of pigs in Hesse, between 1999 and 2010, there is a reduction of
breeding sows (- 30%), while pig-fattening increased by 103% during this time (Mawick et al.,
2011).
In Wetterau county, around 60% of the agricultural farms keep livestock. Among these farms,
60% still own cattle, and 40% own pigs. The average amount of livestock per farm is around 60
for cattle and 98 for pigs.
In the case study, four out of 25 farms keep 53 cattle, and five farms keep 401 pigs (Hessisches
Statistisches Landesamt, 2012a). In Wöllstadt livestock keeping is not yet very intensified
compared to the state average. Compared to the county level, cattle keeping is underrepresented,
while pig fattening is emphasized. The type of livestock keeping (e.g. dairy, breeding, fattening) in
Wöllstadt is not apparent from statistics. Therefore the most common mode of livestock keeping
in Hesse was chosen for the model. For cattle keeping, this is dairy farming, and for pig farming,
the most common mode is pig fattening (Mawick et al., 2011). In the model, four plant and dairy
producing farms, each having 25 stable places and five plant and pig-fattening farms having 30
stable places10 are modeled. According to husbandry methods for dairy, loose-housing stables
with solid manure and for pig fattening, slatted floor, are assumed in the model.
102.8 pigs per stable place and year.
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3.2.4. Soil treatments and yield levels
In Hesse, almost 90% of the farms cultivate their soils with conventional soil tillage, which
is ploughing. With respect to the agricultural area, 57% is ploughed and 37% cultivated with
conserving soil treatments (e.g. harrowing or with cultivators). The other area is cultivated with
direct sowing. In Darmstadt district, 88% of the farms apply conventional soil tillage, which
covers 55% of the agricultural area. 45% of the area is cultivated using conserving soil treatments
(Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012h). In the model it is assumed that farmers plough their
fields conventionally.
Wetterau county has one of the highest yield units with 6111 compared to other counties of
Hesse (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012b). The average yield for the main crop types in
Hesse (winter wheat, rapeseed, and sugar beets) more than doubled between the fifties and 2010.
Further, the average silo maize yield doubled between 1950 and 1980. Since 1980, silo maize
yield has fluctuated around the same level (Mawick et al., 2011).
Yield data for the calibration year are summarized in Appendix G. For the model, average crop
yields are gathered at the county level from Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt (2012d). Since
not all yields for the crops included in the model are covered with this reference, some crop yield
levels are gathered at the district level from the Ktbl database (Ktbl, 2016).
3.2.5. Field structure
The field structure of Wöllstadt has a relatively uniform appearance. In 1945, on average, arable
fields were smaller than in 1970 (compare fig. 3.4 and fig. 3.5). As can be seen, urban areas
increased at the expense of agricultural areas. This trend has continued into the present year
as apparent in fig. 3.6. On the orthophotos, the typical rectangular shape of fields is visible.
Rectangular field shapes allow for simplified and cost-reduced cultivation practices.
For the spatially explicit modeling, GIS data from the HLUG about field and landscape structure
in Wöllstadt is analyzed (see fig. 3.7). Since one of the central variables is field size, it needs to be
compared to the current and actual field sizes. GIS data only show small field units with regard to
the ownership and do not contain information about user rights. The field sizes from GIS did not
fit to the actual cultivation units. They have an average size of 1.6 ha. In order to asses the size of
11Range: 0 - 100.
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Figure 3.4.: The municipality Wöllstadt with its field structures in 1945. Source: Orthophotos
received from HLUG.
Figure 3.5.: The municipality Wöllstadt with its field structures in 1970. Source: Orthophotos
received from HLUG.
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Figure 3.6.: The municipality Wöllstadt with its field structures in 2017. Source: GoogleMaps
(2017-01-19).
the current cultivation units, GIS data is edited by aggregating polygons12. Thereby tracks smaller
than management roads, which are usually 3 m wide, were deleted, and the fields became bigger
(see fig. 3.7, right). After this data adjustment, the average field size was 4.2 ha and reflected the
current field structure more accurately.
12Up to 2.9 m gap between fields.
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3.2.6. Farm labour
In 2010, 67% of the agricultural labour force in Wetterau county was provided by family labourers
(Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012j). The labour force in Wöllstadt consists of 57.5%
family, 35% foreign, and 7.5% seasonal labourers. The total labour force in Wöllstadt was
around 40 labour units 13 in 2010. Of these, 23 labour units were delivered by family labourers
(Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2012i).
For the model, these family labour units were allocated evenly to each farm. It is assumed that
only 50% of the family labour capacity is purely spent for crop and livestock-correlated production
steps. The other 50% is needed for office work such as paperwork and farm communication.
The total family labour capacity for field and stable work was 997 hours of a typical farm per
year. Foreign labour hours can be bought for a gross wage expenditure of 15.5 Euros per hour14.
Seasonal labourers could be hired for the minimum wage of 7.40 Euros per hour in 201115. These
values are taken as respective parameters for the model.
Labour requirements per ha depend on several parameters such as land use type, field size,
distance between farm and field, and the degree of mechanization. For the model, the level of
engine power is 120 KW (see section 2.4.2.2), and the distance between farm and field is assumed
to be one ha due to field consolidation assumed by the modeling approach. The Ktbl database
(Ktbl, 2013a) offers data on labour requirements for several land use activities for two, five, and
ten ha. Depending on the modeling step, the model uses labour input coefficients as summarized
in Appendix H. One exception is the input requirement for fallow land. Since fallow land is small
and typically not used to exploit EoS, the labour coefficient refers to the smallest receivable data
on field size (1 ha) and does not change.
3.2.7. Revenue and variable costs of production
Within the Darmstadt district, the standard output of family farms in 2010 was on average 34,997
Euros, whereas commercial farms generated 163,977 Euros16 (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt,
2012e). The profit of farm types, however, differs and changes annually. For example, in the
financial year 2010/11, commercial arable farms participating in the Hessian regional statistics
gained the highest profit with 76,886 Euros, followed by fodder farming with 70,781 Euros,
13One labour unit corresponds to 40 average labour hours per week.
14This corresponds to a trained labourer of wage group three according to the collective agreement for Hesse (LLH,
2015).
15According to the collective agreement of the agricultural sector in Hesse in 2011.
16Profit for fiscal purposes.
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Table 3.4.: Financial model capacity parameters: liquid monetary amounts per farm size
Farm size [ha] Liquid money [Euros/year]
< 50 6,500
50 - 150 9,750
> 150 13,000
and processing and mixed farms both with around 60,000 Euros. Compared to that, in 2011/12,
processing farms obtained the highest profit (73,919 Euros), whereas arable and mixed farms
gained the lowest profit with around 60,000 Euros. The reasons were increasing costs for farming
inputs (e.g. fodder, fertilizer, seedlings, and fuel), which outweighed increasing revenues (LLH,
2013).
A key figure of the economic farm performance is capital formation, yet it fluctuates strongly
from year to year. From 2011 to 2012, it sunk from around 18,000 Euros to 10,000 Euros for
commercial farms (LLH, 2013). In the model, we assume that liquid money depends on the farm
size (see table 3.4). Farm sizes lower than 50 ha have at their disposal 6,500 Euros per financial
year, and farms between 50 and 150 ha have 50% more. Farms bigger than 150 ha own 13,000
Euro equity capital. Each agricultural activity requests available financial resources differently,
which can be obtained from the Ktbl database. Variable costs of each activity also influence the
gross margin and need to be considered in the model. Financial coefficients and variable costs for
each activity, used in the model, are summarized in Appendix K.
3.2.8. Governmental payments and measurement participation
In Wöllstadt, governmental payments consist of DP and AES payments. As outlined above,
there were no other payments, e.g. for Natura2000 areas. Similarly, there were no payments for
compensatory allowances in the village since the study site benefits from excellent production
conditions. The level of DP for the case study was calculated on the basis of a cluster analysis17
conducted in the working group of the JAGUAR project18. All municipalities of the Vogelsberg
and Wetterau county in 2011 were classified into intensive and extensive agricultural production
areas. For the intensive agricultural production area (to which Wöllstadt belongs), the average
level of DP was calculated using single municipality data from 201019 (Hessisches Statistisches
17For clustering, some important parameters have been urban, artificially vegetated, forest, abandoned, wood,
grassland, orchard, or arable area.
18Sustainable futures for cultural landscapes of Japan and Germany - biodiversity and ecosystem services as unifying
concepts for the management of agricultural regions
19Due to payment graduations, DP were not consistent throughout all farms.
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Landesamt, 2012i). This average value of 275.6 Euros per ha is used in the model.
On the web page of the ‘Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung’ (BLE, 2014),
information about the amount and types of payments for the current EC household year can be
viewed for two years20. Wöllstadt received 1,027 Euros for AES in 2014 (the available year most
closest to the calibration year). This value is chosen for the AES budget parameter in the model.
AES in the model consist of annual flowering strips, which are rewarded with 750 Euros per ha
according to the HIAP guidelines of the Hessian Ministry for the Environment, Climate Protection,
Agriculture, and Consumer Protection21 (HMUKLV, 2015b). Translated into flowering strips,
only around 1.5 ha of semi-natural habitat was provided by AES. Taking this value as a baseline in
the model, the variable production costs are assumed to be 160 Euros per ha since the difference
equals the gross margin of winter wheat, which is often taken as a reference for the calculation
of opportunity costs22. Labour and capital coefficients for flowering strips used in the model are
2.78 Euros per ha and 10.41 Euros per ha, respectively. They are calculated based on Ktbl data
on seeding and milling, assuming 120 KW engine power, field size of one ha, distance to the
farmstead of one km, and a working width of 2.5 m (Ktbl, 2013a).
For modeling the new CAP reform, farmers can also consider hedges since they count to the
EFAs. For their cost calculation, it is assumed that hedges have lifespans of 20 years. Only
variable maintenance costs are taken into account since often hedges already exist; alternatively
the planting and establishing of hedges could be funded by programs or farmers. Then they can
apply for grant funds (Meyerhoff, 2011). Variable costs in this case are calculated using an official
cost catalog of the Bavarian National Office for the Environment (Beiersdorf, 2012). Labour time
is not considered since the model assumes perfect outsourcing of hedge maintenance. Variable
costs consist of (a) trimming (1.5 times per year in the first four years), (b) cutting parts of the
hedge back to the trunk 5 times within 20 years, (c) disposing wood and shrubs (also five times
within 20 years), and (d) the gross margin (opportunity costs) of wheat production. The total
variable costs for hedges per ha and year totals 5,407 Euros.
20Due to Regulation EU EURATOM No. 966/2012, Regulation No. 1306/2013, and Regulation No. 908/2014 the
amount of European agricultural payments have to be public.
21Entered into force on the 21st of September 2015.
22According to the CAP, AES should only compensate farmers for their losses and not put incentives to gain from
implementing AES.
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3.2.9. Energetic biomass production
From the early eighties to 2010, the amount of biogas plants in Hesse reached a level of 124.
These plants supply around 48 MW and utilize an area of 10,400 ha, which covers 1.2% of the
agricultural area. Almost 90% of that area is covered with silo maize and the rest with other grains.
Compared to that, the area of rapeseed for oil and diesel production is much higher with 47,000
ha in 2010 (Mawick et al., 2011).
In 2013, the total capacity of biogas plants in Wetterau county was around 73,000 MWh per
year (Dölling and Voß, 2014). Within a range of 15 km around Wöllstadt, the biogas capacity was
around 16,000 MWh per year. According to LLH (2012), 62% of the biogas production in 2011
was supplied by silo maize. Depending on the silo maize yield for biogas, which is assumed to
be 500 dt per ha, in the case study, the area for silo maize production utilized in biogas plants, is
currently (2016) around 100 ha per municipality within the intensively used agricultural areas of
the cluster analysis mentioned in section 3.2.8. This is around 1% of the area in Wöllstadt and is
used as an upper limit for the model according to the maximum biogas capacity.
3.2.10. Land tenure
Within Hesse and the Darmstadt district, around 64% to 68% of the agricultural area is rented. In
Wetterau county, 64% is rented; this is in Hesse no exception (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt,
2012j). In 2010, the arable land rent in Darmstadt district was 201 Euros per ha, however,
for newly rented land, the price was higher; about 255 Euros per ha arable land (Hessisches
Statistisches Landesamt, 2012g). The average arable land rent for Wetterau county in total in
2010 was 214 Euros per ha, which is used as parameter for the model.
Since land rent is an important parameter in agricultural decision making, especially when
looking at longer time periods, a second sensitivity analysis was conducted using different land
prices. Compared to crop prices, land prices did not fluctuate annually around a certain price level
but showed an increasing trend line for the last years. Within the same year, average rent prices
differ from region to region. Therefore, average rent prices for arable land in all counties of Hesse
for the year 2010 were taken from Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt (2012c) and compared.
According to descriptive statistics 23, Wetterau county almost exactly mirrors the median value of
all observed counties. For the sensitivity analysis one standard deviation lower and higher than
the median value were used as parameters.
23Mean: 225.6; median: 216; min: 151; max: 342; Sd: 59.
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Chapter 4.
FOLAS: Farm optimization at
landscape scale
In this chapter, technical and mathematical dimensions of the model are described in detail. At
first, the model content is presented in a programming language. In doing so, model components
are summarized and classified into sets and variables. In the second section after an overview of
the modeling procedure, mathematical model formulations are outlined. It follows a classification
into two different modeling techniques, which are integral parts of the model procedure. At the
end of the section, alternate political incentive schemes will be presented. They are simulated in
order to compare effects of the new CAP reform on some chosen biodiversity indicators within
our study region. These indicators will be described in the last part of the chapter.
4.1. Model content in GAMS language
In order to set up our model, General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software was used.
GAMS is an elaborated modeling system, solving mathematical programming problems through
optimization. Before elaborating on the mathematical model formulations, which are used to
explain the case study at hand, basic system components of the case study are introduced in
the mode of sets and endogenous variables. The values of variables are unknown and will be
simulated by the model. On the contrary, parameters are fixed values (data) that are used by the
model in order to calculate variables (Rosenthal, 2017). They were presented in the previous
chapter.
4.1.1. Sets
GAMS uses sets in order to integrate system components into the modeling process. Each set
contains elements, capturing certain dimensions. In order to get a broad picture of our model
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world, all FOLAS sets are summarized in table 4.1 with a short description of their elements.
In total we have 24 farms g in the case study. They are classified into arable farms a(g), plant
and pig-fattening farms m(g), and plant and dairy producing farms d(g). Every farm type is
randomly distributed to the farmland at the beginning of the modeling process and does not
change throughout the model iterations. However, some farms and farm types may close down
during farm size optimization and no longer exist after the model run. Potentially they are in the
programming, but not chosen.
The set act covers all cropping and livestock farming activities, whereas the two sets lu(act)
and li(act) are subsets of act and include only the cropping activities or only the livestock keeping
activities, respectively. For the model, all crops in the list in table 3.2 (down to triticale, excluding
oats) are included. The production method of permanent grassland is differentiated between silage
and hay production. Silo maize production is further divided into maize silage as a fodder crop
and silo maize for biogas plants. Additionally, corn cob mix and summer peas, as alternative land
use activities, are included in the model. Thus almost the whole cropped area of Wöllstadt is
covered by the model activities (97.6%).
For livestock-keeping activities, information on feeding practices is required. Fodder crops
are summarized in the set fc(lu), which is a subset of lu(act). The set for feed nutrients feed
includes energy, proteins, RNB (ruminal nitrogen balance), and dry matter.
Farming inputs contain land, labour, capital, pig, and dairy stable places. They are separated
into farming inputs i including all of them and the subset lu(i) for farming inputs of only the
cropping activities.
Each farm has a set (f ) of 36 potential fields. The number of fields per farm is based on GIS
information about the original field number of the study area divided by the amount of farms
in the case study (24 farms). However, fields do not need to be fully utilized by farmers. The
optimal field size, which is one of the model variables, determines the amount of fields since
each farm has a predetermined amount of agricultural land within the linear programming part of
the model (according to the spatial simplification explained in section 2.4.2.2). An overview of
predetermined farm sizes used by the model can be found in Appendix C.
4.1.2. Variables
Variables used in the model are summarized in table 4.2, with their descriptions and variable types
as they are implemented in GAMS. Prior to model execution, variable values are unknown.
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Table 4.1.: Model sets: declarations and descriptions.
Declaration Description Elements
act Cropping and livestock activ-
ities
Winter wheat, winter barley, triticale, rye, silo
maize, silo maize for biogas, corn cob mix,
corn maize, potato, sugar beet, oilseed rape, per-
manent grassland (silage), permanent grassland
(hay), grasses (silage), summer peas, fallow, pig-
fattening, dairy
lu(act) Cropping activities Winter wheat, winter barley, triticale, rye, silo
maize, silo maize for biogas, corn cob mix, corn
maize, potato, sugar beet, oilseed rape, perma-
nent grassland (silage), permanent grassland (hay),
grasses (silage), summer peas, fallow
li(act) Livestock activities pig-fattening, dairy
fc(lu) Fodder crops Winter wheat, winter barley, triticale, rye, silo
maize, corn cob mix, corn maize, permanent grass-
land (silage), permanent grassland (hay), grasses
(silage), summer peas
feed Feed nutrients Energy, proteins, ruminal nitrogen balance (RNB),
dry matter
i Farming inputs Land, labour, capital, pig stable places, dairy stable
places
lu(i) Farming inputs for cropping
activities
Land, labour, capital
g Farms Farm 1 - farm 24
a(g) Arable farms Farm 1, farm 2, farm 4, farm 5, farm 6, farm 7,
farm 8, farm 12, farm 14, farm 15, farm 16, farm
18, farm 20, farm 23, farm 24
m(g) Plant and pig-fattening farms Farm 3, farm 10, farm 11, farm 13, farm 21
d(g) Plant and dairy-producing
farms
Farm 9, farm 17, farm 19, farm 22
f Fields Field 1 - field 36
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FOLAS maximizes the total gross margin (TGM) of all farms in the municipality (TGM_mun)
by summing up the TGM of each farm, field, and land use type. For example, xg,f,lu is one of
the central variables, calculating the levels of cropping activities in ha per farm and field. It is a
’Specially Ordered Sets Type 1’ (SOS1) variable. This means, that only one element of the last
set can have positive values (with the rest being zero) (McCarl et al., 2012, chapter XXI). In that
case, each field f per farm g of the variable x can have only one cropping activity lu. This is
necessary because now a land use decision is linked with one field of a certain size. With this
special type of variable, where mutual exclusivity of elements within a set is forced, the model
changes to a mixed integer programming model, requiring another solver in GAMS: the SCIP
(solving constraint integer programs) solver1.
Livestock keeping activities yg,li and flowering strips aesg,f are both positive variables and
provide information about activity levels regarding their sets: yg,li counts the level of occupied
livestock stable places per farm (for cattle or pigs) and aesg,f the level of flowering strips per field
and farm.
In GAMS, it is possible and often advisable to assign bounds or starting values to variables.
This is done for the upper bound of aesg,f being one. Therefore, flowering strips cannot be bigger
than one ha2. However, in order to model flowering strips more accurately, their width is taken into
account as well. Therefore, another variable is included: aes_widthg,f . It is a semi-continuous
variable. If it is non-zero, it takes on a given level above a minimum or below a maximum. The
minimum level for aes_widthg,f is five, meaning that flowering strips are at least five meters
wide.
For livestock-feeding practices, another positive variable is implemented: feedtransg,fc. It
calculates the total amount of fodder crops that is transferred from one’s own crop production in
order to feed livestock. This variable is calculated for each farm and depends on the livestock
type and number.
Off-farm work (off_labg) covers the amount of family labour hours spent outside the agricul-
tural farm. On the contrary, farmers can hire additional labour hours (hire_labg). Both variables
are positive variables and provide insights into the labour allocation patterns of agricultural farms.
The possibility of renting out land is covered by the variable rentout_landg,f . It shows whether
a farmer gives up his or her land under the current (short-run) production conditions. Under the
given production conditions, this variable should be zero since in the model calibration farming
practices are assumed to be stable (in a short-term perspective). Renting out land is linked with
farm size changes. However, farm size changes are modeled only in the 3rd iteration where
1For more information about the SCIP solver, see Maher et al. (2017).
2According to HMUKLV (2015b), flowering strips need to be at least five meters wide and smaller than one ha.
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Table 4.2.: Model variables: declarations, types, and descriptions.
Declaration Type Description
xg,f,lu Specially Ordered Sets Type
1 (SOS1)
Land use activities per farm and field [ha]
yg,li Positive variable Livestock activities per farm [amount of
stable places]
aesg,f Positive variable AES in form of flowering strips per farm
and field [ha]
aes_widthg,f Semi-continuous variable Width of flowering strips per farm and field
[m]
feedtransg,fc Positive variable Fodder crops fed to livestock per farm [dt]
off_labg Positive variable Off-farm labour per farm [hours]
hire_labg Positive variable Hired labour per farm [hours]
rentout_landg,f Positive variable Land rented out per farm and field [ha]
fieldsizeg,f Semi-continuous variable Field size per farm and field [ha]
farmers interact with each other. In all other iterations, this variable serves as a test of whether the
modeled farming structure is stable under the current short-term conditions.
The field size variable fieldsizeg,f also counts to the semi-continuous variables. It provides the
possibility to allocate upper and lower bounds if the value is non-zero. In comparison to standard
positive variables, semi-continuous variables need not have a value if forcing an upper or lower
bound on it (Rosenthal, 2017). As noticed above, this is required since a farmer does not need 36
potential fields. Fieldsizeg,f calculates the size of each field and thereby the amount of fields per
farm.
4.2. Mathematical model formulations
Within this section, the main equations that constitute our model are written down and described
comprehensively. As previously introduced in section 2.4.2.2, FOLAS follows a certain execution
logic comprising four iterations. The iteration procedure is outlined and charted in the following
subsection.
4.2.1. Iteration procedure
FOLAS acts at farm, field, and municipality level. In doing so, the logic of farm consolidation
and farm size changes as part of long-term structural change processes is addressed. Within the
model procedure, field-level information serves as a model input, which constraints model output
at the farm level. Farm-level output is then used as another model input affecting the next iteration
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and so on. Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the iteration procedure at field, farm, and municipality
levels.
The first iteration ought to simulate the current farming conditions. The amount of farms and
field size are adapted to the real conditions of the case study. Since the actual fields are relatively
small, the field size variable has an upper bound of 3.5 ha with respect to field size information
mentioned in section 3.2.5. In order to account for the smaller field sizes, labour coefficients are
adapted accordingly. Labour requirements (per ha) are based on an average field size of 2 ha (see
Appendix H).
Within the 1st iteration, farms do not interact with each other. This delivers the calibration
results of our case study. The objective of each farm is to maximize the total gross margin (TGM)
considering their land, labour, stable, and capital constraints. In maximizing the sum of each
farm’s TGM, the aim of the 1st iteration is to allocate grassland proportions to the available farms
in an optimal manner. Therefore, a grassland constraint is implemented at the municipality level.
There are other farming aspects implemented at the municipality level. These are sugar beet
and potato contracts, the maximum area of silo maize for biogas production, and the available
budget for flowering strips. The model decides on their allocation. Often, such legal conditions
are allocated ‘a priori’ to the farms either due to survey information (Kächele and Dabbert, 2002;
Aurbacher, 2010; Kantelhardt, 2003) or averages (Dabbert et al., 1999). We assume that farms are
different with respect to these aspects. Since no data is available, the applied mode of allocation
seems plausible as due to path dependencies and farm developments, certain farm structures
evolve (Balmann, 1999).
It has to be noted that the first iteration also simulates crops, livestock, and all other variables
summarized in table 4.2 above. The land use and field size variables can be visualized via GIS. As
we want to show how iterations are linked with each other, only the grassland variable is relevant
as an iteration result at the moment.
In the 2nd iteration, land consolidation is assumed. If farmers reach full amalgamation of their
land, they are able to increase field sizes. Under these new conditions, the field size bounds are
relaxed, and each farmer just needs to have at least five fields3 (due to crop rotation considerations).
Furthermore, per ha labour coefficients are now based on labour requirements for fields, which
have an average size of 5 ha (see Appendix H). Each farmer still maximizes the TGM through
an optimal combination of crops and livestock production regarding their land, labour, stable,
and capital endowments. The model structure stays the same except for the aforementioned
3Farm size divided by five.
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changes in labour coefficients and field bounds. The amount of grassland per farm from the
first iteration is transferred to the second iteration and fixed for the corresponding farm. These
grassland constraints are now implemented at the farm level instead of the municipality level.
The aim of the 2nd iteration is to model the optimal production of crops, livestock, and flowering
strips per farm under the given grassland obligations. These iteration results are transferred to the
next iteration.
The 3rd iteration has a fundamentally different model structure. It captures farm interrelations
through land rentals within neighbourhoods. The aim is to simulate farm sizes based on the land
use (cropping) results of the previous iteration. Therefore, cropping results are fixed, and changes
in farm size are simulated by including a new variable. How this will be done is explained in
more detail when we focus on the mathematical model formulations in section 4.2.3.1.
The aim of the 4th iteration is to simulate new farming decisions (crops, livestock, and flowering
strips) based on the new farm sizes of the previous iteration. This iteration is similar to the 1st and
2nd iteration. It simulates final field sizes per farm. The upper bound on the field size variable is
the same as in the 2nd iteration. However since farm sizes changed, field sizes might increase.
Therefore, per ha labour requirements are based on labour coefficients that hypothesize fields of
10 ha (see Appendix H). Farms with grassland (from the 1st iteration) still have the fixed grassland
proportions. If grassland farms quit the sector (in the 3rd iteration), their grassland is rented out to
the neighbouring farm that increased its size at the expense of the abandoned farm.
The 1st, 2nd, and 4th iteration have similar model structures and operate as mixed integer linear
programming models using the same mathematical formulations. Differences are the parameters
mentioned above. The 3rd iteration, however, operates as a non-linear programming model due to
an additional variable for the farm size simulation. In the following sections, these two model
types are handled separately. A comprehensive list of variables and parameters is applied to both
model types; variables are written in lower-case whereas parameters are written in upper-case.
4.2.2. Linear programming iterations
4.2.2.1. Objective function
Each farm increases its total gross margin (TGM) by producing an optimal combination of crops
(including flowering strips) and livestock. Basically, our objective function is similar to linear
programming models and takes into account revenues and variable costs of production (see also
Henseler et al. (2009), Audsley et al. (2006), or Van Wenum et al. (2004)). Farmers can hire
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Figure 4.1.: Overview of the iteration procedures to simulate structural change processes at the
field, farm, and municipality levels. Dotted arrows indicate information transfer and
solid arrows indicate iteration results.
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labour, which creates costs (see for example Júdez and Miguel (2002) or Lauber (2006)); however,
it might pay off. On the other hand, off-farm wage increases the TGM if after farming a family
labour force is left in order to work outside the farm. Moreover, each farmer has to pay land rents.
They depend on the farm size4 and are fixed cost factors. A farmer can also decide to rent out his
or her own land (see also Lauber (2006) or Kantelhardt (2003)). He or she would do that, if the
TGM of farming activities were negative or if the farm size reached a threshold where resources
no longer sufficed to cultivate the whole land. However, the latter is not possible since the farm
sizes stay the same within the 1st iteration. Renting out land would reduce land rent paid by
farmers. The renting activity is implemented in order to prove whether the resources are allocated
according to the needs of the farm sizes. If not, the farm would reduce farming under the given
production conditions and the released land would be abandoned.
The objective function of this iteration is the sum of each farm’s TGM (TGMmun) and is
written as follows:
TGM_mun =
∑
g,f,lu
(Plu · Y IELDlu + PREMlu − V Clu)xg,f,lu
+
∑
g,li
(Pli − V Cli)yg,li
+
∑
g,f
(P_AES − V C_AES + PREM_AES)aesg,f
−
∑
g
hire_labg · LP
+
∑
g
off_labg ·WOFF
−
∑
g
RENTED_LANDg · LRENTg
+
∑
g,f
rentout_landg,f · LRENTg (4.1)
where
• Plu is the price vector for all cropping activities lu [EUR/ha].
• Y IELDlu is the yield vector for all cropping activities lu [dt/ha].
4The amount of owned land vs rented land is taken from statistics (see section 3.2.10).
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• PREMlu is the direct payments (DP) vector for all cropping activities lu [EUR/ha].
• V Clu is the variable costs vector for all cropping activities lu [EUR/ha].
• xg,f,lu is the area of crop type produced per field f and farm g [ha].
• Pli is the price vector for livestock-keeping activities li [EUR/stable place and year].
• V Cli is the variable costs vector for livestock-keeping activities li [EUR/stable place and
year].
• yg,li is the level of occupied livestock stable places per farm g.
• P_AES is the price for flowering strips [EUR/ha].
• V C_AES are the variable costs for flowering strips [EUR/ha].
• PREM_AES are the DP for flowering strips [EUR/ha].
• aesg,f is the size of each flowering strip per field f and farm g [ha].
• hire_labg is the level of hired labour per farm g [hours].
• LP is the labour price for hired farm workers [EUR/hour].
• off_labg is the level of off-farm labour per farm g [hours].
• WOFF is the off-farm wage for work outside the farm [EUR/hour].
• RENTED_LANDg is the amount of rented land for each farm g [ha].
• rentout_landg,f is the level of land rented out per farm g [ha].
• LRENTg is the land rent for each farm g [EUR/ha].
4.2.2.2. Resource constraints
Farm resources consist of land, labour, capital, and stable place capacities. Each farm has a
different amount of production that determines capital and stable place capacities. Family labour
capacities, however, are the same for all farms.
For the land resources, two conditions need to be considered. First, only farm land is available
for cropping activities and participation in AES in the form of flowering strips. The actual farm
land can be reduced by the amount of land rented out (see also Lauber (2006) and Kantelhardt
(2003)):
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∑
f,lu
LANDREQlu · xg,f,lu
+
∑
f
LANDREQ_AES · aesg,f
≤ GWNNSIZEg −
∑
f
rentout_landg,f (4.2)
where
• LANDREQlu is the amount of land required per ha cropping activity lu5.
• xg,f,lu is the area of crop type produced per field f and farm g [ha].
• LANDREQ_AES is the amount of land required per ha flowering strip (= 1).
• aesg,f is the size of flowering strip per field f and farm g [ha].
• GWNNSIZEg is the farm size for each farm g.
• rentout_landg,f is the level of land rented out per farm g [ha].
Second, only owned land can be rented out:
∑
f
rentout_landg,f ≤ OWN_LANDg (4.3)
where
• OWN_LANDg is the amount of owned land in ha for each farm g.
Farm labour resources are allocated to the cropping, livestock, and AES activities per farm.
Hired labour increases and off-farm labour decreases the available labour stock (see also Júdez
and Miguel (2002) or Lauber (2006)):
5Which is 1 for all cropping activities.
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∑
f,lu
INPTREQ′labour′,lu · xg,f,lu
+
∑
li
INPTREQ′labour′,li · yg,li
+
∑
f
INPTREQ_L_AES · aesg,f
−hire_labg + off_labg ≤ INPTCAP′labour′,g (4.4)
where
• INPTREQ′labour′,lu is the amount of labour required per ha cropping activity lu.
• INPTREQ′labour′,li is the amount of labour required per year and livestock stable place li.
• yg,li is the level of occupied livestock stable places per farm g.
• INPTREQ_L_AES is the amount of labour required per ha flowering strip.
• hire_labg is the level of hired labour per farm g [hours].
• off_labg is the level of off-farm labour per farm g [hours].
• INPTCAP′labour′,g is the labour capacity available for each farm g.
However, the maximal amount of off-farm labour hours cannot exceed the family labour hours
available per farm:
off_labg ≤ LABCAPFAMg (4.5)
where
• LABCAPFAMg is the amount of family labour hours available per farm g.
Another farm resource is the amount of financial capital, which is modeled similarly to the
labour resources but with some small deviations:
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∑
f,lu
INPTREQ′capital′,lu · xg,f,lu
+
∑
li
INPTREQ′capital′,li · yg,li
+
∑
f
INPTREQ_I_AES · aesg,f
≤ INPTCAP′capital′,g (4.6)
where
• INPTREQ′capital′,lu is the amount of capital required per ha cropping activity lu.
• INPTREQ′capital′,li is the amount of capital required per year and livestock stable place
li.
• INPTREQ_I_AES is the amount of capital required per ha flowering strip.
• INPTCAP′capital′,g is the capital capacity available for each farm g.
The constraint for the stable place capacity for pigs is specified as follows:
∑
li
INPTREQ′pigstableplace′,li · yg,li ≤ INPTCAP′pigstableplace′,g (4.7)
where
• INPTREQ′pigstableplace′,li is the amount of pig stable places required per livestock activity
li.
• INPTCAP′pigstableplace′,g is the amount of pig stable places available within each farm g.
A similar restriction is implemented for dairy farming.
4.2.2.3. Biophysical and legal constraints
Due to biophysical constraints, farmers have some natural production limits that need to be
captured by the model as well. This is typically done in programming models, and the way of
implementing does not deviate from many other models (see for example Kantelhardt (2003) or
Kächele (1999)). Potatoes, for example, cannot be planted on the same field for two or three years
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in a row without suffering yield reductions. It is recommended to wait at least four years until the
next seeding. This constraint for potatoes is translated as follows:
∑
f
xg,f,′potato′ ≤ GWNNSIZEg · 0.25 (4.8)
where
• xg,f,′potato′ is the area of potato produced per field f and farm g [ha].
• GWNNSIZEg is the size of each farm g [ha].
The same applies to sugar beets and rapeseed. Maize fields need at least one crop rotation after
three planting periods. The same applies to a combination of halm crops. This is mathematically
translated into less than 75% maize or halm crops per season. Wheat is especially sensitive if
planted two years in a row. The model assumes that the yield of stubble wheat6 decreases by
10%. Therefore, another wheat activity (stubble wheat) is included, and the (first) wheat activity
is restricted to 50%.
Biophysical restrictions all apply to each farm, whereas legal constraints are implemented on
the municipality level. Potatoes and sugar beets are traded under contracts, and thus the observed
production level is assumed. For potatoes, this is 2.3% which translates into:
∑
g,f
xg,f,′potato′ ≤
∑
g
GWNNSIZEg · 0.023 (4.9)
The observed level of produced sugar beets in the calibration year is 16.4%. As described in
3.2.9, silo maize production for biogas plants covers around 1% of the study area. Participation in
AES is restricted to the available budget within Wöllstadt as mentioned in 3.2.8. Legal obligations
restrict the conversion of permanent grassland into arable fields. The amount of grassland, which
is 5%, is restricted to at least the observed level. Farmers are allowed to convert arable land into
grassland.
6The second wheat cultivation at the same location.
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4.2.2.4. Livestock keeping
Livestock-keeping farms are endowed with a certain amount of stable places (see section 3.2.3).
In the model, the stable place capacity of pig-fattening farms needs to be reached with at least
95%:
ym,′pig−fattening′ ≥ INPTCAP′pigstableplace′,m · 0.95 (4.10)
where
• ym,′pig−fattening′ is the level of occupied pig stable places per plant and pig-fattening farm
m.
• INPTCAP′pigstableplace′,m is the amount of pig stable places available per plant and pig-
fattening farm m.
For dairy, at least 50% of the stable place capacity needs to be occupied. The maximum level of
livestock keeping is the full occupation of the stable place capacity of each farm. Since silo maize
(fodder) is only fed to dairy and not to pigs and since the model assumes that silo maize silage is
fully used as fodder within the dairy farm, there is another boundary condition implemented:
∑
f
xd,f,′silomaize′ · Y IELD′silomaize′ ≤ feedtransd,′silomaize′ (4.11)
where
• xd,f,′silomaize′ is the area of silo maize production [ha] per plant and dairy-producing farm d.
• Y IELD′silomaize′ is the yield for silo maize [dt/ha].
• feedtransd,′silomaize′ is the amount of silo maize [dt] fed to dairy per plant and pig-fattening
farm d.
Additionally, silo maize production of the other farm types is forced to zero. The very same
applies to grass production, which is only fed to dairy as grass silage.
Livestock feeding practices are further modeled through several other equations. Our model
formulations are aligned to Schönhart et al. (2011) and constitute the following equations.
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In general, there is always a feed balance to make sure that the transferred fodder crops deliver
the required nutrient contents for the produced amount of livestock. For pigs, the required
nutrients are energy and protein, and for dairy, the dry matter (DM) content. According to GfE
(2006), energy requirements of pigs are around 10.4 GJ per year and stable place. The protein
requirements are 78.5 kg per year and pig stable place, which are partly delivered by the grain
ratio in the fodder. The average nutrition contents of the fodder crops in the model are taken from
LfL (2017) and are summarized in Appendix F. For cows, one important parameter is the feed
amount in dry matter, which is 60.6 dt per year and stable place7. The following example shows
the feed balance for dairy.
∑
fc
feedtransd,fc ·NUTCAPCROPSfc,′drymatter′
≥ NUTREQ′dairy′,′drymatter′ · yd,′dairy′ (4.12)
where
• feedtransd,fc is the amount of fodder crops fc [dt] fed to dairy per plant and dairy-
producing farm d.
• NUTCAPCROPSfc,′drymatter′ is the DM content of fodder crops fc [kg DM/kg fresh
matter].
• NUTREQ′dairy′,′drymatter′ is the DM requirement per dairy stable place [dt/year].
• yd,′dairy′ is the level of occupied dairy stable places per dairy-producing farm d.
A production balance makes sure, that the amount of fodder crops is produced by the same farm
and thus available for feeding purposes. The following example shows the production balance
for plant and pig-fattening farms and is similar to the livestock feed balances of Schönhart et al.
(2011). A similar equation is implemented in the model for dairy-producing farms.
−
∑
f
xm,f,fc · Y IELDfc + feedtransm,fc ≤ 0 (4.13)
where
7This is a recommendation of the GfE (2001) for dairy with 650 live weight giving 20 kg milk per day.
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• xm,f,fc is the area of fodder crops fc produced per field f and per pig-fattening farm m
[ha].
• Y IELDfc is the yield of fodder crops fc [dt/ha].
• feedtransm,fc is the amount of fodder crops fc fed to pigs per pig-fattening farm m [dt].
In order to reach certain proportions of fodder crops within the fodder ratio, further equations
are needed. According to GfE (2006), 10.6% of the energy requirement needs to be delivered by
wheat but must be smaller than 50%. In the following exemplary equation, the energy requirement
per occupied pig stable place needs to be delivered by at least 26.7% barley.
feedtransm,′barley′ ·NUTCAPCROPS′barley′,′energy′
≥ NUTREQ′pig−fattening′,′energy′ · ym,′pig−fattening′ · 0.267 (4.14)
where
• feedtransm,′barley′ is the amount of barley fed to pigs per plant and pig-fattening farm m
[dt].
• NUTCAPCROPS′barley′,′energy′ is the energy content of barley [GJ/dt fresh matter].
• NUTREQ′pig−fattening′,′energy′ is the energy requirement per pig stable place [GJ/year].
• ym,′pig−fattening′ is the level of occupied pig stable places per plant and pig-fattening farm
m.
The model assumes that the dry matter requirement is completely delivered by the farm’s own
crop production. The total permanent grassland yields (silage or hay) need to be used first as
fodder. For dairy, 50-60% of the total DM requirement needs to be delivered by silage coming
from grasslands, maize, or grasses from arable fields. However, the maximum amount of the latter
is 10% of the required DM since we assume a maize dominated fodder ratio due to statistical
information on land use. The maximum amount of grain in the dairy fodder needs to be lower
than 6% with respect to the energy requirements (Meyer, 2005). Additionally, the RNB needs to
be around zero (LfL, 2017, pp. 13), which is implemented in the model as being higher than -5
and lower than 5:
∑
fc
feedtransd,fc ·NUTCAPCROPSfc,′RNB′ ≥ −5 (4.15)
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and ∑
fc
feedtransd,fc ·NUTCAPCROPSfc,′RNB′ ≤ 5 (4.16)
where
• feedtransd,fc is the amount of fodder crops fed to dairy per plant and dairy-producing
farm d [dt].
• NUTCAPCROPSfc,′RNB′ is the RNB contribution per fodder crop.
With the following equation, the model makes sure that the total amount of hay and grass
coming from permanent grassland is used as fodder:
∑
f
xd,f,′grasssilage′ · Y IELD′grasssilage′ + xd,f,′hay′ · Y IELD′hay′
≥ feedtransd,′grasssilage′ + feedtransd,′hay′ (4.17)
where
• xd,f,′grasssilage′ is the area of grass silage produced per field f by plant and dairy-producing
farm d [ha].
• Y IELD′grasssilage′ is the yield for grass silage coming from permanent grassland [dt/ha].
• xd,f,′hay′ is the area of hay produced per field f by plant and dairy-producing farm d [ha].
• Y IELD′hay′ is the yield for hay coming from permanent grassland [dt/ha].
• feedtransd,′grasssilage′ is the amount of grass silage fed to dairy per plant and dairy-
producing farm d [dt].
• feedtransd,′hay′ is the amount of hay fed to dairy per plant and dairy-producing farm d
[dt].
4.2.2.5. Grassland constraints
As described in the previous section, we have four iterations. The 1st iteration allocates the
amount of grassland to the agricultural farms of the municipality. The assumption behind is
that due to path dependencies and competitive pressure, permanent grassland is distributed in an
optimal manner over time.
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Within the 2nd iteration, the model does not allow for changes in the grassland proportions.
The grassland area per farm from the 1st iteration is transferred to the 2nd iteration and allocated
to the respective farms. This means that farmers can change the location of their grassland but not
the total area under cultivation. In doing so, a new set for farms having grassland is introduced:
glfarms. This ranges from one to fourteen8, but similar to the fields, each element does not need
to have a value. A maximum of fourteen farms can have grassland. Afterward, for each grassland
farm simulated by the 1st iteration, a constraint is included in the 2nd model iteration, which
fixes the amount of grassland. This constraint includes the proportion of permanent grassland,
which is allocated to the new set and transferred as minimal amounts to the respective farm. The
mathematical formulation for one of four farms9 having grassland is:
∑
f
x′farm9′,f,′grasssilage′ + x′farm9′,f,′hay′ ≥ GRASSLAND′glfarm1′ (4.18)
where
• x′farm9′,f,′grasssilage′ is the area of grass silage produced per field f by farm nine [ha].
• x′farm9′,f,′hay′ is the area of hay produced per field f by farm nine [ha].
• GRASSLAND′glfarm1′ is the area of permanent grassland for grassland farm one glfarm1
calculated by the 1st iteration [ha].
This kind of constraint is adapted to all other grassland farms. For those farms it is possible to
cultivate more permanent grassland; however, they are not allowed to cultivate less.
After rearranging farm land within the farm size optimization (3rd iteration), some farmers quit
farming and hand over the entire land to the neighbouring farm. In the case of a grassland farm,
the grassland proportion is then also transferred to the neighbouring farm. This is modeled in
the 4th iteration. For the example above, the grassland farm one (′glfarm1′), which is farm nine
(′farm9′) quits farming and hands over its land to farm ten (′farm10′). Therefore, the grassland
proportion is also transferred:
∑
f
x′farm10′,f,′grasssilage′ + x′farm10′,f,′hay′ ≥ GRASSLAND′glfarm1′ (4.19)
8Arbitrary number; in several model runs, this number of farms having grassland was never reached.
9Within the 1st iteration, the model generates four farms with grassland (see Appendix M).
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where
• x′farm10′,f,′grasssilage′ is the area of grass silage produced per field f by farm ten [ha].
• x′farm10′,f,′hay′ is the area of hay produced per field f by farm ten [ha].
• GRASSLAND′glfarm1′ is the area of permanent grassland for grassland farm one glfarm1
calculated by the 1st iteration [ha].
4.2.2.6. Equality constraints
As mentioned in section 4.2, xg,f,lu is a SOS1 variable and therefore needs to fulfill a certain
condition. In this case, the SOS1 application makes sure that each field can have only one land use
type. For the variable, it is necessary to define the amount to which xg,f,lu adds up. The possibility
of planting flowering strips along fields f per farm g needs to be considered as well:
∑
lu
xg,f,lu + aesg,f = fieldsizeg,f (4.20)
where
• xg,f,lu is the area of crop type produced per field f and farm g [ha].
• aesg,f is the size of flowering strip per field f and farm g [ha].
• fieldsizeg,f is the size of each field f cultivated by farm g [ha].
Furthermore, the sum of a farm’s field sizes equals the total size of the farm:
∑
f
fieldsizeg,f = GWNNSIZEg (4.21)
where
• GWNNSIZEg is the size of each farm g [ha].
With a lower bound on aes_widthg,f , the model forces flowering strips to be at least five meters
wide. The width of flowering strips is defined as follows:
aes_widthg,f = aesg,f · 10, 000÷ FIELDLENGTHg (4.22)
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where
• aes_widthg,f is the width of flowering strips per field f and farm g [m].
• FIELDLENGTHg is the length of each farm g [m]10.
4.2.3. Non-linear programming iteration
Non-linear programming models are similar to linear ones in that they are composed of an objec-
tive function and several resource constraints. However, non-linear programming models have at
least one nonlinear function. The optimization problem at hand has some nonlinear constraints
related to farm labour and due to the consideration of economies of size (EoS). In order to solve
the non-linear model with GAMS, the CONOPT solver was used. Before elaborating on the
mathematical model formulations, an overview of sets and variables is given.
The sets of the model are the same as in the linear model above as summarized in table 4.1,
although not all of them are used. Sets comprising livestock feeding practices are omitted since
the amount of livestock and the feeding patterns are calculated in the linear model part and kept
as a constant parameter during the nonlinear model. The same applies to flowering strip activities
as well as to the proportions of cropping activities.
In the non-linear programming part of the model run, the total gross margin TGMmun of all
farms is calculated and maximized as an objective function. This is a typical exercise of regional
farm models (see, for example Balmann (1997); Dabbert et al. (1999)). The difference to our
linear programming model is that farms are assumed to be spatially interrelated and able to lease
out their land resources. With this model specification, the long-term perspective and the issue of
farm succession is indicated. In the longer run, farmers having a successor perform better than
others and have a higher probability of keeping the agricultural production going (Van Passel
et al., 2007).
The land exchanging patterns, though, are strongly linked to spatial issues. We assume that
only neighbouring farms lease land to each other11. Otherwise they couldn’t exploit EoS to a full
extent. By including a land exchanging module, the model can optimize each farm’s size under
the condition to rent in and out. The non-linear iteration also includes variables for off-farm work
(off_labg) and hiring labour (hire_labg) for each farm as in the linear model. Farm sizes are
optimized regarding labour requirements for each crop (labreqg,f ), which depend on the field size.
10The length of each farm is assumed to be a fixed parameter as documented in Appendix C and is deducted from
spatial simplification (see section 2.4.2.3).
11According to Strohm (1998), neighbouring relations positively influence land leases.
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The assumption behind this is that field and farm sizes are linearly linked to each other. Increases
in farm sizes lead to increases in field sizes. This is a common assumption, also made by Brady
et al. (2012).
4.2.3.1. Economies of size
In order to explicitly account for EoS, labour requirements need to be considered in a more
specific manner. We show how this could be done.
Labour requirements, as well as variable machine costs for a farmer depend on the farm’s field
sizes. For each cropping activity12, Ktbl data on permanent and seasonal labour in hours per ha
and variable machine costs in Euros per ha were used. They apply to several field sizes and crop
types. This database contains comprehensive information on labour requirement and machine
costs for one, five, ten, and twenty ha. Based on these data, proximity functions for variable
machine costs and labour requirements per ha were calculated for each crop. The relationships
have been linear with R2-values between 0.97 and 0.99. The slope values of the linear functions
were taken as machine cost/labour coefficients, which were later included in the objective function.
All machine cost/labour coefficients are listed in Appendix I.1.
Afterward, proximity functions for the amount of labour hours per field size were calculated for
each crop. These logarithmic functions have R2-values between 0.86 and 0.9213. Hereafter and as
suggested by Nuppenau and Helmer (2007), an approximation was applied to each logarithmic
function in order to receive broken rational functions around a certain field size level. According
to statistical and spatial information we used an average of 3 ha for our case study. The resulting
functions per arable crop were included in the model to calculate labour requirements for each
crop and field. In order to allow for changes in farm sizes (and corresponding to that in field sizes),
a farm size growth factor was included as a variable (gwnn_sizeg). The following example is for
winter wheat14:
labreq_wheatg,f ≥ 5.67154367 + 5.499÷Xfixg,f,′wheat′ · gwnn_sizeg (4.23)
where
12Flowering strips are assumed to be independent from the farm size. As flowering strips are commonly planted
along the field length, economies of size are unlikely to be considered by the farmer here.
13Logarithmic functions are listed in Appendix I.2.
14All other equations for the respective crop are listed in Appendix J.1.
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• labreq_wheatg,f is the labour requirement for wheat per farm and field [hours/ha].
• Xfixg,f,′wheat′ is the area of wheat production for each farm and field [ha].
• gwnn_sizeg is the growth factor per farm g.
Since for several fields the area of wheat production Xfixg,f,′wheat′ is zero and division by
zero is mathematically impossible, a condition for wheat production being greater than zero was
included. This was made for every other equation calculating the labour requirement for a certain
crop.
Gwnn_sizeg values that are smaller than one indicate a reduction in the farm size. Values
greater than one increase the size of the respective farm. In the objective function, this variable is
multiplied by the fixed land use proportions Xfixg,f,lu. Gross margins change due to increases or
decreases in farm sizes. If farm sizes increase, EoS are exploited since less labour input is needed
for bigger fields.
4.2.3.2. Objective function
The objective function maximizes the TGM at the municipality level TGM_mun, assuming land
transferability among farms in order to account for the long-term perspective of the model. For
TGM calculation, the costs are subtracted from the revenues.
As outlined in equation 4.24, the revenue consists of income from cropping activities (Xfixg,f,lu)
and livestock activities (Y fixg,li), as well as from participation in AES (AESfixg,f ). Those
are now fixed parameters adopted from the former model iteration in which they were treated
as variables. Fixed land use proportions Xfixg,f,lu are multiplied by gwnn_sizeg in order to
address the monetary revenues of exploiting EoS. Gwnn_sizeg values greater than one increase
the TGM, and values lower than one decrease it. Off-farm income off_labg also promotes TGMs.
As in the linear programing model, for each land use activity, a governmental payment is included.
For alternate political incentive schemes, it is divided into two payment components as will be
explained in the next section
On the other hand, variable costs of cropping activities, hiring labour, and renting land reduce
the TGM. In contrast to the objective function of the linear programming model(s), variable costs
for cropping activities are classified into direct (DC), service (SC), and machine costs (MC).
The reason for this division is that machine costs are assumed to correlate negatively with
field sizes. Field sizes change due to farm size changes, whereas the other cost components are
linearly positively correlated with the farm size. This means that direct and service costs increase
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(decrease) in the same shape as an increase (decrease) in farm size. Marginal machine costs,
however, get smaller if fields increase due to reduced labour requirements. Therefore, machine
cost coefficients as a function of labour requirements were calculated (see previous subsection)
and multiplied by the cropping activity, the farm size factor, and the labour requirement labreqg,f
of the respective cropping activity. The labour requirement itself depends on the field size and
was calculated separately (see also subsection above).
The objective function below needed to be re-formulated and disaggregated due to the labour
requirement variables, which must be calculated separately for each crop type. The dots [. . . ]
mark all similar terms for each cropping activity.
TGM_mun =
∑
g,f
(Plu · Y IELDlu + PREMlu −DClu − SClu)Xfixg,f,lu · gwnn_sizeg
−[
∑
g,f
labreq_wheatg,f ·Xfixg,f,′wheat′ · gwnn_sizeg ·MC′wheat′ ]− [. . .]
−
∑
g,f
labreq_potato_seasg,f ·Xfixg,f,′potato′ · gwnn_sizeg · SLP
+
∑
g,f
(P_AES − V C_AES + PREM_AES)AESfixg,f
+
∑
g,li
(Pli − V Cli)Y fixg,li
−
∑
g
hire_labg · LP
+
∑
g
off_labg ·WOFF
−
∑
g
(GWNNSIZEg · gwnn_sizeg −OWN_LANDg) · LRENTg
(4.24)
where
• Plu is the price vector for all cropping activities lu [EUR/ha].
• Y IELDlu is the yield vector for all cropping activities lu [dt/ha].
• PREMlu are the DP for the area of all cropping activities lu [EUR/ha].
• DClu is the direct costs vector for all cropping activities lu [EUR/ha].
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• SClu is the service costs vector for all cropping activities lu [EUR/ha].
• Xfixg,f,lu is the area of crop production for each crop type, field, and farm [ha].
• gwnn_sizeg is the growth factor per farm g.
• labreq_wheatg,f is the labour requirement for wheat per farm and field [hours/ha].
• MC′wheat′ are the machine costs for wheat [EUR/ha].
• labreq_potato_seasg,f is the seasonal labour requirement for potatoes per farm and field
[hours/ha].
• Xfixg,f,′potato′ is the area of potato production for each field and farm [ha].
• SLP is the seasonal labour price for hired farm workers [EUR/hour].
• P_AES is the price for flowering strips [EUR/ha].
• V C_AES are the variable costs for flowering strips [EUR/ha].
• PREM_AES are the direct payments for flowering strips [EUR/ha].
• AESfixg,f is the area of flowering strips for each field and farm [ha].
• Pli is the price for livestock-keeping activities li [EUR/stable place and year].
• V Cli are the variable costs for livestock-keeping activities li [EUR/stable place and year].
• Y fixg,li is the level of livestock-keeping activity per farm [stable places].
• hire_labg is the amount of hired labour per farm [hours].
• off_labg is the amount of off-farm labour per farm [hours].
• LP is the labour price for hired farm workers [EUR/hour].
• WOFF is the off-farm wage for work outside the farm [EUR/hour].
• GWNNSIZEg is the farm size per farm [ha].
• OWN_LANDg is the amount of owned land per farm g [ha].
• LRENTg is the land rent per farm g [EUR/ha].
4.2.3.3. Resource constraints
The resources for farms in this model iteration consist of land and labour. Capital requirements
shrink due to EoS. They play no important role as resource restrictions15. However, after farm
15Since we do not model investment decisions.
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enlargement, it might be that capital no longer suffices. Therefore, in the followed model iteration,
the capital capacities are adapted to new farm sizes according to table 3.4. This 4th and last model
iteration is again a linear model calculating the final farming activities. At the same time, this vali-
dation step allows us to prove whether the new farm land is actually used by farmers. Husbandry
capacities (as other resource constraints) were not included in the nonlinear programming iteration
since livestock activities are assumed to stay the same and be independent from the farm size. In
order to increase stable place capacities of livestock farms, investments are required. However, as
mentioned above, investments are not the focus of this study, so they are not explicitly modeled.
In contrast to capital and husbandry capacities, land constraints are obviously needed. The
sum of all cropping and AES activities of the former model step are restricted to the minimum
amount of land available on the municipality level forcing the whole agricultural land to be used16.
Cropping activities are multiplied with the farm growth factor gwnn_sizeg:
∑
g,f,lu
LANDREQlu ·Xfixg,f,lu · gwnn_sizeg
+
∑
g,f
LANDREQ_AES · AESfixg,f ≥
∑
g
GWNNSIZEg (4.25)
where
• LANDREQlu is the amount of land required per ha cropping activity lu17.
• Xfixg,f,lu is the area of crop production for each field and farm [ha].
• gwnn_sizeg is the growth factor per farm g.
• LANDREQ_AES is the amount of land required per ha flowering strip (= 1).
• AESfixg,f is the area of flowering strip for each field and farm [ha].
• GWNNSIZEg is the farm size for each farm g.
Moreover, labour constraints are required when modeling EoS. The calculated labour require-
ment for each crop type is multiplied by the fixed cropping activity level and the farm growth factor
at the farm level. Labour requirements for livestock and AES activities need to be considered,
as well as hired and off-farm labour. Therefore, a labour market is implemented as in the linear
16In the next iteration, upper limits on land are used in order to check if the whole farm land is used, rented out, or
left as fallow.
17Which is 1 for all cropping activities.
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modeling iterations based on proposals of Júdez and Miguel (2002). The equation is implemented
as follows, where the [. . . ] mark all similar terms for each cropping activity.
∑
f
[labreq_wheatg,f ·Xfixg,f,′wheat′ · gwnn_sizeg] + [. . .]
+
∑
f
AESfixg,f · INPUTREQ_L_AES
+
∑
li
INPUTREQ′labour′,li · Y fixg,li
−hire_labg + off_labg ≤ LABCAPFAMg (4.26)
where
• labreq_wheatg,f is the amount of labour required per ha wheat production [hours/ha].
• Xfixg,f,′wheat′ is the area of wheat production for each field and farm [ha].
• gwnn_sizeg is the growth factor per farm g.
• AESfixg,f is the area of flowering strip for each field and farm [ha].
• INPUTREQ_L_AES is the labour requirement per ha flowering strip [hours].
• INPUTREQ′labour′,li is the labour requirement per occupied livestock stable place li
[hours/stable place].
• Y fixg,li is the amount of occupied stable place per livestock-keeping activity li.
• hire_labg is the level of hired labour per farm g [hours].
• off_labg is the level of off-farm labour per farm g [hours].
• LABCAPFAMg is the labour capacity per farm g [hours].
Labour requirements per farm need to be less than or equal to the available amount of family
labour force plus the amount of hired labour. The amount of off-farm work cannot exceed the
available amount of family labour, which is modeled with the following equation:
off_labg ≤ LABCAPFAMg (4.27)
where
• off_labg is the level of off-farm labour per farm g [hours].
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4.2.3.4. Land rentals and neighboring effects
Modeling land rentals is strongly related to spatial dimensions of the model. Depending on the
possibility of cultivating fields located next to their own fields, farmers can enlarge the cultivation
area at the expense of the neighbouring farm in order to gain from EoS. This enlargement takes
place at the farm level, and ignores the current field structures of a farm. Some exceptions prevail;
only two neighbouring farms are capable of leasing or renting land to each other, although they
might have two farm neighbours. There are two farms modeled that have two neighbours with the
possibility to lease land. This exception stems from the spatial locations of the farms. Each farm
needs at least one neighbour (with the same field length). When looking at the rectangular stylized
farms in Appendix A, this condition only holds true if farm 12 and 17 have two farm neighbours
each. The following equation shows an example of a typical pairwise land change constraint:
GWNNSIZE′farm1′ · gwnn_size′farm1′ −GWNNSIZE′farm1′
≤ −(GWNNSIZE′farm2′ · gwnn_size′farm2′ −GWNNSIZE′farm2′)
(4.28)
where
• GWNNSIZE′farm1′ is the farm size of farm 1 [ha].
• gwnn_size′farm1′ is the growth factor of farm 1.
• GWNNSIZE′farm2′ is the farm size of farm 2 [ha].
• gwnn_size′farm2′ is the growth factor of farm 2.
This equation ensures that the farm size change of farm 1 compensates the farm size change in
farm 2. The same applies to farms 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8, 9 and 10, 14 and 15, 19 and 20, 21
and 22, and 23 and 24 (see Appendix A).
Farm 12 and 17 have two neighbours to which they are capable of leasing land (farms 11 and
13 and farms 16 and 18, respectively). In these cases, the following two equations are needed to
make sure that the lease of land among the three farms in line happens correctly:
85
4. FOLAS: Farm optimization at landscape scale
(GWNNSIZE′farm11′ · gwnn_size′farm11′ −GWNNSIZE′farm11′)+
(GWNNSIZE′farm12′ · gwnn_size′farm12′ −GWNNSIZE′farm12′)+
(GWNNSIZE′farm13′ · gwnn_size′farm13′ −GWNNSIZE′farm13′) ≤ 0
(4.29)
and
GWNNSIZE′farm11′ +GWNNSIZE′farm12′ +GWNNSIZE′farm13′ ≥
GWNNSIZE′farm11′ · gwnn_size′farm11′+
GWNNSIZE′farm12′ · gwnn_size′farm12′+
GWNNSIZE′farm13′ · gwnn_size′farm13′
(4.30)
where
• GWNNSIZE′farm11′ is the farm size of farm 11 [ha].
• gwnn_size′farm11′ is the growth factor of farm 11.
• GWNNSIZE′farm12′ is the farm size of farm 12 [ha].
• gwnn_size′farm12′ is the growth factor of farm 12.
• GWNNSIZE′farm13′ is the farm size of farm 13 [ha].
• gwnn_size′farm13′ is the growth factor of farm 13.
4.2.4. Alternate political incentive schemes
In the baseline model described above, CAP reform 2003 is implemented according to the legal
conditions of the calibration year 2011. The model includes DP per acre and restrictions on
permanent grassland conversions. The budget for AES is taken from public data 18 for the year
2014 and is set as an upper limit. Altogether, governmental payments of our case study total
around 342,000 Euros.
18Available online due to the regulation from 10.12.2008 (eBAnz. 2008, AT147 V1).
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The aim of the study is to test the greening component of the new CAP. It ought to contribute
to the biodiversity targets of the EC (European Commission, 2013). In our study, we develop
three different alternate political incentive schemes. Two of these alternate policy designs are
oriented towards the currently implemented new CAP reform and therefore are closely related to
the ’real world’ situation. In the following, they are called CAP I and CAP II. The other political
incentive scheme contains elements of the ’refocus’ scenario of the European Commission (2011)
as well as newer propositions of the ‘Naturschutzbund’ (NABU) promoting the abolition of direct
payments (DP). We call it the ‘nature-focused’ scheme. Detailed political framework conditions
of the baseline model and the three alternate political incentive schemes (policy designs) are
summarized in table 4.3.
In CAP I we try to model the greening architecture of the current CAP. This includes a
separation of the DP into two components: the regulatory cross compliance and the mandatory
greening financial support19. In the model, the greening support is coupled with a designation
of 5% ecological focus areas (EFAs) per farm. This can be achieved by farmers through legume
cultivation, hedges, or fallow land. Each of these activities are balanced due to their weighting
factor as fixed by the European Parliament. For legumes, this is 0.7, for fallow land 1, and the
weighting factor for hedges is 220. Additionally, the model accounts for crop diversification as
it is obligatory in the new CAP reform. It is not allowed to convert permanent grassland into
arable land. As another feature of the new CAP, redistributive payments to support small and
medium-sized farms are attributed to the first 30 ha and the following 16 ha farm land. This
is taken into account as well. According to BMEL (2015), second pillar payments of the new
CAP for Hesse add up to 651 million Euro. This is 9% lower than for the former reform period
(HMUKLV, 2011). Due to that, the budget for AES in CAP I is reduced by this amount compared
to the baseline model. In CAP I, bioenergy production will probably increase by the end of 2020
due to the ambitious German energy targets. Therefore, the capacity of biogas plantations (which
is relatively low in the study area) is assumed to double. In summary, governmental expenditures
are higher compared to the baseline model with around 372,000 Euros for the whole study site21.
CAP II contains the same political framework conditions as the CAP I scenario but with stricter
greening requirements. The EFAs increase up to 7% by the end of the year 2018 (European
19Both payments will be adjusted to a nationwide limit by the end of the reform period in 2020 and will reach a level
of 176 EUR/ha (cross compliance) or 87 EUR/ha (greening).
20Annex X of the supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013.
21This arises out of the redistributive payments since DP are lower and the budget for AES.
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Commission, 2013). On top of that, crop diversification rules are tightened in such a way that
the production area of the two main crops needs to be lower than 75%. The total governmental
payments are the same as in CAP I.
The ‘nature-focused’ scheme covers some main aspects of a new study that was conducted
by Oppermann et al. (2016). In this study, a complete new payment structure is proposed, albeit
the governmental expenses stay the same as in the first period of the new CAP. The main changes
are the abolition of DP and the implementation of an incentive-based AES scheme, which can
be seen as payment reallocation from the first into the second pillar. The authors conclude that
this would lead to a better achievement of the European biodiversity strategy and to a ‘fairer’
treatment of tax-payers since all payments are linked to environmentally friendly measures of
the farmers (Oppermann et al., 2016). The reform stipulates 10% EFA and a restriction on the
conversion of permanent grassland area for each farm in order to get a sustainability premium (SP)
of 150 Euros per ha. For our model we assume 7% EFA, the prohibition of permanent grassland
conversion into arable land, and crop diversification as modeled in CAP II in order to get the SP.
To simplify, the other part of the EC budget22 is used for AES23, which are remunerated through
the so-called agri-nature premium (ANP) (as suggested by the authors). For these ANPs, a much
higher amount of money (1,350 EUR/ha) is paid in order to make participation in environmentally
friendly schemes more attractive for farmers. The budget for ANPs in the ‘nature-focused’ scheme
is calculated from the total GAP 2020 budget minus the SP paid for the whole cropping area of
the municipality. These two payment schemes both contribute approximately the same quantity to
the total governmental budget of the municipality.
Oppermann et al. (2016, Tab. 5, page 33) propose four agri-environmental measures for arable
land:
• extensively produced grain crops (no pesticides and higher distance between rows).
• flowering fields.
• fallow.
• buffer strips along hedges, water bodies, and forests.
22Which is the same for CAP I and CAP II.
23The payment structure of the NABU study is staggered depending on the participation in ecologically valuable
measurements.
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Table 4.3.: Policy designs with respective parameter dimensions.
Baseline CAP I CAP II Nature-focused
Payment scheme - Mostly DP
- Low budget for AES
(0.3%)
- 30% of DP coupled
with greening condi-
tions
- Lower budget for
AES (0.2%)
- 30% of DP coupled
with greening condi-
tions
- Lower budget for
AES (0.2%)
- SP coupled with
greening conditions
- Remaining budget
for ANP
Ecological focus
areas
no 5% 7% 7%
Crop diversifica-
tion
no Two main crops ≤
95% of the cropping
area
Two main crops ≤
75% of the cropping
area
Two main crops ≤
75% of the cropping
area
Small-sized farm
payment
no yes yes no
Grassland conver-
sion
no no no no
Energy Silo maize for biogas
covers ≤ 1% of the
area
Silo maize for biogas
covers ≤ 2% of the
area
Silo maize for biogas
covers ≤ 2% of the
area
Silo maize for biogas
covers ≤ 2% of the
area
To cover the ANP schemes, the model is extended so that in addition to flowering strips, entire
flowering fields can be managed according to ANP conditions. The maximum utilization level for
these kinds of measurements are 25% of the arable land per farm. In the NABU study, as well as
in the ‘nature-focused’ scheme, redistributive payments are not taken into account within the new
payment scheme. Energy targets remain the same as in CAP I and CAP II above.
4.2.4.1. Mathematical implementation
Initial efforts to implement greening mechanisms into programming models already exist. Apart
from crop diversity constraints for farmers, Was¸ et al. (2014) implemented EFAs within the
framework of the CAPRI model as a set-aside area. EFAs were not further differentiated into
possible land use activities such as fallow land, legumes, or other landscape features. The set-aside
area was implemented using respective constraints per farmer. They force them to dedicate 5%
of arable land to set-aside areas. Solazzo et al. (2015) investigated the impact of the new CAP
reform for a smaller region. The authors developed a positive mathematical programming (PMP)
model based on Howitt (1995) and applied it to a region in northern Italy. They focused on the
greening component as well as on redistribution payments24 and simulated different states of
policy proposals. Mathematically, they emphasized greening requirements and farm exclusions.
24Convergence payments due to regional and national (historical) differences.
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Similarly to Was¸ et al. (2014), EFAs were included as percentage constraints for farmers (see
also Ahmadi et al. (2015) and Cortignani and Dono (2015)). Based on individual farm models,
Louhichi et al. (2017) tested the new crop diversity strategies of the EU by implementing the
respective policy constraints. However, other practices of the CAP reform are not explicitly
modeled. Cortignani et al. (2017) were the first who considered several production choices of
farmers in order to comply mathematically with the greening regulations (EFAs). In doing so, they
considered all greening mechanisms at once: crop diversification strategies, EFAs, and penalties
(if farmers do not comply). They used PMP and designed it as a mixed-integer model in order to
capture binary variables for penalty implementation. The model was applied to farm samples of
three regions in Italy. Moreover, they used environmental indicators to evaluate the environmental
effects of the greening measures.
Until now, current literature does not capture the contribution of the potential EFA activities.
As summarized in Annex X of the supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European
Parliament, chargeable land use activities are weighted and do not contribute to the same extent
to EFAs. The actual area of EFAs differs from the minimum required area depending on the
respective land use activity. For example, legumes have a factor of 0.7, while hedges or trees have
a factor of 2. In FOLAS we try to capture these differences by considering weighing factors.
We simulated the greening aspect of the new CAP in separating direct payments (DP) into two
payment components: area-related payments and mandatory ’greening’ payments. The greening
payment needs to be considered in the objective function. Similar to Was¸ et al. (2014), Solazzo
et al. (2015) or Ahmadi et al. (2015), we force greening-effective activities such as legume
production, hedges, or fallow land to be implemented at a minimum amount as summarized in
table 4.3 although they are mandatory. In order to take into account the weighting factors of
mandatory greening measures, we included the following equation. For CAP I, this equation leads
to at least 5% greening activities per farm:
∑
f
(GREENINGCAP′summerpea′ · xg,f,′summerpea′+
GREENINGCAP′fallow′ · xg,f,′fallow′+
GREENINGCAP′hedge′ · xg,f,′hedge′)
≥ GWNNSIZEg · 0.05 (4.31)
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where
• GREENINGCAP′...′ are the weighting factors for the respective activity.
• xg,f,′...′ is the area of greening-effective activity per field f and farm g [ha].
• GWNNSIZEg is the size of each farm g [ha].
A similar equation is implemented for CAP II, although 7% instead of 5% EFAs are assumed.
With this kind of mathematical formulation, we consider detailed aspects of EFAs and try to
contribute to the current literature.
For CAP I and CAP II, small sized farm payments are calculated for each farm depending on
the farm size. It is added to the governmental payments in the objective function of the linear
programming iterations and does not influence farming decisions with respect to farm size. It
might be possible though, that this payment effects farm size decisions. Nonetheless, modeling the
small-sized farming support payment within the non-linear programming iteration causes crashes
with the GAMS solver since endogenous variables (farm size) cannot be used as conditionals25.
Considering the support of small-sized farmers at least in the linear programming seems to be a
first step.
For the ‘nature-focused’ scheme, AES need to be restricted to 20% of the farm land area, which
is implemented with the following equation:
∑
f
aesg,f ≤ GWNNSIZEg · 0.2 (4.32)
where
• aesg,f is the area of flowering strips or fields per field f and farm g [ha].
• GWNNSIZEg is the size of each farm g [ha].
In the ‘nature-focused’ scheme, the management of entire flowering fields are funded by the
agri-nature premium, which is modeled by deleting the upper bound on the aesg,f variable.
25Logical conditionals are used in GAMS in order to judge a value to be ’true’ or ’false’ (Rosenthal, 2017).
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Within alternate policy designs, crop diversify strategies are tightened. Similar to Was¸ et al.
(2014), another legal constraint forces the two main crop types26 to be lower than a certain limit.
For all three policy designs, biogas constraints need to be adapted at double the amount of allowed
area dedicated to silo maize production for biogas plantations.
4.2.4.2. Iteration sequences
The execution logic of the political incentive schemes is similar to the model execution steps
described in section 4.2.1 and summarized in fig. 4.2. It is also build upon iterations, which are
linked to each other via data transfer. However, the iteration runs follow after the 1st iteration of
the baseline model. This makes sure that the resulting permanent grassland proportions stay the
same for each political scheme. The reference system for all three policy schemes is then the land
use activities and farming structure of the baseline calibration run.
For each scenario, the second iteration includes the new political framework conditions sum-
marized in table 4.3 and mathematically implemented as described in the previous section. It
simulates the optimal crop and livestock production as well as the optimal allocation of flowering
strips. This model output is fixed in the 3rd iteration. Here, new farm sizes are calculated as
described in section 4.2.3. The last iteration simulates the resulting cropping and livestock patterns
of the remaining farms after structural change processes (farm size changes). Already after the
second iteration, we can see how much political incentives influence the consolidation process.
This has further effects on the farm sizes (within the 3rd iteration) and the resulting landscape
appearance (from the 4th iteration).
4.3. Spatial model application: impacts on biodiversity
indicators
Results of the FOLAS model are spatially explicit maps of agricultural farms and fields as well as
crops (including flowering strips). We further use them to calculate several biodiversity indicators,
which is one possible use of the model results. As an alternative, abiotic environmental indicators
such as soil erosion control or nitrate depletion could be conceivable. However, with respect to
our research questions, we stick to biotic impact assessments with special attention on pollinator
dispersion.
26Which is in all cases winter wheat and rapeseed.
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Figure 4.2.: Execution logic for modeling alternate political incentive schemes.
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Due to its complexity, more than one hundred biodiversity indicators exist (Pereira et al., 2013).
Depending on the indicator, different aspects of biodiversity can be addressed: species diversity,
threatened species, habitat quantity/quality or connectivity, habitat diversity, and many more (for
a full list, see Gabel et al. (2016)). According to Butchart et al. (2010), these kinds of aspects can
be broadly separated into pressure, state, and response indicators. However, trade-offs between
them make it difficult to decide on the most appropriate ones (Lindenmayer et al., 2015).
Conservation biologists often use surrogate species such as umbrella species, flagship species,
and indicator species for environmental health, population trends, and biodiversity hot spots (Caro
and O’Doherty, 1999). These direct measures are helpful for indicating the extent of anthropogenic
influences on biodiversity and to tackle conservation problems based on the assumption that
fulfilling the requirement of surrogate species would also conserve other species. Another method
of biodiversity indication would be the use of landscape structures such as landscape diversity
and the extent of certain land use types as the distribution of landscape elements influences the
flows of organisms (Forman and Godron, 1986; Dauber et al., 2003). The landscape approach
is suitable for studies at large spatial scales and monitoring programs for its feasibility in terms
of cost and time. Since it cannot guarantee the presence and/or abundance of species although
habitat is available, Chape et al. (2005) recommends using a combination of these two kinds of
indicators.
Habitat occurrence, extent, and diversity are indeed main conditions for a rich species diversity
(Billeter et al., 2008; Fahrig, 2013). We seek to measure an overall loss of species diversity as well
as the abundance of wild bees as pollinators, which occurs due to agricultural landscape patterns
within our intensified agricultural production region. Therefore, habitat indicators at the landscape
scale have been applied to our case study. Besides bees, we do not look for other surrogate species
that are threatened. Of course, applying other habitat models as done in, e.g. Bamière et al. (2013)
could also be applied; however, this is not envisaged within the scope of this study.
In order to monitor biodiversity at the farm scale, Herzog et al. (2017) proposed a set of
descriptors that evaluate the habitat status of farms and ought to measure the effectiveness of EFAs
with respect to the new CAP reform. They put the agricultural landscape into focus. Farmers are
able to participate in AES in order to conserve farmland biodiversity. By discarding redundant or
misleading descriptors, Herzog et al. (2017) found eight core descriptors addressing the habitat
quality of farms and divided them into three groups: (1) structural composition and configuration
of farms, (2) specific farm habitats, and (3) interpreted farm habitat descriptors. The first group
requires habitat maps, while the latter two can be gathered through interviews with farmers or
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simple habitat mapping (e.g. number of trees per ha). Since we do not consider trees or shrubs,
there are still six indicators left that we could calculate with our approach. These are (1) habitat
richness defined as the number of habitat types per ha of farm, (2) habitat diversity, which accounts
for both the number of habitat types and the area of each, (3) average patch sizes, (4) crop richness
as the number of crops per farm and ha, (5) linear habitats in m per ha, and (6) semi-natural
habitats as percentages of farms.
In Herzog et al. (2017), habitat types consist of some general habitat categories such as arable
crops and orchards. These habitat categories are further divided into different intensity levels. Our
approach covers fewer habitat types since only some of the observed farm types in Herzog et al.
(2017) are present in our case study. Habitat richness as the number of habitat types per ha farm
in our case does not differ greatly between individual farms. Individual habitat types examined
in our study are different types of arable crops, flowering strips, and permanent grassland. This
leaves us with four descriptors of the selection above: crop richness, average patch size, linear
habitats, and semi-natural habitats.
In our approach we account for crop diversity by using a Simpson’s diversity index D, which
takes into account the number of crop types present as well as the area of each crop type. Based
on Di Falco and Perrings (2003) it is formulated as follows:
D = 1−
∑
j
x2j (4.33)
where xj is the proportion of farmland allocated to the jth crop. If all land use types n are
located within an observed area and have similar proportional distributions, this index approaches
one. On the other hand, if only one land use type covers the whole area, D equals 0.
Additionally, the number of patches (fields) within a certain area will be calculated based on the
resulting land use and field size maps. Field sizes are basic components of our model and are to
be simulated. As our approach stylizes the landscape into rectangular land use units, we drop the
linear habitats in m per ha. We extrapolate from actual field shapes, and therefore this descriptor
might be misleading. In order to account for the number of semi-natural habitats in our simulated
agricultural landscapes, we calculate the share of semi-natural habitats, which are defined as
flowering strips and permanent grassland27. Mathematically, this is formulated as follows:
S =
(xgrassland + xfloweringstrips)∑
j
xj
(4.34)
27According to Herzog et al. (2017), permanent grassland and flowering strips are categorized as semi-natural
habitats.
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where xgrassland is the area of farmland allocated to grassland, xfloweringstrips is the area of farm-
land allocated to flowering strips, and xj is the area of farmland allocated to the jth crop.
Spatially, our approach differs from Herzog et al. (2017). As they already stated, farm scale
descriptors are not suitable for including effects of spatial habitat configurations at the landscape
scale. Farm ownership or the question of which farmer manages an area does not influence
pollinator dispersion, for example. The dispersion of pollinators depends on the surrounding
agricultural matrix, which constitutes of landscape features (Tischendorf and Fahrig, 2000;
Hagen et al., 2012). Jauker et al. (2009) investigated pollinator dispersal traits depending on
the landscape matrix in an intensively managed agricultural area of the Wetterau region. They
found that pollinators such as bees and hoverflies disperse around a radius of 250 m. In order
to measure the abundance of bees as pollinators, our approach calculates chosen indicators for
circular buffers with a radius of 250 ha as proposed by Jauker et al. (2009). The use of circular
buffers is a well-established method in landscape ecology (applications can be found, for example
in Berg (2002), Gottschalk et al. (2010), Aue et al. (2014)). We therefore employed the buffer
method to measure habitat indicators in our landscapes instead of using farm scale descriptors as
done by Herzog et al. (2017). It defines the scale, which is rather relevant for land managers in
order to monitor habitat changes in detail. The three indicators are (1) crop diversity, (2) number
of patches (fields), and (3) proportion of semi-natural habitat.
In order to calculate the biodiversity indicators at the landscape scale, we are interested in the
values of the whole surface. Therefore, the maps need to be converted to pixels in order to reduce
computational power 28. We took a spatial resolution of 1 m2 so that information loss is low. Then,
each pixel is assigned a circular buffer with a radius of 250 m. The buffer zones overlap because
each pixel has its own buffer circle. Since land use outside the agricultural area is not modeled,
the outer stretch (250 m) of the resulting land use map does not contain reliable information. It
will be excluded from indicator calculation. Indicator values are calculated for each pixel, using
the land use information within its buffered area.
For example, the Simpson’s diversity index is calculated for each 1 m2 pixel with respect to
the circular buffer around it. The same applies to the semi-natural habitat indicator: the share of
pixels within a buffer cultivated by semi-natural habitats is calculated as a percentage of the whole
buffer area for each pixel separately. In order to account for the landscape structure with respect
to the field sizes, the third biodiversity indicator is the number of fields. The modeled land use and
field size map is again divided into buffer plots with a radius of 250 m. This time, however, the
28This is also done by Jauker et al. (2009).
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number of patches/fields within circular buffers was calculated using sampling points that lie 250
m apart from each other. We then estimated the values using a spline function that extrapolates
the patterns into non-sampled areas. Closer sampling points need too much computational power
and are not workable.
Apart from choosing an appropriate indicator, the reference system against which indicators
are compared is required. This can either be (modeled) potential natural vegetation or the current
land use (Koellner et al., 2013). Since there is no unified concept about which reference point to
take, it depends on the context of the biodiversity assessment. Gabel et al. (2016) suggest at least
comparing different scenarios with each other: one of the actual land use and a second alternative
land use mixture. With our baseline model (1st iteration), we consider the current land use map as
a reference system. Furthermore, we are going to simulate several political incentive schemes that
affect landscape appearance. These varying landscapes lead to certain changes in biodiversity
indicators, which we are going to compare to each other.
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We examined alternate political incentive schemes with respect to the resilience of the socio-
ecological system of our case study. In section 2.3 we clarified our analytical framework and
defined critical thresholds of different domain-scale combinations in order to test whether certain
regime shifts occur due to structural change processes. Regime shifts indicate possible future
developments of our case study, which we are able to elaborate before they actually happen. We
further seek to assess how political incentives may alter species diversity. Therefore, our model
is used (1) to show possible future scenarios of the case study and (2) to test the achievement of
political biodiversity protection goals.
The present chapter is arranged according to the three defined thresholds of the driving variables:
(1) Amount of farm types, (2) amount of farms, and (3) field sizes. There is then an overview
of the model results, which are linked to those respective thresholds. Afterward, the produced
stylized maps of our case study are presented. They are used in order to calculate our three
chosen biodiversity indicators. The last section of the chapter is dedicated to the political impact
assessment with respect to biodiversity targets. Here, we will show results of our first model
application, which seeks to measure spatial biodiversity indicators as previously described.
5.1. Critical thresholds
5.1.1. Farm type losses
The critical threshold within the economic domain at the farm scale is crossed if one of the three
farm types quits the agricultural sector. According to our baseline model results, after structural
change processes, no dairy farm was left, and the critical threshold was reached. This also refers
to each alternate policy design. Pig-fattening farms remained in the sector and even increased
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their acreage1. Arable farms still formed the largest part with respect to farm types.
Similar results can be found in Happe et al. (2011), who examined structural change processes
and measured their indirect effects on nitrogen loss. With AgriPolis, structural change was
modeled, and results were transferred to farm models in order to estimate nitrate depletion.
They tested the impacts of two different policy designs on farm structure and nitrogen effects
in Denmark. Their results showed that cattle farms, and the number of cattle decreased. Only
large-scale dairy farms survived since they were able to use economies of scale. Pig farms
increased their acreage and became classified as mixed farms. The reduction in manure production
due to the change in livestock numbers could reduce ammonia emission.
In our case study, cattle farms are relatively small compared to the regional average (Hessisches
Statistisches Landesamt, 2012a). We can therefore assume that in the long run only arable and
mixed pig farms will remain within our research area. In contrast to the impacts on nitrogen
depletion, our ecological focus lies with spatial agricultural patterns in order to assess changes in
species diversity. Besides field sizes and semi-natural habitats, in our study, landscape structure is
represented by land use patterns in the mode of crops. Therefore, we will take a closer look at
cultivated crops.
The loss of dairy-producing farms led to less diverse cropping patterns at the landscape level.
Table 5.1 depicts the 1st iteration of the baseline model, which comprises our reference point
since it calibrates the cropping patterns of 2011. In comparison to these results, we included the
cropping results after structural change processes for the baseline model and for the alternate
policy designs2. In the 4th iteration, grasses and silage maize were no longer produced compared
to the 1st iteration of the baseline model in which farmers still keep cattle. The management of
permanent grassland was streamlined and only hay was produced at lowest management costs3,
which can be sold to other farmers within the region. Through the obligatory ecological focus areas
(EFAs) of the political incentive schemes (5% in CAP I and 7% in CAP II and ‘Nature-focused’)
summer pea production was added at the expense of rapeseed production.
1Except for the results of the sensitivity analysis on lower land rents, where one pig-fattening farm closed down.
2Land use results of the sensitivity analyses are summarized in Appendix L.
3Hay production is cheaper and requires less labour than grass silage.
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5. Results
In accordance with our analytical framework, regime shifts at the farm scale can trigger regime
shifts at the ‘patch’ scale (see figure 2.2). Our results confirm this since crop diversity is obviously
affected by farm specialization processes. Apart from the ‘patch’ scale, farm scale regime shifts
are also related to the regional scale. As a consequence of dairy farm exits, our model showed
that the labour market can be affected as well.
Dairy keeping is strongly linked with farm labour patterns since it requires much more labour
input compared to purely arable farming. Actually, all our model results showed that only dairy
farmers require additional labour (see table P.1 in the Appendix), which needs to be hired at
great cost from the labour market. After field amalgamation hired labour hours could be reduced.
Due to bigger fields, labour productivity increased, and more labour became available for other
sectors; off-farm labour increased due to free labour capacities (see table P.2). After dairy farms
were displaced, there was no more need for hired labour. We can assume that dairy farmers as
employers will become rare in Wöllstadt. Depending on the new farm sizes after land exchanges,
family labour requirements differed between farms, and off-farm work increased or decreased.
Due to farm size enlargements, one farm already worked full time. It was the largest farm after
land exchanges (see farm 20 in table P.3). Other larger farms (farms 10, 12, and 15) decreased
off-farm labour, while some other farmers worked more outside the agricultural sector; this is
a result of EoS effects. At the municipality level, 48 % of the labour capacity was used for
agricultural activities within the 1st iteration. After farm size optimization, only 37% labour force
was used, with the rest being off-farm labour4. Reducing hired labour in order to save costs and
shifting from part-time to full-time farms are typical features of the structural change process
(Happe et al., 2011).
This trend was even stronger in our sensitivity analysis of lower grain prices. Prices for grain
crops are usually volatile and therefore often subject to change. In order to check for differences
and deviations within our model results, a sensitivity analysis on grain prices was conducted.
Therefore, the median values of time series on grain prices (see section 3.2.2) were exchanged
with values of the baseline model, while all other model parameters stayed the same (c.p.). Since
grain prices were high in the calibration year, median values of the time series were around
one standard deviation lower than the baseline model prices. Results showed that within the 1st
iteration, dairy farmers were already reducing their cattle stocking rate by around 25% at the
municipality level. Due to lower grain prices, farmers’ incomes were reduced5. Therefore, in
4These results are similar to the results of the sensitivity analysis on lower and higher land rents as well as to the
results of the CAP I and CAP II policy designs.
5Detailed model results on income are presented in the next section.
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order to reduce costs, farmers minimized dairy keeping and hired less additional labour (see table
P.4). On average, off-farm labour was higher than the baseline model results. Farmers worked
even more outside the agricultural sector, since less money could be earned within agriculture.
After field amalgamation, total dairy capacity was fully utilized (as it was in the baseline model).
The use of EoS could reduce farmers’ costs and make dairy keeping more competitive meaning
that hiring labour would again be worthwhile (see table P.5). This indicates that field consolidation
might mitigate cattle losses. However, after additional land exchanges (due to land leases) all dairy
farmers quit the sector. At the municipality level, only around 20% of the labour force was used
for farming activities; the rest was off-farm work (see table P.6). In the ‘nature-focused’ policy
design, 25% of the labour force was used after land leases at the municipality level, which is
around ten percent less than for other policy designs6. This deviation was caused by the cultivation
of less labour-intensive flowering fields instead of conventional crop production.
Happe et al. (2008) also showed that cost savings first take place in the form of labour-saving
technologies and by laying off hired farm workers. Labour saving production technologies are
especially preferred since off-farm work is an attractive alternative. The lower the required
labour input, the more favourable the agricultural production. These findings are particularly
relevant with respect to technical progress and labour-saving technologies, but also regarding
job alternatives. The more interesting and lucrative alternative job possibilities are, the more
farmers quit the agricultural sector. It shows the importance of off-farm opportunities as drivers
for structural change (Happe et al., 2011). With our study, we can confirm that labour alternatives
are central conditions for agricultural production.
Agricultural labour movements are linked with population movements (Eberhardt and Vollrath,
2016) and indicate demographic changes within rural areas (Knickel et al., 2017). Depending on
the dimension of out-migration and overaging, another regime shift within the socio-cultural do-
main could follow. According to our conceptual framework, there is a link between the economic
farm scale and the socio-cultural regional scale. The proportion of agricultural employees within
Wöllstadt is relatively low though7, and the effect might be marginal for our case study. However,
in regions where agricultural production provides jobs for a larger part of the population, this link
becomes more significant (Manos et al., 2013). With respect to the debate on promoting strong
rural areas within Hesse (HMUKLV, 2015a), it is remarkable that structural change and the use of
EoS might foster out-migration due to fewer agricultural labour alternatives.
6Off-farm labour patterns of the 4th iteration for alternate policy designs are summarized in table P.7.
72.3% in 2010 according to Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt (2012a).
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Another characteristic of farm type loss worth mentioning here seems to be the participation in
agri-environmental schemes (AES). Before modeling land leases within the 3rd iterations, only
dairy farmers planted flowering strips8. Also Pufahl and Weiss (2009) as well as Zimmermann
and Britz (2016) found that low-intensity cattle keeping is related to the participation in AES.
After dairy farmers quit the sector, our model showed that the largest farms with respect to area
(mainly arable farms) provided flowering strips instead. These findings can be supported by Pavlis
et al. (2016), who found that mainly large farms are attracted to AES.
Nevertheless, at the landscape scale, the amount of flowering strips stayed the same within
each model run. Cultivation of flowering strips has been modeled through available subsidies of
the respective political incentive schemes. In CAP I and II, less money is available for AES (see
section 4.2). Therefore, the amount of flowering strips was lower. In the ‘nature-focused’ scenario
though, a lot more AES in the form of flowering strips and fields were realized (see table 5.1).
Flowering strips are categorized as semi-natural habitats with a high potential to increase habitat
quality in especially homogeneous landscapes (Tscharnke et al., 2012). Therefore, biodiversity
is likely to be affected within our case study. Since other landscape characteristics such as field
sizes as well as spatial allocation patterns of semi-natural habitats also play an important role for
species diversity (Hendrickx et al., 2007; Fahrig et al., 2011; Fahrig, 2013), we will show changes
in biodiversity indicators on the basis of our spatial explicit land use maps in section 5.3.
In summary, the farm scale threshold within the economic domain (changes in the amount of
farm types) has been crossed within each model run. According to our conceptual framework,
this induces shifts within other domain-scale combinations. In our case, cascading regime shifts
have been the economic ‘patch’ scale in the mode of a less diverse cropping patterns, as well
as the regional scale through reduced labour requirements. Depending on the importance of the
sector, the labour market may influence the socio-cultural domain via out-migration (Eberhardt
and Vollrath, 2016). Such cascading effects might lead to new regimes, which are less desired
from the social perspective and less resilient from an ecological point of view (Walker et al., 2004;
Walker and Meyers, 2004; Matthews and Selman, 2006). Although, before elaborating on the
ecological impacts, in the next section we are going to have a look at farm numbers as another
driving threshold variable.
8Apart from the ‘nature-focused’ model, where many more farmers took part in environmental measurements.
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5.1.2. Farm closures
The 3rd iteration simulates farm sizes and their amount within the total agricultural area of the
study site. In our baseline model, 17 of formerly 24 farms remained in the agricultural sector;
around 30% stopped agricultural production. The critical threshold of one third fewer farms was
almost reached within the baseline model, although not crossed.
In order to understand farm closures, we need to dig more deeply into farm income patterns.
Each farmer receives a different total gross margin (TGM), which depends on crop production,
farm size, type, and general model conditions. In appendix N, TGMs of each iteration of the base-
line model are summarized in tabular form. At the individual farm level, TGMs either decreased
or increased from one to the other model iteration. Between the first and the second iterations,
farm sizes stay the same for each farmer and only field sizes change due to field consolidation
processes. Since field consolidation reduces costs, TGMs are expected to increase. For several
reasons, this was not the case for every farm. For example, farm 2 had a TGM of 70,337 Euros in
the 1st iteration and a TGM of 47,772 Euros in the 2nd iteration (see appendix N.1). Whereas in
the 1st iteration, farm 2 planted almost four ha potatoes, among other crops, in the 2nd iteration,
it no longer produced potatoes, producing more sugar beets instead. Potato production delivers
the highest TGMs, which is why the TGM strongly decreased. At a first glance, it is not realistic
for potato production to change between farmers, since potato production is linked to contracts
and specified production machines. A technical solution to control potato cultivation would be to
fix potato production results per farm in the 1st iteration of the baseline model and transfer them
to the 2nd iteration as it was done with the grassland proportions. This would ensure that potato
production stays with the same farmers. However, under free market conditions, farmers are
flexible with respect to their potato and sugar beet production9 and for the harvest, it is possible to
borrow machines or pay a service company. When considering a long-time period as it is done
within this study it is indeed possible that the production patterns of farmers change. Therefore,
the production patterns of potatoes and sugar beets are deliberately not restricted at the farm scale
within our model. In the current study, a more important perspective sheds light on changes in
field and farm sizes, here at the municipality level, after exploiting EoS. Since the impacts on
biodiversity are to be addressed, fields, crops, and technology must interact. A more precise image
of production patterns at the farm level requires much more farm data, which is not available
without elaborate and expensive data acquisition. Note that the average TGMs at the municipality
level increased (see table 5.2), and the model therefore delivers satisfying results. In the following
9For sugar beets this trend is even stronger since sugar contingents of the EU end at the end of the year 2017.
104
5. Results
paragraphs, we focus on the structural implications at the landscape scale.
At the municipality level, TGM results of the 1st iteration of the baseline model totaled
1,392,101 Euros and the average TGM was around 58,000 Euros per farm. With an average
farm size of 51.5 ha, this led to an average TGM of 1,125 Euros/ha (see table 5.2). After field
consolidation, the TGM at the municipality level and the average TGM per farm slightly increased.
In the 4th iteration, the TGM at the municipality level was lower again due to the loss of dairy
production. However, the average TGM was around 78,000 Euros per farm, which is much higher
now. Since seven farms closed down, the total agricultural area was allocated to fewer farms,
which generated more money per farm. Compared to the 1st and 2nd iterations, the average TGM
per ha decreased at the municipality level. When considering much higher farm sizes, though, the
average TGM per ha is still higher10.
Considering the trajectories of the common agricultural policy reforms, the CAP goals of
increasing production efficiency through economic rationalities are approached if some farmers
quit the sector (Burrell, 2009). Rickard (2015) argues that the new CAP 2020 reform slows down
farm growth due to direct payments (DP). He suggests phasing out DP in order to support a more
rapid change to larger-scale, capital-intensive, and highly technological farms using precision
technology and EoS. When looking at our results, interestingly, in both CAP I and CAP II, one
farm less than the baseline model remained. In these cases, the critical threshold levels were
crossed. This indicates another regime shift within the socio-cultural domain at the regional scale
(compare figure 2.2). According to that, the implemented policy designs inspired by the CAP
reform 2020 would accelerate structural change within our research site. We will therefore have
another look at farmers’ incomes in the CAP I and II policy regimes.
Compared to the baseline model, average TGMs per farm were 1.3% or 2.7% lower after the
2nd iteration (see table 5.2). Was¸ et al. (2014), Ahmadi et al. (2015), Cortignani et al. (2017) and
Louhichi et al. (2017) also found marginal losses in farmers’ incomes due to CAP 2020. They
showed that income losses were not the same for all farm types. For example, beef finishing farms
had higher income reductions (3%) (Ahmadi et al., 2015). However, if structural change is taken
into account, what none of the studies above did, a different picture emerged from our results.
Based on production patterns of the 2nd iteration, in our case, new farm sizes were simulated.
After land leases only 16 farms remained and average TGMs per farm were 3.1% (in CAP I) and
1.6% (in CAP II) higher than in the baseline model results. Our results indicate that even small
10EoS might be even higher, if respective investments were modeled.
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deviations in the income level may lead to farm closures in the long run.
The spatial scale and the location of the previously mentioned studies vary significantly from
our case study. Moreover, apart from Cortignani et al. (2017), they did not cover all greening
mechanisms of the new CAP reform. While some considered only crop diversification regulations,
others purely focused on EFAs as part of their greening measures. Nevertheless, income may not
be the only driver of farm closures. Mandryk et al. (2012) applied regression analyses to analyze
impacts on structural change processes. Based on historical data, the authors found that both
technology and market prices have strong influences on farm sizes and farm specialization; the
lower the wheat price, the larger the farm sizes. Our sensitivity analysis on lower grain prices
confirmed the impacts of market prices on farm sizes; only 13 farms remained with a higher
average size. Low grain prices led to the highest income reductions at the municipality and
average farm levels (see table 5.2). Structural change seems to be accelerated due to lower market
prices.
According to Mandryk et al. (2012), climate change and policy change have no impact on the
farm size but positively affect specialization. In our study, climate change variables were not
explicitly taken into account, although, climate change has an influence on crop prices (Ewert
et al., 2011). If crop prices change due to climatic conditions, our sensitivity analysis on grain
prices showed that farm sizes would also be expected to change. Therefore, climate change may
indeed have significant impacts on farm sizes. Impacts on farm types related to policy changes
could not be found in our case. In each model run, dairy farms quit the sector independently
of the implemented political incentives. However, in contrast to the results of Mandryk et al.
(2012), farm sizes have changed due to alternate policy regimes. Within the ‘nature-focused’
policy design after land leases, 18 farms remained in the agricultural sector. Since more farms
than in CAP I and CAP II remained, the average TGM per farm was lower than in other policy
designs. TGMs of the respective iterations were also lower compared to the baseline model (-9.6%
compared to the 2nd iteration and -15% compared to the 4th iteration). However, if we take the
calibration results of the baseline model as a reference system, after structural change, the average
TGM of the ’nature-focused’ policy design increases by around 14%. Therefore, the importance
of determining the reference point becomes apparent. Nevertheless, if this policy design is chosen,
it seems like structural change would be needed in order to compensate farmers’ income losses.
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5. Results
If we compare the outcomes of the ‘nature-focused’ policy design and the sensitivity analysis
for lower grain prices, it becomes more apparent that income variables alone are not sufficient
to predict farm closures. In both model runs, the average TGMs of the 2nd iteration reached a
comparable level. However, there are major differences in number of farms remaining in the
sector after land leases. Due to political incentives, farmers planted more flowering fields instead
of cash crops. This diminished the need to exploit EoS to their full extent, and land leases were
lower. In contrast to cash crops, EoS are not typically exploited for flowering strips and fields.
Instead, farmers need less labour and reduce their production costs. In a situation with low grain
prices farmers also face income losses, though they do not have the same alternatives; there is too
little money available for environmental measures. The optimal strategy seems to be to intensively
exploit EoS, resulting in much fewer farms of bigger sizes. In contrast to Mandryk et al. (2012),
our investigation showed that policy may indeed have impacts on farm sizes; at least for our
case study. The authors noted that they addressed neither landscape characteristics nor spatial
attributes, although these are important for scenario implementations.
Land demand and therefore, farm size is also driven by agricultural land rent prices (Ciaian and
Swinnen, 2006; Bartolini and Viaggi, 2013). In our sensitivity analyses, lower land rent prices led
to 15 farms remaining, while higher rent prices led to 18 farms remaining. At the municipality
level, TGMs of higher rent prices were lower than in the baseline model, and TGMs of lower
rent prices led to higher TGMs in each iteration (see table 5.2). According to the statistics, in our
model 64% of the agricultural area has been rented (see section 3.2.10). If rent prices increase,
farmers have higher costs, and their TGMs are lower; more money needs to be spent in order to
produce crops on more expensive land. This seems to alleviate structural change, since more farms
than in the baseline model remain. On the contrary, lower land rents seems to accelerate structural
change: in the sensitivity analysis on lower land rents, only 15 farms remained. Farming seemed
to be more profitable since TGMs were higher and farmers had more incentives to increase farm
sizes. If land prices were lower, farmers were willing to rent more land than if land prices were
higher, meaning fewer but bigger farms remained within our case study.
Similar results can be found in Happe et al. (2008). They investigated the effects of political
changes on farm structures and found that land prices were influenced by political reforms. Land
prices affected farm profits to such an extent that structural change was accelerated or slowed
down. If rental rates were lower, structural change was faster and vice versa. Since the remaining
farms were able to lease land at lower prices, they could implement economies of scale more
easily. This is why Happe and Balmann (2002) claimed that DPs increase land rents artificially
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and thereby slow down structural change. This of course also depends on the initial state of the
system. If farms are already big and most scale effects are exploited, the effects on structural
change are lower. The authors further stated that livestock farms suffer from lower land prices,
since land also serves as security for the high investment requirements. However, the authors did
not model each farm type separately, so these interpretations need to be treated with caution. In
our sensitivity analysis on lower land rents, we found that apart from all dairy keeping farms, one
mixed pig-fattening farm also closed down. Therefore, livestock-keeping farms may indeed be
more affected by lower land rents.
To summarize, farm closures are driven by complex interrelations. There seems to be a trade-off
between income pressures that push farmers to increase farm sizes (see the example of lower
grain prices) and the profitability of farming per se (see the example of higher land rents). If land
prices are too high, farms rather stop expanding in size. On the contrary, farms get larger if land
rents are low since profitability increases. As we showed with the ‘nature-focused’ policy design,
policy also has the power to control farm closures through incentives.
Within CAP I and CAP II, the critical thresholds of farm closures have been reached. This
might influence other scales and domains, too. For example, a reduction in farms may induce a
reduction in the rural population (Eberhardt and Vollrath, 2016). After farm size enlargement
mainly small part-time farms quit the sector. The obligation to stay in the rural area is lower and
migration to urban centers becomes more attractive (Knickel et al., 2017). Even labour markets
are influenced by farm closures since fewer farms as potential employers remain (as already
outlined above). Larger farms have larger fields (Cong et al., 2016); therefore, also the patch
scale is influenced by regime shifts of the economic farm scale. This leads us to our last critical
threshold, which we are going to discuss in the following section.
5.1.3. Increasing field sizes
The vast majority of agricultural system models simulated land use variables for the prevailing field
structures. Therefore, some authors converted landscape features into raster data and allocated
economic land use results randomly to the respective pixels albeit they considered spatially
geographic data (e.g. Rounsevell et al. (2006); Weinmann (2002); Dabbert et al. (1999)). Others
used Markov chains to allocate land use results (Castellazzi et al., 2010; Aurbacher and Dabbert,
2011). Kapfer et al. (2015), Schönhart et al. (2010), Aurbacher (2010), and Kächele and Dabbert
(2002) simulated land use results by working at the field level and referred to each existing field;
due to computational power and time restrictions, only small case studies could be investigated.
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Table 5.3.: Average field sizes of the baseline model per farm in ha.
Farm 1st iteration 2nd iteration 4th iteration
1 3.1 4.2 10.6
2 3.3 7.0 3.0
3 3.1 6.5 10.9
4 3.1 6.5 -
5 3.2 8.6 16.4
6 3.4 7.8 -
7 3.4 5.9 6.2
8 2.8 5.2 4.9
9 3.0 7.2 -
10 2.9 6.4 13.6
11 2.8 4.6 2.6
12 3.0 6.5 10.7
13 2.7 5.5 4.1
14 3.2 8.6 -
15 3.2 10.4 19.1
16 2.9 4.6 10.5
17 2.5 4.1 -
18 3.1 6.6 6.9
19 3.1 6.8 -
20 3.5 15.9 21.5
21 2.7 4.1 11.4
22 2.9 5.8 -
23 3.3 7.5 7.9
24 3.2 6.8 6.4
Total average 3.1 6.7 9.9
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We simulated field sizes as a part of farming decisions. They are subject to change throughout
every iteration due to new model conditions (e.g. field amalgamation or farm size changes). Our
results showed that the average field size at the municipality level increased after each iteration.
The average field size of the baseline model increased from 3.1 ha in the 1st iteration to 6.7 ha in
the 2nd iteration and 9.9 ha in 4th iteration after land exchanges11. At the farm level, field sizes
developed differently as summarized in table 5.3. From the 1st to the 2nd iteration, due to field
consolidation, average field sizes increased for every farm. However, in the 4th iteration for some
farms, the average field size decreased, whereas they increased for other farms. Negative field
size developments occurred on the farms getting smaller during the 3rd iteration. For example,
the average field sizes of farm 2 decreased while its size also decreased from around 49 ha to 14
ha (see tables P.1 and P.3). This farm is a typical case, where even more farms become part-time
enterprises with a higher degree of off-farm labour. Despite having less land, crop rotation still
needs to occur, which is why the field sizes cannot go beyond a certain minimum or maximum,
depending on the farm size.
In the sensitivity analysis on lower grain prices, the average field size within the calibration step
was the same as in the baseline model (see table 5.4). However, in the 2nd iteration, the average
field size at the municipality level was higher with 7.1 ha. The difference is relatively low and
stems from changes in the grassland allocation patterns within the 1st iteration12. Corresponding
to higher farm sizes, field sizes were also higher after land leases than in the baseline model (13.3
ha). Field size results of the sensitivity analysis for higher land rents were almost the same as
the baseline model. The only deviation was the average field size of the last iteration, which was
lower when putting higher land rents at the base (9.4 ha). The reason is that more farms remained
after farm size optimization than in the baseline model. In the sensitivity analysis of lower land
prices, field sizes increased from 3.1 ha in the 1st iteration to 6.7 ha in the 2nd iteration and 11.0
ha in the 4th iteration. Compared to the baseline model, these values are the same for the 1st and
2nd iteration but higher than in the last iteration due to there being fewer farms after land leases.
The sensitivity analyses again showed, that the model reacted plausibly.
If we compare our results of the different policy designs, the highest average field size after
land leases occurred in CAP II with 10.8 ha. Although in both the CAP I and II policy schemes,
the same amount of farms remained, the average field sizes in CAP I was lower in both iterations
(see table 5.4). In CAP II farmers faced stricter crop diversification requirements and more land
11Field size changes occurred similarly to Brady et al. (2012).
12Allocation patterns of grassland to farms are summarized in Appendix M.
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Table 5.4.: Amount of farms and average farm and field sizes of all model runs at the municipality
level in ha.
Model run Amount of farms ∅ farm size (ha) ∅ field size (ha)
Baseline
1st iteration 24 51.5 3.1
2nd iteration 24 51.5 6.7
4th iteration 17 72.8 9.9
Sensitivity analysis lower grain prices
1st iteration 24 51.5 3.1
2nd iteration 24 51.5 7.1
4th iteration 13 95.2 13.3
Sensitivity analysis higher land rents
1st iteration 24 51.5 3.1
2nd iteration 24 51.5 7.1
4th iteration 18 68.7 9.4
Sensitivity analysis lower land rents
1st iteration 24 51.5 3.1
2nd iteration 24 51.5 6.7
4th iteration 15 82.5 11.0
CAP I
2nd iteration 24 51.5 6.6
4th iteration 16 77.3 10.2
CAP II
2nd iteration 24 51.5 7.2
4th iteration 16 77.3 10.8
’Nature-focused’
2nd iteration 24 51.5 7.0
4th iteration 18 68.7 9.5
needed to be reassigned to EFAs. Therefore, farmers balanced income losses by using EoS to
increase their agricultural fields. In the ‘nature-focused’ policy design after land exchanges, the
lowest average field sizes at the municipality level remained (even compared to the baseline
model). Farmers’ incentives to increase their field sizes seemed to be lower since alternative
income possibilities from flowering fields were not driven as much by EoS measures as cash crops
were (see previous section).
In all model runs, the critical field size threshold was crossed. According to our definition, it
is reached if field sizes more than double. Since in the 1st iteration of the baseline model (the
model calibration step) the average field size was 3.1 ha, this threshold was heavily crossed by all
ensuing model runs. This indicates another regime shift, which takes place at the ‘patch’ scale
within the economic domain. Field size changes at the ‘patch’ scale also effect landscapes and
therefore species diversity (Billeter et al., 2008). Field sizes determine the distance between
potential habitats and the location where beneficial insects can have a positive effect on pollination
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(Ricketts et al., 2008). Crop pollination is densely edged to marginal areas, and valuable ES might
get lost (Pufal et al., 2017; Potts et al., 2010). On the other hand, bigger fields lead to higher
homogeneity since fewer crop types are planted within the same area. As a result, aesthetic values
might get lost (Van Zanten et al., 2016), too.
In our study, three spatial indicators capturing these phenomenons will be presented. Indicator
calculations were applied based on the land use and field size maps of the baseline model as well
as the three alternate policy regimes. However, before elaborating on our biodiversity indicator
results, land use and field size maps of the respective model runs are summarized and visualized
in the following section.
5.2. Stylized maps of agricultural lands in Wöllstadt
Cropping and field size results were translated into spatial units as described in section 2.4.2.
Therefore, spatial information of the study site was taken in order to depict agricultural farms as
rectangles lying adjacent to each other. By simplifying our spatial outlay (see section 2.4.2.3),
fields also have rectangular shapes and are located next to each other. Based on spatial information
from the case study, the economic model was built, and the results could be allocated to the
respective farms (rectangles).
Figure 5.1 visualizes the calibration results of the baseline model as a stylized map of the
case studies. The assumption behind this iteration (and stylized map) is a scattered allocation of
farmers’ fields13. Fields cannot exceed a certain size since farmers did not yet consolidate them.
Compared to HLUG data on land use from 2011, the calibration results of the cropping activities
(as derived from the 1st iteration of the baseline model) delivered a coarse picture of the actual land
use patterns of Wöllstadt (see table 5.5). Wheat production mirrored the current condition quite
good, although the model overestimated rapeseed production. Barley production in the actual land
use in 2011 was higher than the model calculated. Sugar beet and potato production were adapted
to the observed level of cultivation and therefore had the same array as the statistical data. Silo
maize production in the model was split into silage maize for fodder and for biogas plantations.
The observed level of silage maize in 2011 was 0.6 ha; no information about utilization was
available. In the model, silage maize for biogas production was limited to a maximum level of 1%
due to plantation capacities (see section 3.2.9). Silage maize as fodder was with 0.5% similar to
13This means there is no allocation of fields to farmers.
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Figure 5.1.: Stylized land use and field size results of the 1st iteration of the baseline model.
Farmers’ fields are scattered within the agricultural area of the study site.
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Table 5.5.: Baseline model cropping results as a % of the agricultural area at the municipality
level compared to HLUG data of the calibration year (2011).
Crop type [%] 1st iteration Statistics 2011 2nd iteration 4th iteration
Wheat 50.0 51.7 50.0 50.0
Sugar beets 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4
Rapeseed 22.3 10.6 22.3 24.2
Barley 0.7 7.9 0.7 0.7
Potatoes 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Rye - 1.3 0 0
Silage maize 0.5 0.6 0.5 -
Silage maize (biogas) 1.0 0.6 (n.d) 1.0 1.0
Corn maize 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.3
Triticale - 0.2 - -
Corn cob mix - - - -
Summer peas - - - -
Grass silage (permanent grassland) 1.1 n.d (5 %) 1.1 -
Hay (permanent grassland) 3.9 n.d (5 %) 3.9 5.0
Weed silage 0.8 - 0.8 -
Summer peas - - - -
Flowering strips 0.11 n.d 0.11 0.11
the observed amount of 0.6%. Corn maize production was also similar to the observed level with
0.9% compared to 0.4% from statistical data. It is sold and not used for private consumption. In
the model as well as in the statistics, no corn cob mix or summer peas were produced. Although
rye and triticale were cultivated in the calibration year, they were not in the solution vector of
the model results, although these crops have been included as cropping options. According to
statistics, Wöllstadt had 5% permanent grassland in 2011. However, information about grassland
management was not available in public statistics. Due to our model results, 1% of permanent
grassland was managed as grass silage and 4% as hay. Model results further simulated 0.8% weed
silage, although this crop type was not observed in the calibration year of the study site. Within
the statistical land use data received from HLUG, no information on participation in AES existed.
Therefore, the amount of flowering strips was calculated based on monetary information about
payments for AES in Wöllstadt (see section 3.2.8). The simulated value of 0.11% seemed to
be appropriate since studies showed similar percentages of arable land managed as AES within
Germany (Oppermann et al., 2012, e.g).
Within the next iterations, crop proportions changed if ever only in a minor manner for most
crops. Potato, sugar beet, and silo maize (biogas) production did not change at all due to
contractual model restrictions. Rapeseed proportions only increased from the 1st to the 2nd
iteration, whereas the proportions of wheat and barley stayed the same. In the last iteration,
silage maize as fodder crops, as well as weed silage and grass silage from permanent grassland,
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disappeared from the landscape while corn maize decreased. These changes came from the loss of
dairy farms since there was no more cattle that required fodder. Permanent grassland was managed
as hay, bearing lower management input requirements. Notably, the proportion of flowering strips
stayed the same since the budget for AES was not supposed to change within the baseline model
run.
Although crop proportions at the landscape level did not change significantly throughout the
model iterations, field sizes did change. How much farming decisions about field sizes spatially
influenced landscape appearance becomes apparent when looking at our stylized maps of the 2nd
and 4th model iterations (figure 5.2). In the 2nd iteration, field sizes had already doubled for
most of the farms (cf table 5.3). The assumption behind this iteration is perfect consolidation of
fields for any farm. Therefore, farmers increased their fields in order to use EoS. The numbers in
figure 5.2 represent the farms of Wöllstadt. After land leases (right map), only 17 farms remained,
and average field sizes even increased. However, there were still some small farms left having
smaller field sizes. These farms reduced their acreage but still needed to meet crop rotation
requirements implemented as model restrictions (e.g. farm 2 or 11). More labour is spent outside
the agricultural sector, and those farms are managed part-time.
High deviations in the cropping patterns of farmers occurred due to different market conditions.
The sensitivity analysis on grain prices revealed quite different cropping results. The main
differences were much higher corn maize production (almost 50%) and a maximum proportion of
rapeseed (25% due to biophysical constraints) at the expense of wheat production, whereas the
other crops had similar values compared to the baseline model (see table L.2 and table 5.5). This
shows how sensitive farmers react on changes in crop prices. In contrast to the sensitivity analysis
on grain prices, cropping patterns in both sensitivity analyses on different land rents did not differ
much from the baseline model, nor between each other (see table L.3). The sensitivity analyses
showed that our model reacted flexibly to changes in crop prices and land rents. However, the
results were not stylized as maps.
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Our alternate policy schemes, though, were visualized as stylized maps. A comparison of the
2nd and 4th iterations of each political incentive scheme can be found in figures 5.3 and 5.4.
Field sizes are comparable with the baseline model as well as among policy designs. However,
cropping patterns differ between the CAP schemes and the ‘nature-focused’ policy design. Wheat
production was relatively even for all three political schemes (see table L.4); it was lowest with
46.8% in the ’nature-focused’ scheme. Similar to the baseline model, sugar beet and potato
production was the same due to contractual conditions. Rapeseed production in CAP I was with
14.7% in the 2nd iteration and 16.3% in the 4th iteration much lower than in the baseline model
(22% and 24%). It further decreased within the CAP II and ’nature-focused’ policy designs.
There were almost no changes for barley, rye, triticale, or corn cob mix production. Silage maize,
grass silage, and weeds were only cultivated within the 2nd iteration steps since after farm size
optimization, dairy farms and fodder crops disappeared from the landscape. Again, after farm
closures, only hay management remained on permanent grassland since there was no more use for
grass silage as a potential fodder crop. Silage maize for biogas was produced to a higher extent
(2%) than in the baseline model since the political incentive schemes assume that policy sticks to
its ambitious energy targets. Corn maize production was relatively low for all three policy designs
within the 2nd iteration and even lower within the last iteration, with always less than 0.5% of the
total agricultural area. Compared to the baseline model, summer pea production was now another
significant crop. Due to the new CAP reform, farmers needed to meet a certain amount of EFAs in
order to receive a greening premium in CAP I and II, respectively a sustainability premium (SP)
in the ‘nature-focused’ design. In CAP I, summer pea production was lower than in the other two
policy designs since only five instead of seven percent agricultural area needed such ‘ecological
treatment’. The proportions of flowering strips in CAP I and II are notably even lower than in the
baseline model since the budget for agri-environmental schemes of the new CAP reform is lower
(see section 3.2.8). In the ‘nature-focused’ policy design, many more flowering strips (11.1%),
which can now cover entire fields (flowering fields), adorn the landscape.
The stylized land use and field size maps show certain points in time. While the 2nd iteration
indicates agricultural landscape after land amalgamation, the 4th iteration shows the resulting
land use and field size patterns after land exchange processes through land leases. Based on the
demonstrated stylized maps, three different spatially explicit biodiversity indicators were calcu-
lated in order to investigate the potential impacts of structural change processes on biodiversity.
We are going to present the biodiversity indicator results in the following section.
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5. Results
5.3. Biodiversity indicators
The farmland indicator for biotic diversity of the German national indicator report consists of stock
values of ten main birds taken as indicator species. For the calculation, averaged stock values were
set in relation to the target value (BMBU, 2010). According BMBU (2015), only 56% of the target
value had been reached in 2011. In order to test the political achievements of three alternate policy
designs with respect to the biodiversity targets, we applied three different biodiversity indicators to
our simulated and stylized agricultural landscape maps. Our indicators covered (1) crop diversity
in the mode of a Simpson’s diversity index, which takes into account the number and area of
different crops, (2) proportions of semi-natural habitats consisting of permanent grassland and
flowering strips/fields, and (3) number of patches/fields. These indicators are targeted to measure
landscape heterogeneity. They are not adapted to the habitat requirements of birds or mammals.
They rather indicate the abundance of insects such as bees since our study also covers flowering
strips as semi-natural habitats and allocates them spatially. With this procedure we seek to get
comparable figures to the indicator value of the national indicator report since insects form an
important part of the food web of birds. Indeed, Valerio et al. (2016) found that the species
richness of surrogate bird species protected by the European Birds Directive14 corresponds to
landscape heterogeneity. At a spatial scale of 125-250 m, the correlation between bird diversity
and landscape heterogeneity is especially significant (Morelli et al., 2013).
Landscape matrices determine pollinator dispersions (Tischendorf and Fahrig, 2000). As we
focused on pollination as an ecosystem service, the surrounding agricultural landscape matrix
was considered for the indicator calculation. For each sample point, land use features of a buffer
zone with a radius of 250 m served as the calculation base. In doing so, for each indicator a value
map for each iteration was produced. In the following, descriptive statistics of these maps are
analyzed. However since space matters, descriptive statistics alone cannot cover the significance
of the indicator calculation. This is why biodiversity indicator maps need to be considered as well.
5.3.1. Crop diversity
Crop diversity is directly associated with agricultural production and influences soil degradation,
fertility, and erosion (Bullock, 1992; Thrupp, 2000). It therefore can alter the performance of
ecosystem services (Naeem et al., 1994) and becomes important for food security issues (Smale
and King, 2005) in terms of improving the resilience of agricultural systems (FAO, 2011). It also
14And also used for the calculation of the biodiversity indicator of the German national indicator report.
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Table 5.6.: Simpson’s diversity indicators of the baseline model and alternate policy designs:
descriptive statistics of stylized maps based on pixel data.
Simpson’s Diversity Indicators Min Max Mean Std Dev.
Baseline model
1st iteration 0.26 0.85 0.63 0.09
2nd iteration 0.0 0.82 0.57 0.12
4th iteration 0.0 0.79 0.47 0.19
CAP I
2nd iteration 0.03 0.78 0.60 0.13
4th iteration 0.0 0.82 0.56 0.18
CAP II
2nd iteration 0.02 0.78 0.61 0.12
4th iteration 0.0 0.79 0.49 0.19
‘Nature-focused’
2nd iteration 0.0 0.83 0.62 0.14
4th iteration 0.0 0.80 0.51 0.18
helps one understand how landscapes change over time (Herzog et al., 2017).
The Simpson’s diversity index (Simpson, 1949) (SD) reflects the richness and evenness of
species within an observed area (Magurran, 2004). It therefore can be used as a proxy for spatial
crop diversity within a research area and has also been applied in several newer studies (Palmu
et al., 2014; Conrad et al., 2017, e.g.). Depending on the spatial resolutions, SD indicators vary.
For example, Conrad et al. (2017) used circular buffers of 1.5 km and 5 km radii. Comparisons
between studies with different spatial resolutions need to be interpreted with caution. This indica-
tor, though, has a relatively intuitive interpretation. It represents the probability that two randomly
picked observations would be different crops (Hurlbert, 1971).
Table 5.6 summarizes descriptive statistics for each stylized map. The respective maps for each
iteration of the baseline model can be found in figure 5.5. Note that for the outer stretch (250
m distance from the mapped border) no indicator values were calculated. We only modeled the
agricultural area within Wöllstadt, and no reliable data for the surrounding area, which serves as
information for the indicator calculation, was available.
In the 1st iteration, where fields of farmers have been scattered, the mean SD indicator at the
landscape level was 0.63. The highest crop diversity values reached a level of 0.85. In only a few
spots, SD indicators fell below 0.4 (see left map in figure 5.5). After field amalgamation (2nd
iteration), the average SD indicator decreased. More spots showed values below 0.4, while crop
diversity of those spots with already low SD values became even lower. The lowest values could
be found after land leases (4th iteration) with an average mean SD indicator of 0.47.
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According to our results, crop diversity also changed due to different political incentive schemes.
Compared with the current situation (1st iteration of the baseline model), no policy design could
compensate crop diversity losses due to structural change processes and always led to lower SD
indicator values after land leases (4th iterations). Taking the mean value of the 1st iteration of the
baseline model (0.63) as a basis, all alternate policy designs were associated with slightly lower
SD indicators within the 2nd iteration (see table 5.6)15. However, if taking the last iteration of the
baseline model as a basis, SD indicators of the policy designs were higher. All alternate policy
regimes led to an improvement with respect to crop diversity in comparison to the ‘business as
usual’ policy design. CAP I led to highest mean values (0.56), followed by the ‘nature-focused’
policy (0.51), CAP II (0.49), and the baseline model (0.47).
In summary, due to structural change processes, crop diversity of our case study decreased
independently from the policy design. But what does this tell us about biodiversity? Indicators
for habitat diversity are linked to species richness (Billeter et al., 2008). The Simpson’s diversity
indicator evaluates heterogeneity of landscapes in general and does not emphasize rare species,
for example. In landscape ecology, it indicates species diversity since the higher the heterogeneity,
the higher the variety of resources available for species; it does not guarantee the abundance of
certain species (Valerio et al., 2016). Therefore, landscape heterogeneity needs to be defined
according to its functions to serve as a habitat for target species (Fahrig et al., 2011). If all species
living within a landscape need to be captured, the Simpson’s diversity index is a popular measure,
although universal statements about biodiversity or indicator thresholds in the sense of species
richness, for example, are not possible (Kadoya and Washitani, 2011). This is why Chape et al.
(2005) recommends a combination of different biodiversity measures.
5.3.2. Semi-natural habitats
In contrast to the Simpson’s diversity index, which is often used to show general biodiversity
trends, the abundance of certain habitats also indicates the abundance of target species (Fahrig
et al., 2011). In fact, the extent of habitats is much more critical for organisms than land use
diversity is (Rüdisser et al., 2015). This is why habitat indicators are more useful for conservation
purposes, than, for example, crop diversity indicators (Kadoya and Washitani, 2011).
15Spatially explicit SD indicator maps for the alternate policy designs can be found in Appendix Q.
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Table 5.7.: Semi-natural habitats of the baseline model and alternate policy designs (%): descrip-
tive statistics of stylized maps based on pixel data.
Semi-natural habitats Min Max Mean Std Dev.
Baseline model
1st iteration 0 57 5.5 10.5
2nd iteration 0 53 5.6 10.1
4th iteration 0 58 4.5 11.8
CAP I
2nd iteration 0 50 6.1 11.6
4th iteration 0 55 4.3 10.6
CAP II
2nd iteration 0 57 6.4 12.2
4th iteration 0 58 4.8 11.6
‘Nature-focused’
2nd iteration 0 88 16.8 18.3
4th iteration 0 66 15.8 18.0
In our study we included another landscape indicator that measures semi-natural habitats. These
influence the flow of organisms (Forman and Godron, 1986; Dauber et al., 2003) and are important
for the overall species richness within agricultural areas (Hendrickx et al., 2007; Billeter et al.,
2008). Species richness in turn preserves the flow of ecosystem services such as pollination (Klein
et al., 2007). Literature shows that semi-natural habitats serve as sources for the dispersion of
pollinators, which contribute to a higher species richness within adjacent areas (Duelli and Obrist,
2003; Öckinger and Smith, 2007).
We focused especially on pollinators such as wild bees. For pollinators, flowering strips and
permanent grassland can serve as habitats and determine the matrix quality of agriculturally
characterized lands (Jauker et al., 2009). Results for our baseline model showed, that semi-natural
habitat values have been relatively stable throughout the iterations; they changed only within a
range of 1%. In each iteration there have been samples that contained no semi-natural elements at
all (see minimum values in table 5.7). In these areas crop pollination might be critical. However,
there have been some spots with more than 50% semi-natural habitats. Those spots cover the areas
of dairy farms (see farms 9, 17, 19, 22 in figure 5.6). Dairy farms manage permanent grassland
and additionally often participate in AES (Pufahl and Weiss, 2009; Zimmermann and Britz, 2016),
which could also be confirmed with our results (see section 5.1.1). With respect to habitat quality,
our case study seemed to be already in bad condition, which might have become even worse with
the policy design at the time. Mean indicator values were very low in each modeling step, with
5.6% in the 2nd iteration and 4.5% in the 4th iteration (see table 5.7). According to Jauker et al.
(2009), 10% semi-natural habitat is regarded as low. Our results further showed that semi-natural
habitats conglomerated within certain areas where higher values had already occurred (see figure
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5.6). The highest maximal values could be found in the 4th iteration (cf table 5.7). After dairy
farms closed down, the biggest farms that rented in the land of dairy farms planted flowering
strips. Semi-natural habitat aggregation remained unchanged and even increased after structural
change processes.
The results for CAP I and II delivered comparably low values for the semi-natural habitat
indicator (see table 5.7). In the shorter run, the CAP reform seemed to have some positive effects
with respect to potential semi-natural habitats. In both policy designs initially, after the 2nd
iteration, mean values were higher than the reference point (1st iteration of the baseline model).
However, these small deviations might have stemmed from random field allocations within the
rectangular farms. For example, if permanent grassland had been allocated to an outer border of
the indicator map, higher values might have gotten lost and vice versa. After land leases, lower
average values for the semi-natural habitat indicators occurred. In CAP I, the mean value (4.3%)
was even lower than in the baseline model, while in CAP II the mean index value was slightly
higher (4.8%). Similar to the baseline model, in each policy scenario, the index for semi-natural
habitats had minimum values of 0. There were still areas where some pollinators such as bees
might not have found enough living space. However, pollinator dispersion strongly depends on the
life history traits of the observed taxon (Jauker et al., 2009). In CAP I and II, maximal index values
increased from the 2nd to the 4th iteration, while mean values decreased. Similar to the baseline
model, this and the reduction of standard deviations indicated that areas that already had enough
semi-natural habitat conglomerated, whereas the habitat quality of other areas decreased. Merely
a few grasslands and even fewer flowering strips along field margins are not enough to support
diverse bee communities and do not allow adequate levels of dispersion (Steffan-Dewenter, 2003).
The ‘nature-focused’ policy scheme delivered totally different results. Farmers participated
in ANP schemes and planted many more flowering fields and strips. Mean semi-natural habitat
values of the 2nd (16.8%) and 4th (15.8%) iterations were much higher. Maximal values also
reached a much higher level of 88% and 66%, respectively. There were still areas with no
semi-natural elements since the minimum value was 0. However, when looking at the value maps
of the semi-natural habitat indicator summarized in Appendix Q, these areas occurred less often.
Improvements in the matrix quality of agricultural areas (semi-natural habitats well above 10%)
lead to a lower decay in species numbers, especially for wild bees, and supports species dispersion
(Jauker et al., 2009).
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Table 5.8.: Number of patches in the baseline model and alternate policy designs: descriptive
statistics of stylized maps based on pixel data.
Number of patches Min Max Mean Std Dev.
Baseline model
1st iteration 8 31 17.2 5.0
2nd iteration 2 16 8.6 2.8
4th iteration 1 15 6.4 2.9
CAP I
2nd iteration 2 20 8.7 3.2
4th iteration 1 19 6.7 3.8
CAP II
2nd iteration 2 17 8.0 3.0
4th iteration 2 12 5.3 2.0
‘Nature-focused’
2nd iteration 2 18 7.9 2.9
4th iteration 1 14 5.8 2.5
5.3.3. Number of fields
Another indicator we analyzed in our study was the number of fields. In landscape ecology, this
indicator usually counts the number of patches and is related to the number of habitat patches
(Jepsen et al., 2005; Dramstad et al., 2001, e.g.). However, we applied it to our agricultural
fields to show changes in field sizes and related them to pollination services by choosing the
adequate dispersion radius of potential pollinators. Field sizes determine field margins within
agricultural landscapes. Field margins can serve as corridors and enhance species migration to
and from nesting and/or food resources (Collinge, 2000; Cane, 2001). In general, movements
between several habitats would be lower without corridors (Mabry and Barrett, 2002). On the
other hand, field sizes determine the distance between potential habitat and required pollinator
services (Ricketts et al., 2008; Pufal et al., 2017).
Our results for the baseline model showed that the mean values, as well as the minimum and
maximum values, decreased from one iteration to the next iteration (see table 5.8). The standard
deviation was lowest for the 2nd iteration; however, it did not vary much from the 4th iteration.
While the current farming structure exhibited at least 8 agricultural fields within a radius of 250
m, after structural change, only one field could be found in some areas. Mean values reduced to
around one third of the reference scenario. The highest changes occurred after field amalgamation;
differences in the patch sizes were relatively low between the 2nd and 4th iterations. This became
more obvious when comparing the stylized maps of figure 5.7.
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Similar to the baseline model, the mean as well as maximum, minimum, and standard deviation
values in all alternate policy designs decreased after farm size optimization. A slightly higher
mean value than in the baseline model could be found in CAP I, with 8.7 in the 2nd iteration and
6.7 in the 4th iteration. The CAP II and ‘nature-focused’ policy design delivered lower values
than the baseline model (see table 5.8). Each model run showed a declining trend in the number
of patches16. Field sizes increased while field margins that may serve as corridors became fewer.
Therefore, we expect species’ movements to be lower after structural change processes, and crop
pollination might become difficult for internal areas since fields are bigger. However, this depends
on the pollinator species and matrix quality (Jauker et al., 2009).
Measuring habitat composition always needs a set of several habitat indicators since species
richness is driven by a variety of factors (Bailey et al., 2007). The lower Simpson’s diversity index
of the ‘nature-focused’ policy design compared to CAP I, for example, is driven by a relatively low
number of patches after structural change processes (see table 5.8). While the minimum values
for the number of patches indicator did not differ between these policy designs, the maximum
values of the CAP I scenario were higher than in the ‘nature-focused’ design. Furthermore, the
standard deviations were higher in CAP I than in the ‘nature-focused’ design and even increased
in the 4th iteration of CAP I. Field sizes in the ‘nature-focused’ policy design were lower and
distributed more evenly than in CAP I. This contributed to lower Simpson’s diversity indicators
for the ‘nature-focused’ incentive scheme. However, since the SD indicator covers only the
average crop type diversity within the buffer zones and no habitat quality, the low deviation in
the ‘nature-focused’ policy regime did not necessarily indicate reductions in biodiversity. In fact,
species diversity most probably increased due to many more semi-natural habitats (Hagen et al.,
2012; Hendrickx et al., 2007; Steffan-Dewenter, 2003).
The current state of our case study seems to already be very poor with respect to semi-natural
habitats and will get worse without significant changes in agricultural policy reforms. In both
CAP designs, a lower abundance of semi-natural habitats, lower cropping diversity, and a lower
number of patches led to landscape homogeneity, probably with adverse effects on biodiversity
and pollination. For our case study, the new CAP reform was not able to compensate biodiversity
losses linked to structural change processes.
16Indicator maps are summarized in Appendix Q.
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6
Chapter 6.
Socio-ecological resilience of the
case study
In the first part of the chapter, a picture of the socio-ecological resilience of our case study is
drawn, and possible future developments under the new CAP reform are envisaged. According to
these trends, political implications to enhance biodiversity within agricultural lands are delineated.
Afterward, conditions under which the research questions can be answered are elaborated. This
contains critical examinations with respect to methodology and the spatial outlay. At the same
time, we debate possible model extensions.
6.1. The new basin of attraction
The conceptual framework of the study at hand follows a holistic view where humans play a
crucial role in landscape appearance (Berkes et al., 2003). It seeks to measure the socio-ecological
resilience (Walker et al., 2004) of our system. Interactions between components of a system
occur at several scales and domains (Carpenter, 2003). Therefore the economic, ecological, and
socio-cultural domains of our case study were investigated regarding several scales. Within the
economic domain, all three scales were addressed: (1) the small scale in the form of agricultural
fields, (2) the medium scale represented by farms as decision units, and (3) the large scale because
interactions between farmers at municipality level were modeled. Within the ecological scale,
large-scale effects in mode of biodiversity changes as being the consequence of drivers were
investigated. The socio-cultural domain takes into account large-scale interactions within the
labour market. Since temporal aspects are crucial for investigating socio-ecological systems
(Kinzig et al., 2006), we considered structural change processes.
The identified variables that might drive the socio-ecological system into another basin of
attraction were the amount of farms, field sizes, and farm types. Our results demonstrated that
structural change within the study site can be modeled and traced back to these drivers. According
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to our analytical framework, thresholds were defined for the driving variables, which tie together
different domains and scales. These are used to show possible future developments of our case
study.
In the baseline model, two of the three critical thresholds were crossed: field sizes more than
doubled at the ‘patch’ scale, and farm type loss occurred at the farm scale. In both CAP policy
designs, within each scale, critical thresholds were reached. Similar to the baseline model, two
critical thresholds were crossed in the ‘nature-focused’ policy design. Here, more farms remained
in the agricultural sector. Structural change processes were prevalent in all model runs, where the
amount of farms were reduced at the expense of dairy farms. Field sizes sharply increased due to
field consolidations and the reduction of farm numbers.
Each time a threshold is crossed, regime shifts are induced. Since often one single regime shift
triggers a whole system to change it is most probable, that several regime shifts in combination
(cascading effects) lead the system into another basin of attraction (Walker et al., 2004). In
fact, cascading domain-scale regime shifts within investigated case studies always led to new
system regimes that were more resilient to changes and often even irreversible (Kinzig et al.,
2006). These new regimes are usually less popular from the societal perspective (Matthews and
Selman, 2006). The authors further note that desired landscapes need to be assessed and depend
on cultural and ecological values as well as many other aspects such as current needs or conditions.
The regime shifts outlined above had different effects on biodiversity indicators, however. All
policy designs led to lower biodiversity indicator values except the ‘nature-focused’ incentive
scheme. There, more semi-natural habitats occurred despite structural change processes. Since
semi-natural habitats predict species richness more securely than landscape indicators such as
the Simpson’s diversity index (Rüdisser et al., 2015), we assume that the ‘nature-focused’ policy
design has potential to fulfill the desired biodiversity targets of the EC. Within our case study, CAP
policy designs, which were aligned to the new CAP reform, were not able to enhance biodiversity.
However, a rich species diversity is a declared goal of the political and hence societal domain. We
can conclude that in our case study, a new basin of attraction induced by the ‘CAP towards 2020’
reform will follow. This new basin of attraction will be worse with respect to ecological desires.
It might even be irreversible. With the CAP policy design, the cultural landscape of our case
seems to change into a ‘pure’ food and energy production site. Only few semi-natural habitats will
remain, whereas small and scattered fields might be displaced by huge and uniform production
units. Agricultural production might be specialized in a mode of arable and pig-fattening farms,
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while dairy farming will disappear. The loss of dairy farms leads to lower crop diversity, which
can only partly be offset by the simulated greening measures of the new CAP reform. Furthermore,
the trend to cost-saving, full-time farms probably holds, and only a few family farms working
part-time will stay in the agricultural sector. Running parallel to the insecure question of farm
succession and demographic changes within rural areas (Mawick et al., 2011), the rural population
might further decrease due to fewer job alternatives within the agricultural sector and changing
landscapes that no longer mirror cultural identities (Eberhardt and Vollrath, 2016; Dramstad et al.,
2001).
Semi-natural habitat loss and aggregation through structural change processes could not be
compensated through incentives schemes of the CAP designs. As outlined above, pollinator
dispersion strongly depends on potential nesting and fodder habitats, as well as on the agricultural
landscape matrix (Tischendorf and Fahrig, 2000). Therefore, the new basin of attraction might be
fragile with respect to the pollination on which farmers rely. Either farmers need to replace these
missing ES by bearing high costs as a result of paying pollination service companies, or adequate
habitats need to be established. As we showed with our biodiversity indicators, this could be the
establishment of semi-natural habitats or reduction of field sizes in order to increase landscape
mosaic and the amount of field margins. However, as already altered systems might get stuck
within their new basin of attraction (Kinzig et al., 2006), it might not be enough to restore earlier
landscape structures (hysteresis effect). More landscape structures are possibly required in order
to establish new populations since a lot of knowledge and time is needed to restore ecosystems
(Bengtsson et al., 2003). For that reason it seems to be fundamental to maintain already existing
habitats within agriculturally intensified areas. Otherwise costs for re-establishing pollinator
populations might explode.
Our results further showed that cost pressures influence the amount of farmers remaining in the
agricultural sector. Costs for declining pollinators are indeed high (see Bauer and Wing (2016) or
Breeze et al. (2016) for a review). If farmers need to replace missing ES through, for example,
self-pollination, high costs might further accelerate structural change. Small-scale farmers might
simply not be able to bear those costs, and buying pollination services only pays off for large
farms (Geslin et al., 2017).
6.2. Political implications
As the aim of the study is to assess policy impacts on landscape changes and on biodiversity,
within a given modeling framework, the hypothesis is that structural change subverts political
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measurements. In order to protect ecosystems and therein living species active management
is needed. Three political scenarios were built with varying degrees of environmental support.
(1) The CAP I policy design, which mirrors the current (‘CAP towards 2020’) legal framework
conditions, (2) the CAP II policy design with strengthened greening conditions, and (3) the
‘nature-focused’ policy design where DP are replaced by other premiums linked to environmental
measurements based on ideas of the ‘refocus’ scenario of the European Commission (2011) and
the NABU as described in Oppermann et al. (2016). Detailed political framework conditions of
the baseline model and all three alternate political incentive schemes can be found in table 4.3.
The results of the first two policy designs confirmed the hypothesis and led to increasing
landscape homogeneity accompanied with less species diversity. Fewer ES such as pollination and
pest control can be expected within the research area. For an improved scenario, policy advise is
required in order to prevent biodiversity declines. Quite the contrary, improving the conditions for
species diversity is envisaged. This is why we included a third policy relevant incentive scheme.
The results for the ‘nature-focused’ policy revealed that biodiversity and pollination services can
be improved within our case study. However, what are the costs for farmers?
Farmers did not have significant monetary losses through the new CAP designs. Model results
delivered comparable values for farmers’ income than without the reform. In fact, farmers even
profited from the CAP designs, especially after land leases took place. The average income level
per farm increased since less farms than without the reform remained. However, all other farmers
need to find job alternatives.
Regarding the economic performance of agricultural farms within the ‘nature-focused’ policy
design, farmers’ income was lower. In the 2nd iteration, the average income per farm was
lower than in our reference point and could only be compensated through farm size optimization.
Although, compared to CAP I and II, the income after structural change was still lower (-15%).
This example shows the importance of where to put the reference point especially in political
planning and decision making. If structural change is assumed in any case, farmers would
suffer income losses under the governmental measurements of the ‘nature-focused’ policy design.
However, as long as the income situation after structural change processes is not yet reached, any
income improvement might be experienced positively. From a social perspective, the required
farm and field size enlargements in order to compensate farmers’ income losses might be easier to
accept if biodiversity also profits from such political measurements.
In literature, the abolition of DP as it is also part of our ‘nature-focused’ policy design is
discussed controversial (Rickard, 2015). There were other studies simulating farm exits due to
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reductions in DP. For example, Brady et al. (2012) found that under this policy regime structural
change was strongest with highest shares of farm exits. This consequently resulted in negative
impacts on landscape heterogeneity and biodiversity1. Similar results can be found in Uthes
et al. (2011), where the abolition of DP led to high income losses, which further led to land
abandonment and farm closings especially of small-scale and livestock keeping farms. In contrast
to our policy scheme, in these studies, DP were reduced without cushioning farmers’ income
losses with alternative payment schemes.
In our case study, abolishing DP and replace them by well paid and ecologically effective
environmental measures, led to structural change processes with less farms and larger fields,
but with higher species diversity and pollination services. Structural change might probably be
mitigated through this incentive scheme since compared to all other tested policy regimes more
farms remained and fewer critical thresholds were reached. This has influences on other domains
and scales. The socio-ecological system might be more stable and this might prevent undesired
initiations of regime shifts at other domains and scales.
In all modeled policy designs crop diversity decreased. Crop diversity is linked with soil quality
and soil erosion issues (Bullock, 1992; Thrupp, 2000). It needs to be considered in questions of
food security and contributes to a high resilience of agricultural systems (FAO, 2011). Our model
showed, that keeping dairy farms at place leads to a higher crop diversity. Dairy farmers could get
additional governmental support, such that cattle keeping becomes more viable again. Another
possibility could be to strengthen crop diversification regulations. The current crop diversification
requirements do not effectively increase crop diversity (European Commission, 2016; Lakner and
Bosse, 2016) and needs to be better targeted (European Parliament, 2016). Louhichi et al. (2017)
found that especially livestock keeping farms were more affected than arable farms. Our results
suggest to relieve dairy farms and enforce stricter crop diversification requirements for arable
farms. They have more options to diversify their cropping patterns than livestock keeping farms
have (Louhichi et al., 2017).
Especially in structural poor regions hedges have a positive impact on biodiversity (Batàry et al.,
2010; Tscharnke et al., 2012). However, farmers would rather choose nitrogen-fixing crops than
ecologically more beneficially landscape features such as hedges (Pe’er et al., 2016). According to
Zinngrebe et al. (2017), farmers’ EFA choices are motivated by several reasons such as economic
issues (e.g. implementation costs), administrative, locational, and ecological considerations. Our
1They used a Shannon-Wiener index as biodiversity indicator.
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model results showed that in any model only summer pea production as one of three alternative
greening measures was chosen. Farmers did not decide to leave some of their land fallow or
plant hedges. The two activities seemed to be of low attraction. Summer peas can be sold or
used as fodder, while the other two alternatives not. Fallow land has the advantage that it saves
labour, though this incentive was too low. Depending upon the hedge type, this greening measure
can be used for wood or berries for own consumption. However, compared to all other land use
activities, planting and maintaining hedges bears income losses and high costs. Hedges need to be
maintained especially if they are young and in the growing period. Even if some labour would
be invested instead of paying someone else, the costs would just get displaced. A possibility to
support planting hedgerows could be to initiate programes, in which farmers just need to release
some of their lands and dedicate it to hedge land. The farmer, though, is not obliged to contribute
to the establishment and maintenance of hedges and at least does not need to bear any costs.
Compensations are needed and perhaps the farmer gets, similar to the current AES for flowering
strips, compensation payments for the losses of farmland (BMBU, 2010).
Within our case study and under the given model framework, the greening measurements of
CAP 2020 were not able to reach pursued biodiversity targets of the European Commission. On
contrary, due to structural change processes, biodiversity indicators showed to be worse. However,
without the new CAP reform, biodiversity might have been even lower. There is a high political
scope to control farm closures with incentive-based environmental measurements that compete
with the risk of income loss due to volatile market prices. In the ‘nature-focused’ policy, for
example, the average field sizes were lower and the amount of farms higher since alternative
income possibilities were not driven as much by EoS measures. Either regulations to establish
more semi-natural habitats such as hedges, fallow land, flowering fields, or a complete restructure
of governmental incentive schemes could improve the conditions for a richer species diversity
within our case study. Restructured political incentive schemes might include the abolition of DP.
This however, needs to be compensated by incentive-based environmental measurements having
positive effects on the habitat quality and farmers’ incomes. Incentives to support dairy farms
would increase the crop diversity of agricultural landscapes.
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6.3. Modeling restrictions and development chances
6.3.1. Structural change
In order to assess the effects of structural change on agricultural land use patterns and landscape
mosaics, the present model has taken account of farm and field sizes. With a methodological com-
bination of linear and non-linear programming, linked together through iterations, the temporal
scale of structural change has been addressed. Since the conceptual framework was comparatively
static, it provided three theoretical points in time: (1) current cropping conditions, (2) after full
land consolidation, and (3) after farm size optimization through land leases; the speed of structural
change was not investigated. One possibility to explicitly account for the speed of structural
change would be to include empirical knowledge about the annual change in farm sizes as a model
constraint in the non-linear optimization model step. However, the methodological uncertainties
of empirical operations would be an issue (Heckelei and Wolff, 2001). Structural change depends
on several conditions that are difficult to predict even if statistical information exists (Happe et al.,
2008; Mandryk et al., 2012). Empirical uncertainties paired with less model flexibility due to a
higher amount of constraints would need to be brought in. Nevertheless, determination of the
speed of structural change would be a meaningful task, since the time horizon plays a crucial
role in setting political goals (Lai et al., 2017). The new CAP reform, for example, has a time
frame until 2020. However, farm size changes calculated by our model may take longer. The
model results for the CAP policy designs might be more reliable, i.e. if these policy designs will
not change significantly for a longer time period than until 2020. Our results at least indicate
directions of structural change and corresponding regime shifts under the ‘CAP towards 2020’
reform.
Other framework conditions might be changes in output or input prices, as well as climatic
conditions affecting yield levels (Ewert et al., 2011). With the sensitivity analysis on grain prices,
we already showed that through lower grain prices structural change will be faster. This is in line
with findings of Mandryk et al. (2012), who measured the impact of price trends on structural
change processes.
Ewert et al. (2011) estimated the price effects of climate and market changes on crop prices
and yields for the EU member states. After initial assessments, however, the extent to which yield
levels have changed within our study region has not yet been fully explored. Basically, in order
to capture insecure climatic change possibilities, several scenarios exist but were not considered
in this work. According to the authors, grain prices will increase mainly due to macroeconomic
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variables (e.g. GDP and world demand). Yield effects play only a minor role.
Commodity prices might also increase due to boosting energy prices (Wang et al., 2014). If
energetic aspects are taken into account, questions about thresholds where the use of energy-
intensive machinery will be replaced with more labour arise. Under such framework conditions
and a declining agricultural energy productivity (Cleveland, 1995; Rydberg and Haden, 2006),
it might be interesting if labour subsidies affect structural change. Furthermore, catch crops
might become more competitive than fertilizer. In general, it might be interesting to explore
under which input prices (labour and energy) healthy ecosystems become superior. According to
McArthur and McCord (2017), agricultural inputs drive structural change and have strong impacts
on agricultural labour patterns. The extent to which macroeconomic variables and international
price developments impact farm size changes of several farm types and sizes within different
regions needs to be further investigated (Landi et al., 2016).
Based on the background of yield and production uncertainties, it might be important to
model risk aversion of farmers, especially in combination with farmland biodiversity assessments
(Mouysset et al., 2013; Baumgärtner and Quaas, 2006). The argument for this is that farmers
try to reduce their risk through diversification of land use. Mouysset et al. (2013) showed that
the stronger the risk aversion is, the stronger the habitat heterogeneity becomes. However, the
correlation between habitat heterogeneity and the ecological performance was weaker. The
model was very coarse with respect to landscape characteristics. Nevertheless, it showed that
incorporating risk into the decision model significantly altered results.
Crop rotations are also linked to risk mitigation strategies (Hauk et al., 2017). Including them
would additionally equip our model with temporal aspects. Taking into account several crop
rotation schemes may lead to different optimal field and farm sizes by diminishing the utilization
of scale economies. Finely tuned crop rotation schemes might also increase yields (Schönhardt
et al., 2009).
Especially with regard to uncertainties due to climatic change, farmers’ risk aversion might
also change (Woods et al., 2017). Farmers might want to diversify their cropping patterns through
suitable crop rotation schemes. Again, reaching critical thresholds within the ecological domain
might trigger regime shifts within the economic domain. Therefore, modeling risk aversion might
reveal further insights into the systems’ dynamics.
Structural change processes are driven by dynamic interactions between human population
growth and improved technologies (Boserup, 1965). If the competitive pressure increases, farmers
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will be tempted to either abandon their agricultural business or expand it through modernization
and investments. Technologies that are part of farmers’ investment decisions, though, are not
modeled within the scope of this work. Usually, farms are differently equipped with respect to
machinery. In our model, though, all farmers had the same engine power of 120 kW. Higher
machine power might shift labour requirements outwards, but only to the extent of the available
production units. Our results showed that if a certain farm size was reached, no more off-farm
labour was chosen by farmers2. If farms could improve their technologies, off-farm labour might
become available again, or farms might get even larger (Romano and Traù, 2017; Eberhardt
and Vollrath, 2016). Therefore our results need to be viewed under these bounded framework
conditions of a certain unchangeable machine power. Investment decisions determine to a large
extent the speed of farm size growth as well as the farm type development (Chavas, 2001; Boehlje,
1992). Increasing farm sizes are often accompanied with field consolidation in order to reduce
production costs (Burton, 1988). Intensified agricultural production is highly mechanized and
depends on advanced and expensive machinery (Pimentel, 2009). Therefore, large investments
are needed in order to keep pace with free market developments that confront farmers nowadays.
Once a farmer invests a large amount of money and takes the risk of an uncertain business, he
needs to use the machinery in an optimal manner until amortization. In order to utilize the
potential of big machinery in an adequate way, fields must become bigger and easier to work with
(Zimmermann and Heckelei, 2012). This reduces the abundance of e.g. field margins, which
often fulfill important ecological functions (Lanz et al., 2018). These kinds of negative impacts
on ecosystem services are linked to lower plant productivity (Cardinale et al., 2012). Therefore,
field and farm size decisions need to be captured by the model and related to investment decisions.
Regime shifts at the ‘patch’ scale induces regime shifts at the economic farm scale and vise versa.
6.3.2. Land market
After land leases, our model showed that most farms had already reached maximal possible sizes
since they fully took over neighbouring farms. On the one hand this means that the amount of
new land a farm could rent was well defined: based on the considered machinery power, labour
capacities were sufficient for new farm sizes under the condition of economies of size. However,
predefined renting possibilities make the model less flexible and less realistic. There are different
programming techniques for land leasings.
For example, Kantelhardt (2003) or Moosburger (1999) simulated rental markets based on farm
models. Therefore, iterative processes were applied. Single farms and their shadow prices for land
2See for example farm 20 after farm size optimization.
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were calculated independently from each other. In a second iteration, an equilibrium situation
was modeled, where pre-calculated shadow prices determined the new tenant of the land that was
set free. The new situation served as a starting point for further potential land rental processes.
A similar approach was applied by Kapfer et al. (2015), who ranked farmers according to their
economic strength and land according to its site quality. However, those approaches lack spatial
references, as opposed to agent-based models.
A famous modeling technique applied in agent-based models includes auctions as simulated
in Happe et al. (2004). Similar to a free market situation, an auctioneer (the market) allocates
free land from each farmer who offers it to those who have intentions to rent additional land. In
such a case, the shadow price for land and spatial attributes (e.g. distance between fields and
farms) determine farmers’ bids. This kind of land market where farmers compete individually for
land is often found in ABM models (Berger, 2001; Schnicke et al., 2007; Schreinemachers and
Berger, 2011, e.g.). If the land market would have been modeled using auction schemes, potential
land rentals would have needed to be allocated to adjacent fields of the tenderers, or restrictions
would be necessary so that tenderers only bid for land that lies next to their own fields. Otherwise,
field size changes would be difficult to simulate since they are only possible if farmers cultivate
a coherent area. If this auction mechanism were achieved, though, renting possibilities could
also include the whole neighbourhood instead of only one neighbouring farm. Auction schemes
require less assumptions implemented as constraints and would make the model more flexible.
Neighbourhood relationships would not need to be defined explicitly prior to each iteration, which
is time consuming.
We did not model land auctions due to our conceptual and methodological framework. Instead
of modeling for yearly changes in farm sizes through taking into account shadow prices reflecting
the current cropping patterns of each farm, longer time steps caused by long-term processes such
as the question of finding a successor were addressed. These underlying processes were reflected
in the farm size optimization process of a whole bunch of farms; it all depends on the market
situation being at the mercy of hard competition conditions, and the farming community within our
study area is seen in the long run as a group of collaborating farms with unbounded rationalities.
Therefore, the total gross margin at the municipality level is maximized, and reductions in farm
sizes cause increases in other farm sizes as it is done in the non-linear modeling part (3rd iteration).
Within the linear modeling parts (short-term farming decisions), no farmer intends to rent out land.
In our case therefore, an auction based land market would lead to no changes in the farm structure
at all. As an alternative, though, it is conceivable that after the 4th iteration more iterations follow
with different neighbourhood relationships (e.g. the opposite farm).
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6.3.3. Spatial aspects
Our model delivers a novel form of spatial visualization in order to improve the interdisciplinary
work within landscape research. Up until now, either raster-based landscape models (Happe et al.,
2004; Weinmann, 2002, e.g.) or heavily stylized landscapes (Havlík et al., 2008; Cong et al.,
2016, e.g.) exist. The former approach often lacks the possibility to include important agricultural
landscape elements such as field margins or flowering strips, while the latter approach is rather
technical and has not yet been applied to real agricultural regions.
One important feature of our model is the optimization of field sizes. Field sizes were concep-
tualized as driving variables inducing potential regime shifts. Within each linear model iteration,
field sizes were simulated. This assumes that farmers have free choices on where to put their
field boundaries. Through including some constraints due to biophysical and legal preconditions,
they at least need to have a minimum number of fields. Results showed that farmers decided
on fewer and bigger fields instead of many small fields. This decision is demanding since it
is only possible to decide on the field sizes if the assumption of full consolidation holds true.
At the moment, this type of spatial condition does not exist. However, there are political and
technical endeavors to reach such a spatial allocation of agricultural land. Gritzmann et al. (2014)
developed a mathematical software that ought to help farmers exchange fields in order to reach
full consolidation. It already takes into account physical aspects such as soil qualities. Based on
applications of the ProLand model, field consolidation is proposed in order to reduce production
costs (Möller et al., 2002; Schroers, 2005). Historical observations also confirm the assumption of
a trend to full consolidation. It can be observed in many parts of the world (Luo and Timothy,
2017). A pioneer example is the wheat belt region of Western Australia (Walker and Salt, 2006)
as already mentioned in section 2.3.
If farmers lease agricultural lands, they lease whole fields instead of certain hectares. Similarly
to Lauber (2006), the model should only allow for entire fields to be rented out. Therefore, field
sizes would need a predefined value that requires a lot more data, programming, and working
memory. The present study deliberately kept field sizes as variables to be simulated in order to
optimize them. This procedure seemed to be plausible since a longer time span in which spatial
processes can take place was covered. Furthermore, field consolidation and farm size optimization
might occur simultaneously. In the long run, farmers who cultivate a huge agricultural area might
indeed determine their field units. Field shapes, though, are not taken into account in our model.
At the moment, all fields of a farmer have the same field length. They therefore are relatively
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slim. If it might be possible to at least divide the agricultural land of a farmer into two ‘rows’,
our stylized land use maps would become more realistic since they would mirror the actual field
shapes more acurately. An additional benefit would be that management possibilities with respect
to the location of flowering strips could be realized. The minimum spanning tree calculation as
it was done in Wossink et al. (1998), for example, might then be another interesting feature of
our model. In doing so, also the allocation of fields within farms can be adapted. At the moment,
FOLAS distributes fields within farms randomly.
The spatial visualization in FOLAS is rather restricted to intensively used agricultural lands.
Our results do not necessarily apply to extensively used areas. In order to transfer our model to
other regions, the landscape structures need to be observed. If, for example, the research site
lies in an extensively used agricultural area with a high proportion of natural habitat (e.g. forest
or conservation areas), physical or geographical landscape conditions might not allow perfect
consolidation and the realization of scale economies would not be possible to a similar extent as
in intensively used lands. In other words, income losses initiated by e.g. greening measures might
not easily be compensated with technological progress. As field structures become more irregular
with unused gaps inbetween, spatial simplification becomes more complex.
However, the stylized landscape visualization proves the usability of the model for other
disciplines within intensively used agricultural areas. Spatial attributes play a crucial role in land
management, especially when addressing ecological questions (Bailey et al., 2007; Hendrickx
et al., 2007; Tscharnke et al., 2012; Hagen et al., 2012; Fahrig et al., 2011). With our spatially
explicit modeling design, ecological information in terms of spatial indicators for biodiversity
assessment was gained without abstracting from the farmer as the primary land user and decision
maker.
6.3.4. Policy designs
In order to assess political impacts on farming decisions and the resulting landscape appearance,
several scenarios were built (see section 4.2 for more details). We simulated effects of the greening
mechanism of the new CAP reform using a different payment scheme than in the baseline model.
The baseline model simulated the current policy of the calibration year (2011). In order to
model the greening component of CAP 2020, a part of the total DP was linked to management
practices in order to reach a given amount of EFAs. We made first attempts to simulate ecological
management practices according to their weighting factors as fixed in the EU Regulation No.
1307/2013. Management practices were hedges, summer peas (as legumes), and fallow land.
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Furthermore, within ‘CAP towards 2020’, redistributive payments ought to support small
holders in allocating money to the first 46 ha. In our model this mechanism is included only in
the linear modeling parts where no decision on farm size takes place. In order to measure the
farm size effects of redistributive payments, this has to be modeled in the the non-linear part (3rd
iteration). However, this causes problems with the GAMS solver used since endogenous variables
(farm sizes) cannot be used as conditionals. As-if statements can only be used for exogenous
variables (such as given parameters). Hence, the incentive scheme of the new CAP reform to
support small holders is not fully taken into account within our model. This, however, might
be important and alter our model results. To our knowledge, in the current literature, no other
modeling example exists that takes into account redistributive small-scale support payments as
they were implemented in Germany. Nevertheless, as the redistributive payments are relatively
low, high influences are not expected.
Our ‘nature-focused’ policy design is based on the newest NABU study conducted by Op-
permann et al. (2016). There, they considered participation in basic environmental measures3
as voluntary and showed that 75% of all farms participated. Due to their results, ten percent of
the arable and 20% of the grassland area was dedicated to such environmental measures. Our
study assumes that all farms participate obligatorily with 10% of their areas in order to get a
basic environmental premium. The same applies to the ‘greening’ component of CAP I and CAP
II: in our model the participation in EFAs is an obligation, whereas in reality, it is voluntary.
Additionally, in the NABU study, the cultivation of legumes and inter-cropping are not accepted in
order to receive environmental premiums. In this study, however, legume production is accepted.
Due to our results, it actually was the single land use type chosen by farmers in order to fulfill the
requirements. The result of the NABU study further showed that farms that engaged the most in
higher-value environmental measures4 were better off than those that participated with less than
five percent of their agricultural area. In contrast, our results revealed that small farms with a
lower TGM rather participated in higher-value environmental measures than big farms with high
TGMs. However, in contrast to the present work, the NABU study did not consider farm sizes,
and the results are not directly comparable.
3In order to get the sustainability premium; these measurements are comparable with the EFA measurements of
CAP 2020.
4Comparable to AES.
143
6. Socio-ecological resilience of the case study
6.3.5. Ecological model interlinkages
With our stylized agricultural maps, we delivered the basis for the calculation of biodiversity
indicators. However, we did not consider other non-agricultural landscape elements such as trees,
conservation areas, forest edges, or ditches. These landscape elements are already part of the
landscape and have high impacts on pollinator dispersion (Ricketts et al., 2008). When spatially
explicit biodiversity indicators were calculated, already existing natural and semi-natural habitats
need to be taken into account since biodiversity indicator assessments need to consider the space
around agricultural fields in order to deliver reliable values (Dauber et al., 2003).
Peripheral areas of our land use maps lack information and therefore cannot be assessed with
respect to indicator values. Therefore, surrounding landscape characteristics need to be explored
as well. They might form the outer border of a research area with influences on biodiversity but
be unchangeable geographical items (e.g. forests). Non-agricultural landscape characteristics
might also be roads or other infrastructure that could have negative impacts on species habitats. In
future work, more detailed non-agricultural landscape features need to be taken into account.
Moreover, different soil parameters could be included for the study area. Soil quality influence
cropping decisions due to differences in yield levels. These could be modeled via yield functions
that depend on several components such as precipitation, soils, and temperature as, for example, in
Sheridan (2010). In addition to the classical yield function, however, ecosystem services such as
pollination may also influence certain crop yields (Isaacs et al., 2017). If other farming practices
such as drilling or soil conversion measurements were covered by the model, soil and water
erosion could also be addressed. Then, the decision on a certain soil treatment feeds back on the
production function. This can be reflected in the form of a nature production function influencing
income and hence, farmers’ decision making. Feedback loops that influence crop yields are linked
to the economic domain via the ‘patch’ scale (see Figure 6.1). If at the ecological ‘patch’ scale,
ES are low due to low biodiversity grounded in low landscape heterogeneity, low crop diversity,
few semi-natural landscape elements, or other (missing) landscape features, yield levels might
decrease. This in turn affects the economic domain since farm viability might also decrease due
to lower and/or insecure income. Similar to other domain-scale combinations, such a regime shift
might trigger changes in other domain-scale combinations at the regional scale. For example,
more farms might quit the agricultural sector with further impacts on the labour market and on the
rural population as already described above. Assessments of how the absence of ES at the patch
scale affects the economic farm scale are urgently needed in order to estimate future regional
landscape pattern developments (Cong et al., 2016).
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Figure 6.1.: Main variables of the possible interactions between different domains and scales
including a feedback loop at the ecological patch scale. Figure adapted from Kinzig
et al. (2006).
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In any case, our model is predestined to implement feedback loops of flowering strips in order
to design a landscape pattern bio-economic model including a nature production function. It is
further capable to compare different policy designs and reveals insights into changes in the matrix
quality and pollination services over time. Furthermore, in order to design spatially targeted
policies for habitat conservation, spatially explicit habitat functions can be coupled with our
economic model. If ecological feedbacks are integrated into the model, the following research
questions can be raised:
• Is there a natural threshold regarding structural change?
• How can political measures be designed in order to improve spatial targeting?
Consequently, the spatially explicit modeling of landscape structures can result in win-win
situations since optimal distributions in the sense of cost-saving implementations can be achieved
(Wossink et al., 1998; Havlík et al., 2008; Bamière et al., 2011).
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Chapter 7.
Summary
Agro-ecosystems form a major part of today’s habitats worldwide (FAO, 2017). Their main
function is to deliver food and fibers in order to feed the growing population (Alexandratos
and Bruinsma, 2012). However, agricultural land management is expected to provide multiple
functions such as biomass production, the provision of cultural heritage, or mitigation of climate-
relevant gases (De Groot, 2006; Kremen, 2005). Furthermore, land use within agro-ecosystems
determines biodiversity and is driven by agricultural activities (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment,
2005). Agricultural ecosystems underlie permanent physical changes that affect species distri-
bution, whilst political targets to protect biodiversity and ecosystem services fail (Pe’er et al.,
2014; Leadley et al., 2014; European Commission, 2015). With its newest nature conservation
offensive, the German federal agency for environmental protection acknowledged the malfunc-
tions of reaching the German and European biodiversity targets (BMBU, 2015). Similarly, the
mid-term review of the European Commission confirms the poor situation of ecosystems within
the whole EU and especially in agriculturally related habitats (European Commission, 2015). This
is why the BMBU (2015) proposed proofing the new CAP with respect to its efficacy in protecting
ecosystems. They doubt that the new greening measures and cross-compliance obligations of the
new CAP reform 2020 can contribute in order to reach the biodiversity goals and therefore urge
changing the current governmental payment system.
For a political impact assessment on biodiversity issues, the whole landscape including its
geological diversity (Gray, 2005) and biological characteristics needs to be considered (Parks
and Mulligan, 2010). This comprises not only agricultural and silvicultural areas but also non-
agricultural areas such as natural landscape elements or infrastructure. On top of these spatial
scales, assessing political impacts on agricultural production and cultural landscape appearance
needs to explore temporal and spatial farming decision scales (Cohen and Crowder, 2017). With
respect to the past failures in meeting several political goals within the agricultural sector, a better
interdisciplinary collaboration, especially between agronomists and landscape-oriented researchers
is required (Banks, 2004). Therefore, ecologists and geographers, as well as economists interested
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in agro-ecosystems, need to work together since it is central to understand the spatial organization
of farmers’ decision making (Rizzo et al., 2013).
Collaboration, though, requires a systemic approach that considers all patterns and processes of
socio-ecological systems. The concept of socio-ecological resilience shifts the way of thinking to
a broader perspective of system interactions at multiple scales (Anderies et al., 2006). It considers
all scales and domains of a socio-ecological system: the field, farm, and landscape scale, as
well as the economic, ecological, and socio-cultural domain. Changes within one scale-domain
combination can trigger other scale shifts (Kinzig et al., 2006), which might lead to a highly
resistant and undesired new ‘basins of attraction’ (Matthews and Selman, 2006). Taking into
account several domains and scales might improve political impact analyses and the assessment of
future landscape developments (Kinzig et al., 2006; Anderies et al., 2006). For example, structural
change processes within the agricultural sector take place slowly but most irreversibly influence
the landscape mosaic in the form of field sizes, natural and semi-natural habitats, and cropping
heterogeneity (Jones et al., 2016; Khoury et al., 2014; Hötker and Leuschner, 2014).
Most agro-environmental studies have not considered important structural change processes
within the agricultural sector, although this had massive influences on landscape constitution
during the last decades (Kenny, 2017). Long-term farming decisions contain not only cropping
decisions or the question of participation in environmental measures, they also include investment
decisions, branch considerations, and the difficulty finding a farm successor. Against the back-
ground of demographic changes and urban migration (Knickel et al., 2017), farming takeovers
became a lifestyle decision (Manos et al., 2013).
FOLAS combined the agricultural land use decisions of farmers with economical principles
of cost reductions, namely economies of size being a driver of structural change. We defined
structural change as the increase in field sizes, the reduction in the amount of farms, and a less
diverse farm type structure due to the reduction of farm types. We further used the concept of
socio-ecological resilience in order to apply an impact assessment of the new CAP reform 2020
for a small research area. As described above, a switch from one to another basin of attraction
is determined by the resilience of a SES. We applied a conceptual framework based on Kinzig
et al. (2006), which allowed us to operationalize resilience thinking by defining critical threshold
levels for three domain-scale combinations and tested, if the thresholds were crossed within the
model runs. According to studies, threshold crossings indicated regime shifts and altered whole
socio-ecological systems (Kinzig et al., 2006). Our specified thresholds were (1) the loss of farm
types, (2) a defined reduction of farms, and (3) a certain level of field sizes. In addition, our study
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captures spatial aspects of farmers’ decision making regarding farm and field sizes combined with
land use changes affecting the landscape appearance. With our novel spatial approach we seek to
improve the interdisciplinary work within landscape research. It simulates farmers’ decisions at
several scales. At the field scale it takes into account field sizes. Each farmer is represented by
a certain consolidated cropping area on which field size and cropping decisions take place (the
farm scale). Neighbouring farmers are linked together via land leases. Modeling farm interactions
allowed us to simulate landscape changes at higher scales. Adapted to statistical information
of the case study, several farm types and sizes were differentiated. In an iterative process, short
and long-term farming decisions were simulated using a combination of linear mixed integer
and non-linear programming models that underlie certain spatial and temporal assumptions (see
section 2.4.2.2). The model results were visualized with a certain spatial outlay in a stylized
rectangular form using GIS. Based on these maps, three different biodiversity indicators linked to
landscape heterogeneity were applied (see section 4.3). This spatial model component forms a
valuable interface between economic and ecological models.
FOLAS was applied to a small municipality of around 15 km2 lying in the heart of one of the
most intensively used agricultural area in Wetterau county in Hesse, Germany. Three different
policy designs were tested: (1) CAP I, which is adapted to the new CAP 2020 reform; (2) CAP II
with a stricter CAP 2020 reform, probably entering into force in 2018; and (3) a ‘nature-focused’
policy design with a completely different governmental payment structure based on incentive-
based payments for environmental measurements. In order to test in how far the socio-ecological
system of our case study was influenced by the CAP 2020 reform, all three scenarios were
analyzed with respect to potential regime shifts within several domains and scales according to
Kinzig et al. (2006). In a second step, we analyzed the political impacts on species diversity
within our case study.
Results showed that in the CAP I and II policy designs, all critical thresholds indicating a
scale-domain regime shift were crossed. A shift into another new regime seems to be inevitable,
although it is less desired from a social and cultural perspective. All three biodiversity indicators
had negative trends. The new ‘CAP towards 2020’ reform seems to be ineffective in reaching
the biodiversity targets of the EC within our case study. On the contrary, it accelerated structural
change and led to a more homogeneous landscape due to fewer farms and bigger fields. It has to be
noted that the Simpson’s diversity index improved compared to no policy reform. However, semi-
natural habitats conglomerated in areas where already a larger amount of semi-natural habitats
occurred. Since the abundance and distribution of semi-natural habitats determine pollinator
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dispersion (Tischendorf and Fahrig, 2000), species diversity will most probably decrease within
our study area. In the CAP II policy design, resulting field sizes were highest. Therefore, we
expect species’ movements and the dispersion of pollinators to be lower after structural change
processes since with increasing field sizes fewer field margins remained. Crop pollination might
become difficult for some areas.
Within the ‘nature-focused’ policy design, two of three critical thresholds were reached. This
policy scheme is less labour intensive and structural change processes were slower since fewer
farms closed down. It had significant positive impacts on our chosen biodiversity indicators and
seemed to be superior with respect to achieving the EC biodiversity targets. Due to incentive-based
environmental measurements, many more semi-natural habitats in the form of flowering strips
and fields have emerged. However, in order to compensate income losses of the ‘nature-focused’
policy design, structural change seem to be required (although of lesser magnitude) so that fewer
farms use EoS and share the available amount of land.
In all policy designs, dairy farmers quit the agricultural sector, which led to a less diverse crop-
ping pattern at the municipality level. Farm type losses and the resulting cropping homogeneity
could not be compensated by either the crop diversity strategy of the new CAP reform or the
implementation of EFAs. Since dairy farming requires more labour, the labour market at the
regional scale could be affected. In consequence, the rural population might further shrink and
rural areas become less attractive (Knickel et al., 2017). Therefore, it is advisable to maintain
dairy farms. If this is pursued, though, particular support is needed. We found out that already
small income reductions led to farm closures in the long run. More investigations are needed to
assess the requirements to maintain dairy farming, if this is politically pursued. This is why we
even more need a long-term perspective in political impact assessments.
The single environmental measurement for EFAs chosen by farmers was the cultivation of
legumes. Planting hedges or leaving land fallow were not profitable. However, this unified picture
may also be related to methodological issues regarding space. Soil quality determines cropping
decisions as well. If, for example, biophysical information had been included, farming decisions
might have been more diverse. Furthermore, hedges that already exist would most probably have
been maintained. Therefore, fixed landscape elements lying adjacent to or within the agricultural
area need to be considered in farming decisions and in the calculation of biodiversity indicators.
But also spatial scales can be improved. In order to capture the temporal scale more explicitly, (1)
implementing investment decisions, and (2) modeling crop rotation schemes are highly suggested.
Agricultural policy instruments are crucial in determining future ecosystem health and species
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diversity (Leventon et al., 2017; Bartolini and Viaggi, 2013; Gomez y Paloma et al., 2013). How-
ever, political measures and reforms are often spatially ill targeted since they need to cover a huge
variety of different landscape structures (Marcos-Martinez et al., 2017; Leventon et al., 2017). A
wise use of political regulations and incentives, as well as a clear idea of socio-cultural values
has the potential to control future developments (Manos et al., 2013; Petrick and Zier, 2012).
In order to understand the dynamics of agro-ecosystems, several scales and domains need to be
considered so that interacting single regime-shifts are identified (Anderies et al., 2006; Berkes
et al., 2003; Folke, 2006; Walker and Salt, 2006). FOLAS captures a long time frame and is
adapted to the local and spatial production conditions. It therefore lays an important cornerstone
for the development of spatially and temporally explicit bio-economic models.
How the agricultural area in Wöllstadt would look in the future will strongly depend on
governmental incentives and legal framework conditions. These are affected by socio-cultural
aspects that influence the political sphere and new institutions. In most studies, however, such
aspects are neglected, and often detrimental one-way paths are detected too late (Matthews and
Selman, 2006).
The introductory song lyric ought to remind us of the socio-cultural context of socio-ecological
systems. After flowers, girls, men, and soldiers were gone, also their graveyards disappeared.
The song asks where they went, and the answer is ‘long time passing.’ It seems that there is
no reason to ask why they went, because the reason is known and somehow endured. Each
verse ends with the beginning of the next one. Here, the scale-domain interrelations become
obvious: slow changes in the reference systems of the socio-cultural domain might have the power
to induce encompassing regime shifts of the whole socio-ecological system. Socio-ecological
systems are dynamic, and their parts are interconnected. Changes in one part bring about changes
in other parts, and seemingly insignificant shifts can trigger a whole system to change. Some
changes within a society run very slowly and in the background, while others are obvious and
fast (Kinzig et al., 2006). The structural change in agriculture is one of those developments that
happens slowly with less notice from a large part of society. Structural change has impacts on
the landscape and has already had severe impacts on species diversity (Khoury et al., 2014). The
environment creates feedback if certain thresholds are crossed or if the ecosystem is degraded
(Pearce, 2007). However, action might be too late, which is why we need spatially and temporally
in-depth political impact assessments in order to protect public goods.
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A. Data: Landscape transformation
Figure A.1.: Landscape transformation via GIS: aggregated farms and rectangular stylized deci-
sion units within the study area.
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Appendix C.
Data: Farm sizes
Table C.1.: Initial farm sizes of the baseline model and field lengths of the stylized rectangular
farms.
Farm Field length [m] Farm size [ha]
1 671.63 37.64
2 671.63 48.82
3 774.68 52.03
4 774.68 45.81
5 591.34 59.95
6 591.34 54.54
7 922.30 40.98
8 922.30 36.68
9 702.50 64.79
10 702.50 57.7
11 900.00 36.41
12 900.00 45.3
13 900.00 43.71
14 950.00 60.48
15 950.00 72.92
16 482.63 32.03
17 482.63 37.02
18 482.63 45.85
19 647.05 61.47
20 647.05 111.31
21 910.90 32.49
22 910.90 58.94
23 910.90 52.80
24 910.90 47.41
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Data: Grain price volatilities
XXII
D. Data: Grain price volatilities
H
Figure D.1.: Density functions for grain prices: Darmstadt district (2000/01 - 2014/15). Source:
Ktbl (2016).
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Appendix E.
Data: Crop prices
Table E.1.: Crop prices used as parameters for the model in Euros/dt, their year of collection,
regional scale, and references.
Activity Price [Euros/dt] Year Regional scale Source
Winter wheat 20 2010/11 Darmstadt district Ktbl (2016)
Sugar beets 2.98 2010/11 Darmstadt district Ktbl (2016)
Rapeseed 40.72 2010/11 Darmstadt district Ktbl (2016)
Winter barley 17.8 2010/11 Darmstadt district Ktbl (2016)
Permanent grassland - grass silage 2.594 2011 Hesse LLH (2012)
Permanent grassland - hay 9 - - Internal farm price*
Potatoes 25.08 2010/11 Darmstadt district Ktbl (2016)
Winter rye 19.15 2010/11 Darmstadt district Ktbl (2016)
Fallow 0 - - -
Silo maize 2.8 2010/11 Darmstadt district Ktbl (2016)
Silo maize for biogas plants 3.75 2011 Hesse LLH (2012)
Corn cob mix 8.7 2012 Germany Ktbl (2013a)
Corn maize 16.2 2015 Hesse LLH (2015)
Weeds - grass silage 6.8 2011 Hesse LLH (2012)
Triticale 17.7 2010/11 Darmstadt district Ktbl (2016)
Summer peas 17.82 2010/11 Darmstadt district Ktbl (2016)
Dairy 2,368** 2012 Germany Ktbl (2013b)
Pig fattening 1,047.2*** 2012 Germany Ktbl (2013b)
*calibrated
**revenue (including milk, slaughter, and calves per stable place per year)
***revenue per stable place per year
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Appendix F.
Data: Fodder crops
Table F.1.: Fodder crops and their nutritional contents. Source: LfL (2017).
Fodder crop Energy [GJ/dt] Proteins [kg/dt] RNB Dry matter [kg/dt]
Winter wheat 0.7421 14.79 -5 0.87
Winter barley 0.7038 14.18 -6 0.87
Permanent grassland - grass silage 0.2448 5.4 3 0.4
Permanent grassland - hay 0.4764 11.09 2 0.86
Winter rye 0.7325 14.09 -8 0.87
Silo maize 0.2352 4.69 -8 0.35
Corn cob mix 0.4764 9.54 -9 0.6
Corn maize 0.7291 14.62 -10 0.87
Weeds - grass silage 0.1957 4.59 3 0.17
Triticale 0.7212 14.09 -6 0.87
Summer peas 0.7378 16.18 12 0.87
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Data: Crop yields
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G. Data: Crop yields
Ta
bl
e
G
.1
.:
Y
ie
ld
le
ve
ls
us
ed
as
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
fo
rt
he
m
od
el
in
dt
pe
rh
a,
th
ei
ry
ea
ro
fc
ol
le
ct
io
n,
re
gi
on
al
sc
al
e,
an
d
re
fe
re
nc
es
.
C
ro
p
Y
ie
ld
[d
t/h
a]
Y
ea
r
R
eg
io
na
ls
ca
le
So
ur
ce
W
in
te
rw
he
at
79
.6
20
11
W
et
te
ra
u
co
un
ty
H
es
si
sc
he
s
St
at
is
tis
ch
es
L
an
de
sa
m
t(
20
12
d)
Su
ga
rb
ee
ts
79
1
20
11
W
et
te
ra
u
co
un
ty
H
es
si
sc
he
s
St
at
is
tis
ch
es
L
an
de
sa
m
t(
20
12
d)
R
ap
es
ee
d
38
.5
20
11
W
et
te
ra
u
co
un
ty
H
es
si
sc
he
s
St
at
is
tis
ch
es
L
an
de
sa
m
t(
20
12
d)
W
in
te
rb
ar
le
y
69
.8
20
11
W
et
te
ra
u
co
un
ty
H
es
si
sc
he
s
St
at
is
tis
ch
es
L
an
de
sa
m
t(
20
12
d)
Pe
rm
an
en
tg
ra
ss
la
nd
-g
ra
ss
si
la
ge
28
0
20
11
H
es
se
L
L
H
(2
01
2)
Pe
rm
an
en
tg
ra
ss
la
nd
-h
ay
57
.5
20
12
G
er
m
an
y
K
tb
l(
20
13
a)
Po
ta
to
es
44
4.
8
20
11
W
et
te
ra
u
co
un
ty
H
es
si
sc
he
s
St
at
is
tis
ch
es
L
an
de
sa
m
t(
20
12
d)
W
in
te
rr
ye
58
.3
20
10
/1
1
D
ar
m
st
ad
td
is
tr
ic
t
K
tb
l(
20
16
)
Fa
llo
w
0
-
-
-
Si
lo
m
ai
ze
47
3
20
10
/1
1
D
ar
m
st
ad
td
is
tr
ic
t
K
tb
l(
20
16
)
Si
lo
m
ai
ze
fo
rb
io
ga
s
pl
an
ts
50
0
20
11
H
es
se
L
L
H
(2
01
2)
C
or
n
co
b
m
ix
94
.8
20
11
H
es
se
H
es
si
sc
he
s
St
at
is
tis
ch
es
L
an
de
sa
m
t(
20
12
d)
C
or
n
m
ai
ze
93
.7
20
10
/1
1
D
ar
m
st
ad
td
is
tr
ic
t
K
tb
l(
20
16
)
W
ee
ds
-g
ra
ss
si
la
ge
36
0
20
11
H
es
se
L
L
H
(2
01
2)
Tr
iti
ca
le
60
20
10
/1
1
D
ar
m
st
ad
td
is
tr
ic
t
K
tb
l(
20
16
)
Su
m
m
er
pe
as
30
.9
20
11
H
es
se
H
es
si
sc
he
s
St
at
is
tis
ch
es
L
an
de
sa
m
t(
20
12
d)
XXVII
H
Appendix H.
Data: Labour coefficients
Table H.1.: Labour coefficients of the model activities in Akh/ha or stable place and year for
different field sizes and livestock keeping activities. Source: Ktbl (2013a,b)
Model activity 2 ha 5 ha 10 ha per stable place and year
Winter wheat 7.67 5.75 5.13 -
Sugar beets 5.91 4.56 4.06 -
Rapeseed 6.64 4.96 4.39 -
Winter barley 7.13 5.41 4.83 -
Permanent grassland - grass silage 12.09 10.42 10.42 -
Permanent grassland - hay 10.13 8.47 7.62 -
Potatoes 28.1 24.57 23.31 -
Winter rye 6.58 4.97 4.44 -
Fallow* 0.66 0.66 0.66 -
Silo maize 10.58 9.33 8.52 -
Silo maize for biogas plants 9.79 8.57 7.78 -
Corn cob mix 7.07 6.04 5.65 -
Corn maize 6.66 5.39 4.93 -
Weeds - grass silage 19.2 17.03 16.23 -
Triticale 6.69 5.06 4.53 -
Summer peas 5.9 4.51 3.99 -
Dairy - - - 44.33
Pig fattening - - - 1.02
*maintenance: mulching (5.5 m working width)
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Appendix I.
Data: Proximity functions
Table I.1.: Proximity functions for each crop: machine costs per labour hour. Calculated based on
data from Ktbl (2013a).
Crop Machine costs per labour hour R2
Winter wheat f(x) = 12.975x+ 106.97 0.9998
Sugar beets f(x) = 18.365x+ 147.93 0.9988
Rapeseed f(x) = 13.386x+ 117.98 0.9999
Barley f(x) = 13.1x+ 103.84 0.9999
Potatoes f(x) = 12.465x+ 302.02 0.9995
Maize (silage) f(x) = 11.036x+ 142.41 0.9945
Corn cob mix f(x) = 13.673x+ 115.61 0.9998
Permanent grassland (silage) f(x) = 10.625x+ 319.16 0.9997
Permanent grassland (hay) f(x) = 10.865x+ 161.16 0.9998
Grasses (silage) f(x) = 11.535x+ 549.36 0.9995
Triticale f(x) = 13.64x+ 97.961 0.9992
Rye f(x) = 13.731x+ 99.393 0.9993
Maize (silage biogas) f(x) = 10.714x+ 152.57 0.9748
Corn maize f(x) = 12.649x+ 375.21 0.9989
Summer peas f(x) = 14.408x+ 98.955 0.9996
XXIX
I. Data: Proximity functions
Table I.2.: Logarithmic proximity functions for each crop: labour hours per field size. Calculated
based on data from Ktbl (2013a).
Crop Labour hours per field size R2
Winter wheat f(x) = −1.833ln(x) + 9.5183 0.8956
Sugar beets f(x) = −1.257ln(x) + 7.1173 0.9053
Rapeseed f(x) = −1.58ln(x) + 8.2004 0.899
Barley f(x) = −1.637ln(x) + 8.7727 0.8952
Potatoes (permanent employees) f(x) = −2.733ln(x) + 20.646 0.8892
Potatoes (seasonal workers) f(x) = −0.926ln(x) + 11.3 0.928
Maize (silage) f(x) = −1.382ln(x) + 12.061 0.872
Corn cob mix f(x) = −0.988ln(x) + 8.0582 0.8944
Permanent grassland (silage) f(x) = −1.631ln(x) + 13.832 0.8657
Permanent grassland (hay) f(x) = −1.58ln(x) + 11.715 0.893
Grasses (silage) f(x) = −2.14ln(x) + 21.487 0.8661
Triticale f(x) = −1.534ln(x) + 8.2179 0.8962
Rye f(x) = −1.515ln(x) + 8.0837 0.8979
Maize (biogas) f(x) = −1.349ln(x) + 11.253 0.8637
Corn maize f(x) = −1.241ln(x) + 7.9384 0.8871
Summer peas f(x) = −1.334ln(x) + 7.2316 0.8962
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Appendix J.
Data: EoS Approximations
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Appendix K.
Data: Financial and cost
coefficients
Table K.1.: Financial and cost coefficients of the model activities. Source: Ktbl (2013a,b)
Activity Financial coeffi-
cients [Euro/ha]
Variable costs
[Euro/ha]
Direct costs
[Euro/ha]
Machine cost
coefficients
[Euro/ha]
Winter wheat 64.76 992.08 766.47 12.975
Sugar beets 61.14 1371.84 1096.10 18.365
Rapeseed 61.21 987.64 759.45 13.386
Winter barley 58.38 799.08 593.03 13.100
Permanent grassland - grass silage 50.5 834.25 386.22 10.625
Permanent grassland - hay 32.14 295.37 100.37 10.865
Potatoes 328.88 3270.81 2584.28 12.465
Winter rye 56.32 740 536.19 13.731
Fallow 2.97 638.04* 638.04 -
Silo maize 97.22 867.5 620.45 11.036
Silo maize for biogas plants 63.86 714.58 435.15 10.714
Corn cob mix 68.68 834.53 506.58 13.673
Corn maize 61.69 951.85 488.32 12.649
Weeds - grass silage 79.85 915.67 501.94 11.535
Triticale 56.32 737.86 532.13 13.640
Summer peas 54.4 535.21 349.36 14.408
Dairy 59.11 1032 - -
Pig fattening 3.77 1016.4 - -
*Opportunity costs for wheat production plus machine costs for mulching
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Appendix L.
Results: Land use patterns
Table L.1.: Baseline land use results of the linear programming iterations as a % of the cropping
area at the municipality level compared to statistical data of the calibration year
(received from HLUG).
Crop [%] 1st iteration Statistics 2011 2nd iteration 4th iteration
Wheat 50.0 51.7 50.0 50.0
Sugar beets 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4
Rapeseed 22.3 10.6 22.3 24.2
Barley 0.7 7.9 0.7 0.7
Potatoes 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Rye - 1.3 0 0
Silage maize 0.5 0.6 0.5 -
Silage maize (biogas) 1.0 0.6 (n.d) 1.0 1.0
Corn maize 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.3
Triticale - 0.2 - -
Corn cob mix - - - -
Summer peas - - - -
Grass silage (permanent grassland) 1.1 n.d (5 %) 1.1 -
Hay (permanent grassland) 3.9 n.d (5 %) 3.9 5.0
Weed silage 0.8 - 0.8 -
Summer peas - - - -
Flowering strips 0.11 n.d 0.11 0.11
XXXIV
L. Results: Land use patterns
Table L.2.: Land use results of the linear programming iterations as a % of the cropping area at
the municipality level for the sensitivity analysis on grain prices.
Crop [%] 1st iteration 2nd iteration 4th iteration
Wheat 0.2 0.2 0.1
Sugar beets 16.4 16.4 16.4
Rapeseed 25.0 25.0 25.0
Barley 0.7 0.7 0.4
Potatoes 2.3 2.3 2.3
Silage maize 0.4 0.4 -
Silage maize (biogas) 1.0 1.0 1.0
Corn maize 46.7 48.1 49.6
Corn cob mix - - -
Grass silage (permanent grassland) 0.8 1.2 -
Hay (permanent grassland) 4.2 3.8 5.0
Weed silage 0.4 0.8 -
Summer peas 1.7 - -
Flowering strips 0.11 0.11 0.11
Table L.3.: Land use results of the linear programming iterations as a % of the cropping area at
the municipality level for the sensitivity analysis on higher and lower land rent prices.
Crop [%] 1st iteration 2nd iteration 4th iterationHigh Low High Low High Low
Wheat 50 50 50 50 50 50
Sugar beets 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4
Rape seeds 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 24.2 24.5
Barley 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5
Potatoes 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Silage maize 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 - -
Silage maize (biogas) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Corn maize 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.2
Corn-Cobb mix - - - - - -
Grass silage (permanent grassland) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 - -
Hay (permanent grassland) 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 5 5
Weed silage 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 - -
Summer peas - - - - - -
Flowering strips 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
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L. Results: Land use patterns
Table L.4.: Land use results of the 2nd and 4th iterations for all three scenarios as a percentage of
the agricultural area at the municipality level.
CAP I CAP II ’Nature-focus’
Crop type 2nd iteration 4th iteration 2nd iteration 4th iteration 2nd iteration 4th iteration
Wheat 49.8 50.0 49.8 50 46.8 50
Sugar beets 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4
Rape seeds 14.7 16.3 12.0 13.6 3.9 2.4
Barley 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7
Potatoes 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Rye - - - - - -
Silage maize 0.6 - 0.6 - 0.6 -
Silage maize (biogas) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Corn maize 0.4 0.03 0.3 0.06 0.3 0.06
Triticale - - - - - -
Corn-Cobb mix - - - - - -
Grass silage (permanent
grassland)
0.9 - 0.8 - 0.8 -
Hay (permanent grass-
land)
4.1 5.0 4.1 5.0 4.2 5.0
Weed silage 0.8 - 0.8 - 0.8 -
Summer peas 7.1 7.1 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Flowering strips/fields 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 11.1 11.1
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Appendix M.
Results: Grassland farms
Table M.1.: Farms with permanent grassland in ha and distribution to farm types. Results are
the same for the baseline model as well as for the sensitivity analyses on lower and
higher land rents.
Farm Grassland area [ha] Farm type
Farm 9 17.4 Dairy producing farm
Farm 17 9.7 Dairy producing farm
Farm 19 17.4 Dairy producing farm
Farm 22 17.4 Dairy producing farm
Table M.2.: Farms with permanent grassland in ha from the 1st iteration of the sensitivity analysis
on grain prices and distribution to farm types.
Farm Grassland area [ha] Farm type
Farm 2 1.3 Arable farm
Farm 6 2.4 Arable farm
Farm 9 10.5 Dairy producing farm
Farm 17 14.6 Dairy producing farm
Farm 19 14.0 Dairy producing farm
Farm 21 1.1 Pig farm
Farm 22 17.9 Dairy producing farm
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Appendix N.
Results: Total gross margins
Table N.1.: Total gross margins (TGMs) of the 1st and 2nd iterations of the baseline model per
farm in Euros.
Farm Farm size [ha] TGM 1st iteration [Euros] TGM 2nd iteration [Euros]
1 37.7 38,435 42,942
2 48.8 70,337 47,772
3 52.0 48,625 118,199
4 45.8 44,657 45,428
5 60.0 70,947 76,529
6 54.5 51,306 52,224
7 41.0 40,979 41,668
8 36.7 37,013 38,321
9 64.8 66,526 66,871
10 57.7 52,944 53,920
11 36.4 79,109 37,347
12 45.3 66,473 45,031
13 43.7 50,090 43,030
14 60.5 63,314 56,848
15 72.9 65,305 164,294
16 32.0 34,162 34,701
17 37.0 50,528 51,537
18 45.9 68,075 41,571
19 61.5 63,010 64,727
20 111.3 93,419 96,427
21 32.5 33,743 34,294
22 58.9 61,654 64,710
23 52.8 96,755 50,870
24 47.4 44,693 46,674
XXXVIII
N. Results: Total gross margins
Table N.2.: Total gross margins (TGMs) of the 4th iteration of the baseline model per farm in
Euros.
Farm TGM [Euros] Farm size [ha]
1 73,147 74.4
2 14,182 12.1
3 93,124 97.8
4 0 0
5 107,011 114.5
6 0 0
7 43,869 43.1
8 36,560 34.5
9 0 0
10 100,023 122.5
11 20,152 18.1
12 163,357 74.8
13 32,961 32.5
14 0 0
15 122,652 133.4
16 62,471 73.6
17 0 0
18 97,889 41.3
19 0 0
20 183,990 172.8
21 76,820 91.43
22 0 0
23 53,637 55.5
24 44,474 44.7
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Appendix O.
Results: Feeding practices
Table O.1.: Feeding practices of all pig fattening farms for the linear programming iterations.
Farm Wheat [dt] Barley [dt] Corn maize [dt] Hay [dt]
1st iteration
3 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
10 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
11 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
13 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
21 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
2nd iteration
3 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
10 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
11 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
13 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
21 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
4th iteration
3 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
10 210.3 118.3 - 152.7
11 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
13 210.3 118.3 99.7 -
21 210.3 118.3 - 152.7
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Appendix P.
Results: Labour
Table P.1.: Off-farm and hired labour per farm for the 1st iteration of the baseline model.
Farm Farm size [ha] Off-farm labour [hours] Hired labour [hours]
1 37.64 734 -
2 48.82 579 -
3 52.03 600 -
4 45.81 677 -
5 59.95 527 -
6 54.54 616 -
7 40.98 711 -
8 36.68 733 -
9 64.79 - 673
10 57.7 561 -
11 36.41 569 -
12 45.3 590 -
13 43.71 633 -
14 60.48 550 -
15 72.92 488 -
16 32.03 773 -
17 37.02 - 453
18 45.85 599 -
19 61.47 - 656
20 111.31 208 -
21 32.49 737 -
22 58.94 - 635
23 52.80 473 -
24 47.41 653 -
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P. Results: Labour
Table P.2.: Off-farm and hired labour per farm for the 2nd iteration of the baseline model.
Farm Farm size [ha] Off-farm labour [hours] Hired labour [hours]
1 37.64 783 -
2 48.82 740 -
3 52.03 485 -
4 45.81 756 -
5 59.95 622 -
6 54.54 710 -
7 40.98 781 -
8 36.68 804 -
9 64.79 - 563
10 57.7 661 -
11 36.41 772 -
12 45.3 759 -
13 43.71 734 -
14 60.48 679 -
15 72.92 322 -
16 32.03 828 -
17 37.02 - 387
18 45.85 710 -
19 61.47 - 545
20 111.31 412 -
21 32.49 793 -
22 58.94 - 527
23 52.80 719 -
24 47.41 748 -
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P. Results: Labour
Table P.3.: Off-farm and hired labour per farm for the 4th iteration of the baseline model.
Farm Farm size [ha] Off-farm labour [hours] Hired labour [hours]
1 73,147 647 -
2 14,182 940 -
3 93,124 507 -
4 0 - -
5 107,011 461 -
6 0 - -
7 43,869 795 -
8 36,560 835 -
9 0 - -
10 100,023 327 -
11 20,152 870 -
12 163,357 386 -
13 32,961 812 -
14 0 - -
15 122,652 373 -
16 62,471 586 -
17 0 - -
18 97,889 645 -
19 0 - -
20 183,990 0 -
21 76,820 476 -
22 0 - -
23 53,637 737 -
24 44,474 787 -
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P. Results: Labour
Table P.4.: Off-farm and hired labour per farm for the 1st iteration of the sensitivity analysis on
grain prices.
Farm Farm size [ha] Off-farm labour [hours] Hired labour [hours]
1 37.64 749 -
2 48.82 671 -
3 52.03 621 -
4 45.81 697 -
5 59.95 587 -
6 54.54 620 -
7 40.98 731 -
8 36.68 753 -
9 64.79 - 7
10 57.7 309 -
11 36.41 566 -
12 45.3 695 -
13 43.71 679 -
14 60.48 599 -
15 72.92 470 -
16 32.03 789 -
17 37.02 107 -
18 45.85 648 -
19 61.47 - 600
20 111.31 266 -
21 32.49 675 -
22 58.94 - 593
23 52.80 651 -
24 47.41 690 -
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P. Results: Labour
Table P.5.: Off-farm and hired labour per farm for the 2nd iteration of the sensitivity analysis on
grain prices.
Farm Farm size [ha] Off-farm labour [hours] Hired labour [hours]
1 37.64 798 -
2 48.82 506 -
3 52.03 700 -
4 45.81 762 -
5 59.95 690 -
6 54.54 701 -
7 40.98 780 -
8 36.68 809 -
9 64.79 - 509
10 57.7 671 -
11 36.41 731 -
12 45.3 765 -
13 43.71 735 -
14 60.48 677 -
15 72.92 624 -
16 32.03 827 -
17 37.02 - 387
18 45.85 586 -
19 61.47 - 507
20 111.31 427 -
21 32.49 673 -
22 58.94 - 507
23 52.80 727 -
24 47.41 754 -
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P. Results: Labour
Table P.6.: Off-farm and hired labour per farm for the 4th iteration of the sensitivity analysis on
grain prices.
Farm Farm size [ha] Off-farm labour [hours] Hired labour [hours]
1 - - -
2 86.46 329 -
3 23.51 856 -
4 74.33 650 -
5 114.49 461 -
6 - - -
7 - - -
8 77.66 634 -
9 - - -
10 122.49 202 -
11 125.42 387 -
12 - - -
13 - - -
14 - - -
15 133.4 279 -
16 - - -
17 - - -
18 114.9 406 -
19 - - -
20 172.78 127 -
21 91.43 496 -
22 - - -
23 55.48 739 -
24 44.73 790 -
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P. Results: Labour
Table P.7.: Farm sizes in ha and off-farm labour in hours of the 4th iteration of the alternate policy
designs.
CAP I CAP II ‘nature-focused’
Farm Size [ha] Off-farm [hours] Size [ha] Off-farm [hours] Size [ha] Off-farm [hours]
1 - - 86.5 350 37.8 641
2 86.5 573 - - 48.7 723
3 97.8 259 97.8 454 56.7 719
4 - - - - 41.2 610
5 - - 62.6 704 114.5 411
6 114.5 463 51.8 559 - -
7 - - 77.7 635 43.1 809
8 77.7 635 - - 34.5 847
9 - - - - - -
10 122.5 156 122.5 341 122.5 341
11 39.1 783 8.2 926 8.3 927
12 53.2 749 59.1 722 80.5 648
13 33.1 811 58.2 694 36.6 698
14 54.4 608 133.4 377 133.4 419
15 79.0 629 - - - -
16 54.1 744 37.7 822 37.7 833
17 - - - - - -
18 60.8 679 77.2 601 77.2 628
19 - - - - - -
20 172.8 127 172.8 - 172.8 110
21 91.4 483 91.4 483 91.4 494
22 - - - - - -
23 45.1 786 74.8 650 85.3 622
24 55.1 697 25.4 878 14.9 931
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Appendix Q.
Results: Biodiversity indicators
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